DOP-C02 Exam Dumps : AWS Certified DevOps Engineer - Professional

You need to understand how SCP inheritance works in AWS. The way it works for Deny policies is different that allow policies.

Allow polices are passing down to children ONLY if they don ' t have an allow policy.

Deny policies always pass down to children.

That ' s why there is always an SCP set to the Root to allow everything by default. If you limit this policy, the whole organization will be limited, not matter what other policies are saying for the other OUs. So it ' s not A. It ' s not D because it restricts the wrong OU.

AWS Config offers a managed rule called CLOUDFORMATION_STACK_DRIFT_DETECTION_CHECK to detect stack drift automatically.

Creating an SNS topic and subscribing the DevOps lead enables simple notification without custom Lambda functions.

An EventBridge rule that triggers on NON_COMPLIANT status (when drift is detected) can send alerts directly to SNS. Option B adds complexity by requiring custom rules and Lambda. Option C incorrectly triggers on COMPLIANT, not NON_COMPLIANT. Option D needs a Lambda for email, while SNS can send email directly. Hence, Option A offers the least operational effort.

To allow only creation/configuration of service-linked roles , you need a way to tightly scope what IAM actions the developer can perform. The most AWS-appropriate mechanism for “delegate limited IAM admin” is a role with a permissions boundary :

A permissions boundary sets the maximum permissions the role (and any roles it creates, depending on design) can ever have. This is a standard pattern to safely delegate IAM tasks without granting broad IAM administration.

You can define the role’s policy + boundary so the developer can call only the APIs required for service-linked roles (for example actions like creating service-linked roles and passing only allowed AWS service principals), while preventing general role/policy creation outside that scope.

Why the others don’t meet “service-linked roles only”:

A is vague (“common services”) and cross-account access doesn’t inherently restrict to only service-linked roles. It’s also more operational overhead than needed for a single dev account use case.

B PowerUserAccess is far too broad and does not restrict to service-linked roles.

C An SCP with Deny iam:* would block IAM entirely (including what the developer needs). Even if refined, SCPs set account-wide guardrails and are not the right tool to grant a single developer the precise ability to create only service-linked roles.