Last Attempt SY0-701 Questions

A backup strategy that combines weekly full backups with daily incremental backups stored on a NAS (Network Attached Storage) drive is likely to meet an organization's Recovery Point Objectives (RPOs) and Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs). This approach ensures that recent data is regularly backed up and that recovery can be done efficiently, without significant data loss or lengthy downtime.

References =

CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 Course Content: Domain 05 Security Program Management and Oversight​.

CompTIA Security+ SY0-601 Study Guide: Chapter on Disaster Recovery and Backup Strategies​.

The first step in reducing the number of credentials each employee must maintain when using multiple SaaS applications is to select an Identity Provider (IdP). An IdP provides a centralized authentication service that supports Single Sign-On (SSO), enabling users to access multiple applications with a single set of credentials.

Enabling SAML would be part of the technical implementation but comes after selecting an IdP.

OAuth tokens are used for authorization, but selecting an IdP is the first step in managing authentication.

Password vaulting stores multiple passwords securely but doesn't reduce the need for separate logins​​.

A firewall policy is a set of rules that defines what traffic is allowed or denied on a network. A firewall policy should be carefully designed and tested before being implemented, as a misconfigured policy can cause network disruptions or security breaches. A common best practice is to test the policy in a non-production environment, such as a lab or a simulation, before enabling the policy in the production network. This way, the technician can verify the functionality and performance of the policy, and identify and resolve any issues or conflicts, without affecting the live network. Testing the policy in a non-production environment would prevent the issue of the ‘deny any’ policy causing several company servers to become unreachable, as the technician would be able to detect and correct the problem before applying the policy to the production network.

Documenting the new policy in a change request and submitting the request to change management is a good practice, but it would not prevent the issue by itself. Change management is a process that ensures that any changes to the network are authorized, documented, and communicated, but it does not guarantee that the changes are error-free or functional. The technician still needs to test the policy before implementing it.

Disabling any intrusion prevention signatures on the ‘deny any’ policy prior to enabling the new policy would not prevent the issue, and it could reduce the security of the network. Intrusion prevention signatures are patterns that identify malicious or unwanted traffic, and allow the firewall to block or alert on such traffic. Disabling these signatures would make the firewall less effective in detecting and preventing attacks, and it would not affect the reachability of the company servers.

Including an ‘allow any’ policy above the ‘deny any’ policy would not prevent the issue, and it would render the ‘deny any’ policy useless. A firewall policy is processed from top to bottom, and the first matching rule is applied. An ‘allow any’ policy would match any traffic and allow it to pass through the firewall, regardless of the source, destination, or protocol. This would negate the purpose of the ‘deny any’ policy, which is to block any traffic that does not match any of the previous rules. Moreover, an ‘allow any’ policy would create a security risk, as it would allow any unauthorized or malicious traffic to enter or exit the network. References = CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 Certification Study Guide, page 204-205; Professor Messer’s CompTIA SY0-701 Security+ Training Course, video 2.1 - Network Security Devices, 8:00 - 10:00.

Based on the logs, it seems that the host that originated the infection is 192.168.10.22. This host has a suspicious process named svchost.exe running on port 443, which is unusual for a Windows service. It also has a large number of outbound connections to different IP addresses on port 443, indicating that it is part of a botnet.

The firewall log shows that this host has been communicating with 10.10.9.18, which is another infected host on the engineering network. This host also has a suspicious process named svchost.exe running on port 443, and a large number of outbound connections to different IP addresses on port 443.

The other hosts on the R&D network (192.168.10.37 and 192.168.10.41) are clean, as they do not have any suspicious processes or connections.