DOP-C02 Exam Dumps : AWS Certified DevOps Engineer - Professional

The requirement is to retry the replication process, not to manually copy the object with PutObject. S3 Batch Replication is built for replicating existing objects and can filter objects by replication status. AWS documentation states that Batch Replication can include objects with ObjectReplicationStatus set to FAILED to retry objects that previously failed replication. S3 Replication metrics also allow S3 Event Notifications when objects fail to replicate to a destination Region. Therefore, Lambda should react to the failed-replication notification and start an S3 Batch Operations Batch Replication job for the failed object. Options A, B, and C manually copy the object, which is not the same as retrying native S3 replication and can mishandle replication semantics, metadata, encryption, ownership, or status tracking.

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To implement a control that requires the use of IMDSv2 on all EC2 instances in the account, the DevOps engineer can use a permissions boundary. A permissions boundary is a policy that defines the maximum permissions that an IAM entity can have. The DevOps engineer can create a permissions boundary that prevents the ec2:RunInstance action if the ec2:MetadataHttpTokens condition key is not set to a value of required. This condition key enforces the use of IMDSv2 on EC2 instances. The DevOps engineer can attach the permissions boundary to the IAM role that was used to launch the instance. This way, any attempt to launch an EC2 instance without using IMDSv2 will be denied by the permissions boundary.

This is a classic AWS Organizations governance design:

Restrict Regions and allowed services across all accounts

The correct Organizations mechanism for account-wide guardrails is a Service Control Policy (SCP) .

SCPs set the maximum permissions that accounts/OUs can use, making them the right tool to enforce “only these Regions” and “only these services” consistently across the org.

Authentication from Active Directory + consistent job-function roles in every account

With AD as the identity source, the standard approach is federation to AWS using an IAM identity provider (SAML) and role assumption based on job function.

AWS CloudFormation StackSets is the operationally efficient way to deploy identical IAM roles/policies into multiple accounts/OUs so job-function permissions are consistent everywhere.

The roles’ trust policies can be configured to allow federated identities (from the AD-backed IdP) to assume the correct job role in each account.

Why the other options don’t fit:

A “OU with group policies” isn’t an AWS Organizations control mechanism for restricting Regions/services. The AWS-native control for this is SCPs , not “group policies.”

B Permissions boundaries are useful to limit what an IAM principal/role can do within an account , but they are not the org-wide enforcement mechanism for “all accounts must stay in these Regions / use only these services.” That’s what SCPs do.

C AWS RAM is for sharing resources (like subnets, Transit Gateway, etc.), not for “sharing roles” across accounts as a governance baseline. Also, the question emphasizes identical permissions in each account, which is best achieved by provisioning roles in each account (StackSets), not attempting to “share” roles.