Amazon Web Services DVA-C02 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

AWS Secrets Manager is purpose-built for securely storing and managing sensitive information such as API keys, tokens, and credentials. It provides automatic secret rotation , fine-grained IAM access control, encryption at rest using AWS KMS, and audit logging through AWS CloudTrail. This makes it the most secure and scalable option for managing short-lived authentication keys.

AWS Lambda extensions enable efficient secret retrieval by caching secrets locally within the execution environment. This reduces repeated calls to Secrets Manager on every invocation, improving performance and lowering costs while maintaining up-to-date credentials. AWS documentation explicitly recommends using Lambda extensions or caching logic for secrets that are frequently accessed.

Storing secrets in S3 (Option B) or environment variables (Option C) lacks built-in rotation and increases exposure risk. Parameter Store (Option D) supports encryption but does not provide native rotation for secrets without custom automation, making it less suitable for this use case.

Therefore, Secrets Manager with Lambda extensions provides the most secure, automated, and operationally efficient solution.

This is a classic cross-account S3 access requirement: EC2 instances in Account A must read from a private S3 bucket in Account B without making the bucket public.

The correct pattern is to grant access using IAM + S3 bucket policy while keeping the bucket private. In Account B, you create an IAM role that has the necessary S3 read permissions (such as s3:GetObject and potentially s3:ListBucket depending on access needs). That is Option A.

However, permissions on the role alone are not sufficient, because the S3 bucket is in a different account and is private by default. AWS requires that the bucket owner explicitly grants access to the external principal. This is done by adding a bucket policy in Account B that allows the principal (either the role in Account A or a role session via STS) to access the bucket objects. That is Option D.

Option B is not correct in the “select two” sense because adding permissions to Account A’s instance profile role does not, by itself, grant access to a bucket owned by Account B. You still need the bucket policy or another resource-based policy from the bucket owner.

Option C violates the requirement (“without exposing the S3 bucket to anyone else”). Making the bucket public is unnecessary and insecure.

Option E is incorrect because a trust policy controls who can assume a role (sts:AssumeRole), not what S3 permissions the role has. Also, trust policies do not grant s3:Get* access.

Therefore, create an IAM role with S3 read permissions in Account B and grant access via the Account B bucket policy.