Amazon Web Services DOP-C02 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

S3 RTC ensures ≤15-min replication SLA.

Multi-Region Access Point (MRAP) simplifies active-passive replication access.

SubmitMultiRegionAccessPointRoutes API manages routing changes during failover. This configuration follows AWS DR best practices for S3 active/passive architectures.

This is a classic AWS Organizations governance design:

Restrict Regions and allowed services across all accounts

The correct Organizations mechanism for account-wide guardrails is a Service Control Policy (SCP) .

SCPs set the maximum permissions that accounts/OUs can use, making them the right tool to enforce “only these Regions” and “only these services” consistently across the org.

Authentication from Active Directory + consistent job-function roles in every account

With AD as the identity source, the standard approach is federation to AWS using an IAM identity provider (SAML) and role assumption based on job function.

AWS CloudFormation StackSets is the operationally efficient way to deploy identical IAM roles/policies into multiple accounts/OUs so job-function permissions are consistent everywhere.

The roles’ trust policies can be configured to allow federated identities (from the AD-backed IdP) to assume the correct job role in each account.

Why the other options don’t fit:

A “OU with group policies” isn’t an AWS Organizations control mechanism for restricting Regions/services. The AWS-native control for this is SCPs , not “group policies.”

B Permissions boundaries are useful to limit what an IAM principal/role can do within an account , but they are not the org-wide enforcement mechanism for “all accounts must stay in these Regions / use only these services.” That’s what SCPs do.

C AWS RAM is for sharing resources (like subnets, Transit Gateway, etc.), not for “sharing roles” across accounts as a governance baseline. Also, the question emphasizes identical permissions in each account, which is best achieved by provisioning roles in each account (StackSets), not attempting to “share” roles.

 Impact of Removing FullAWSAccess and Adding Policy for EC2 Actions:

The FullAWSAccess policy allows all actions on all resources by default. Removing this policy from the Department OU will limit the permissions that accounts within this OU inherit from the parent OU.

Adding a policy that allows only Amazon EC2 API operations will restrict the permissions to EC2 actions only.

 Permissions of Administrative IAM Roles:

The administrative IAM roles in the Engineering OU have the AdministratorAccess policy attached, which grants full access to all AWS services and resources.

Since SCPs are restrictions that apply at the organizational level, removing FullAWSAccess and replacing it with a policy allowing only EC2 actions means that for all accounts in the Engineering OU:

They will have full access to EC2 actions due to the new SCP.

They will be restricted in other actions that are not covered by the SCP, hence, non-EC2 API actions will be denied.

 Conclusion:

All API actions on EC2 resources will be allowed.

All other API actions will be denied due to the absence of a broader allow policy.