DOP-C02 Exam Dumps : AWS Certified DevOps Engineer - Professional

Only the Organizations management account (or roles in that account) can call organizations:CreateAccount directly. When moving the Lambda function to a different (dedicated) account, the correct pattern is to perform cross-account role assumption into a role that resides in the management account and has tightly scoped Organizations permissions.

Option A describes exactly this:

Create an IAM role in the management account with only the required Organizations permissions (for example, organizations:CreateAccount and related read permissions).

Configure the trust policy on that role to allow it to be assumed by the Lambda execution role in the new account.

Update the Lambda code to call sts:AssumeRole into the management-account role before invoking the Organizations API.

This approach ensures that:

The Lambda function can create new accounts, but only via the management account.

The Lambda execution role in the dedicated account has no direct Organizations permissions; it only has permission to assume the specific role.

Option B is incorrect because “delegated administration for Organizations” in the generic sense is not how CreateAccount is exposed; account creation remains a management-account responsibility. Options C and D either misconfigure trust or introduce unnecessary Control Tower complexity. Cross-account assume-role from the dedicated account into the management account is the correct and least-privilege solution.

To meet the requirements, the DevOps engineer needs to configure the CloudWatch alarm to stop the EC2 instances when the average of the NetworkPacketsIn metric is less than 5 for at least 3 hours in a 12-hour time window. This means that the alarm should trigger when 3 out of 12 datapoints are below the threshold of 5. The alarm should also treat missing data as not breaching the threshold, so that the EC2 instances continue to run if there is no data for the metric during the evaluation period. The DevOps engineer can add an EC2 action to stop the instance when the alarm enters the ALARM state, which is a built-in action type for CloudWatch alarms.

The question emphasizes “MOST securely” and involves a multi-account backup strategy with a centralized backup account. AWS Backup best practice for high-security environments is to use customer managed KMS keys for encrypting backup vaults rather than AWS managed keys. Customer managed keys provide tighter control over key lifecycle, key policies, and cross-account access.

Option A creates encrypted backup vaults in both the source and centralized accounts, each protected by a customer managed KMS key in that account. AWS Backup is then configured to create full EC2 backups (AMIs) and copy them to the centralized backup vault. This design ensures:

Encryption at rest in both accounts.

Independent key control and policies per account.

Secure cross-account backup copy behavior governed by explicit KMS key grants and vault access policies.

Option B incorrectly uses the source account’s KMS key to encrypt vaults in both accounts, which is not the recommended pattern; each account should manage its own CMK. Options C and D rely partially or fully on AWS managed keys, which are less appropriate when the requirement explicitly stresses maximum security and control.

Therefore, Option A best satisfies both the RPO/RTO goals (daily AMI backups with rapid restore) and the strongest encryption posture.