8010 Exam Dumps : Operational Risk Manager (ORM) Exam

Statement I is true as expected losses are the 'cost ofdoing business' and charged against the P&L of the unit holding the exposure. When evaluating the business unit, expected losses are taken into account. Unexpected losses however require risk capital reserves to be maintained against them.

Statement II isnot true. Credit portfolio loss distributions are not symmetrical, in fact they are highly skewed and have heavy tails.

Statement III is true. The notional, or the face value of a defaulted debt is the basis for a claim in bankruptcy court, and not the market value.

Statement IV is false. In the case of over the counter instruments, the replacement value of the contract represents the amount of the claim, and not the notional amount (which can be very high!).

The probability that only one of thethree bonds will default is equal to the sum of the probabilities of the three scenarios where one bond defaults and the other two survive. This probability is given by 1%*(1 - 2%)*(1 - 3%) + (1 - 1%)*2%*(1 - 3%) + (1 - 1%)*(1 - 2%)*3% = 5.7818%. Choice 'c' is the correct answer.

According to a paper by the BCBS, here is an excellent summary of what happened. Based on this, Choice 'c' is the correct answer.

"At the outset of the crisis, mortgage default shocks played a part in the deterioration of marketprices of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). Simultaneously, these shocks revealed deficiencies in the models used to manage and price these products. The complexity and resulting lack of transparency led to uncertainty about the value of the underlying investment. Market participants then drastically scaled down their activity in the origination and distribution markets and liquidity disappeared. The standstill in the securitisation markets forced banks to warehouse loans that were intended to be soldin the secondary markets. Given a lack of transparency of the ultimate ownership of troubled investments, funding liquidity concerns were triggered within the banking sector as banks refused to provide sufficient funds to each other. This in turn led to the hoarding of liquidity, exacerbating further the funding pressures within the banking sector. The initial difficulties in subprime mortgages also fed through to a broader range of market instruments since the drying up of market and funding liquidity forced market participants to liquidate those positions which they could trade in order to scale back risk. An increase in risk aversion also led to a general flight to quality, an example of which was the high withdrawals by households from money market funds."