DOP-C02 Exam Dumps : AWS Certified DevOps Engineer - Professional

This is a classic AWS Organizations governance design:

Restrict Regions and allowed services across all accounts

The correct Organizations mechanism for account-wide guardrails is a Service Control Policy (SCP) .

SCPs set the maximum permissions that accounts/OUs can use, making them the right tool to enforce “only these Regions” and “only these services” consistently across the org.

Authentication from Active Directory + consistent job-function roles in every account

With AD as the identity source, the standard approach is federation to AWS using an IAM identity provider (SAML) and role assumption based on job function.

AWS CloudFormation StackSets is the operationally efficient way to deploy identical IAM roles/policies into multiple accounts/OUs so job-function permissions are consistent everywhere.

The roles’ trust policies can be configured to allow federated identities (from the AD-backed IdP) to assume the correct job role in each account.

Why the other options don’t fit:

A “OU with group policies” isn’t an AWS Organizations control mechanism for restricting Regions/services. The AWS-native control for this is SCPs , not “group policies.”

B Permissions boundaries are useful to limit what an IAM principal/role can do within an account , but they are not the org-wide enforcement mechanism for “all accounts must stay in these Regions / use only these services.” That’s what SCPs do.

C AWS RAM is for sharing resources (like subnets, Transit Gateway, etc.), not for “sharing roles” across accounts as a governance baseline. Also, the question emphasizes identical permissions in each account, which is best achieved by provisioning roles in each account (StackSets), not attempting to “share” roles.

The correct answer is C. Allowing users to deploy CloudFormation stacks using AWS Service Catalog only and enforcing the use of a launch constraint is the best way to ensure that the internal business teams launch resources through pre-approved CloudFormation templates only. AWS Service Catalog is a service that enables organizations to create and manage catalogs of IT services that are approved for use on AWS. A launch constraint is a rule that specifies the role that AWS Service Catalog assumes when launching a product. By using a launch constraint, the DevOps engineer can control the permissions that the users have when launching a product. Using AWS Config rules to detect when resources have drifted from their expected state is the best way to automate the monitoring of the resources. AWS Config is a service that enables you to assess, audit, and evaluate the configurations of your AWS resources. AWS Config rules are custom or managed rules that AWS Config uses to evaluate whether your AWS resources comply with your desired configurations. By using AWS Config rules, the DevOps engineer can track the changes in the resources and identify any non-compliant resources.

Option A is incorrect because allowing users to deploy CloudFormation stacks using a CloudFormation service role only is not the best way to ensure that the internal business teams launch resources through pre-approved CloudFormation templates only. A CloudFormation service role is an IAM role that CloudFormation assumes to create, update, or delete the stack resources. By using a CloudFormation service role, the DevOps engineer can control the permissions that CloudFormation has when acting on the resources, but not the permissions that the users have when launching a stack. Therefore, option A does not prevent the users from launching resources that are not approved by the company. Using CloudFormation drift detection to detect when resources have drifted from their expected state is a valid way to monitor the resources, but it is not as automated and scalable as using AWS Config rules. CloudFormation drift detection is a feature that enables you to detect whether a stack’s actual configuration differs, or has drifted, from its expected configuration. To use this feature, the DevOps engineer would need to manually initiate a drift detection operation on the stack or the stack resources, and then view the drift status and details in the CloudFormation console or API.

Option B is incorrect because allowing users to deploy CloudFormation stacks using a CloudFormation service role only is not the best way to ensure that the internal business teams launch resources through pre-approved CloudFormation templates only, as explained in option A. Using AWS Config rules to detect when resources have drifted from their expected state is a valid way to monitor the resources, as explained in option C.

Option D is incorrect because enforcing the use of a template constraint is not the best way to ensure that the internal business teams launch resources through pre-approved CloudFormation templates only. A template constraint is a rule that defines the values or properties that users can specify when launching a product. By using a template constraint, the DevOps engineer can control the parameters that the users can provide when launching a product, but not the permissions that the users have when launching a product. Therefore, option D does not prevent the users from launching resources that are not approved by the company. Using Amazon EventBridge notifications to detect when resources have drifted from their expected state is a less reliable and consistent solution than using AWS Config rules. Amazon EventBridge is a service that enables you to connect your applications with data from a variety of sources. Amazon EventBridge can deliver a stream of real-time data from event sources, such as AWS services, and route that data to targets, such as AWS Lambda functions. However, to use this solution, the DevOps engineer would need to configure the event source, the event bus, the event rule, and the event target for each resource type that needs to be monitored, which is more complex and error-prone than using AWS Config rules.

Short Explanation: To meet the requirements, the DevOps engineer should update the SAML assertion to pass the user’s team name, update the IAM role’s trust policy to add an access-team session tag that has the team name, create an IAM permissions boundary in each account, and for each CodeCommit repository, add an access-team tag that has the value set to the name of the associated team.

Updating the SAML assertion to pass the user’s team name allows the DevOps engineer to use IAM tags to identify which team a user belongs to. This can help enforce fine-grained access control based on the user’s team membership1.

Updating the IAM role’s trust policy to add an access-team session tag that has the team name allows the DevOps engineer to use IAM condition keys to restrict access based on the session tag value2. For example, the DevOps engineer can use the aws:PrincipalTag condition key to match the access-team tag of the user with the access-team tag of the repository3.

Creating an IAM permissions boundary in each account allows the DevOps engineer to set the maximum permissions that an identity-based policy can grant to an IAM entity. An entity’s permissions boundary allows it to perform only the actions that are allowed by both its identity-based policies and its permissions boundaries4. For example, the DevOps engineer can use a permissions boundary policy to limit the actions that a user can perform on CodeCommit repositories based on their access-team tag5.

For each CodeCommit repository, adding an access-team tag that has the value set to the name of the associated team allows the DevOps engineer to use resource tags to identify which team manages a repository. This can help enforce fine-grained access control based on the resource tag value6.

The other options are incorrect because:

Creating an approval rule template for each team in the Organizations management account is not a valid option, as approval rule templates are not supported by AWS Organizations. Approval rule templates are specific to CodeCommit and can only be associated with one or more repositories in the same AWS Region where they are created7.

Creating an approval rule template for each account is not a valid option, as approval rule templates are not designed to restrict access to modify branches. Approval rule templates are designed to require approvals from specified users or groups before merging pull requests8.

Attaching an SCP to the accounts is not a valid option, as SCPs are not designed to restrict access based on tags. SCPs are designed to restrict access based on service actions and resources across all users and roles in an organization’s account9.