CIMA F3 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

Interest rate swaps are covered in CIMA F3 under risk management and derivative instruments, specifically as tools for managing interest rate risk. An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange interest payment obligations, typically swapping fixed-rate interest payments for floating-rate payments, or vice versa, on a notional principal amount.

Option A is TRUE.

CIMA F3 recognises that although swaps are primarily used for hedging, some companies may enter into interest rate swaps for speculative or risk-taking purposes. If management believes it has superior forecasts of future interest rate movements compared to the market, it may deliberately increase exposure to interest rate risk by swapping into floating rates or fixed rates accordingly. This behaviour is discussed in F3 as speculation rather than pure hedging.

Option E is TRUE.

An interest rate swap is an external hedging technique. CIMA F3 clearly distinguishes between:

Internal hedging (e.g. matching assets and liabilities, netting, leading and lagging), and

External hedging, which involves using financial instruments with third parties, such as forwards, futures, options and swaps.

Since a swap involves a counterparty (often a bank or financial institution), it is classified as an external hedge.

The remaining options are incorrect:

B is FALSE. Default risk does not automatically become “high” for the floating-rate payer when interest rates rise; it depends on the firm’s overall financial strength and cash flows. Rising rates increase payments, but not necessarily default risk to a high level.

C is FALSE. When interest rates fall, the fixed-rate payer is at a disadvantage (paying above-market rates), which may increase rather than reduce financial strain.

D is FALSE. An interest rate swap is not an internal hedging technique; it requires an external counterparty.

✅ Final Answer: A and E

Competition authorities focus primarily on market structure and competition, not on whether the bid is generous or on employment promises. Their concern is: Will this merger substantially lessen competition?

In food retailing, a key issue is local market concentration – for example, a single group owning too many supermarkets in particular towns or regions. A classic remedy is for the bidder to divest overlapping outlets so that effective competition remains.

B. Agreeing to dispose of specified outlets which overlap geographically directly addresses the competition authority’s main concern and is the standard structural remedy used in practice.

A (more cash) is irrelevant to competition issues.

C (job guarantees) is mainly a political/employment concern, not an antitrust one.

D (promise to pass on cost savings) is difficult to monitor and enforce and is normally viewed as less credible than structural remedies.

So the action most likely to persuade the competition authorities is B.

Current PBIT = $25m

Existing debt = $60m at 5% → interest = 0.05 × 60 = $3m

Current interest cover = 25 / 3 = 8.3 times (as stated).

New borrowing: $20m at 10% → extra interest = 0.10 × 20 = $2m

Total interest after borrowing = 3 + 2 = $5m

PBIT in first year is unchanged at $25m, so:

New interest cover=255=5 times\text{New interest cover} = \frac{25}{5} = 5 \text{ times}New interest cover=525​=5 times

Loan covenant requires minimum cover of 4 times. New cover (5x) is above this, so covenant is not breached.

Correct answer: D – Interest cover would reduce to 5 times and the covenant would NOT be breached.