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According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Section 2.2.2 The EU Fourth AML Directive, the release of the EU’s Fourth AML Directive resulted in the threshold for reporting suspicious transactions decreasing from 15,000 EUR to 10,000 EUR (Answer A) and all financial institutions were required to identify and verify the beneficial owner of legal entities (Answer B). The directive also defined money laundering and terrorist financing as separate crimes, which expanded the directive's measures (Answer C). Answer D is incorrect as the scope of obliged entities was not enlarged from casinos to all providers of gambling services, but rather to all providers of payment services. Answer E is also incorrect as the directive does not provide that knowledge of criminal conduct can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. Reference: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Section 2.2.2 The EU Fourth AML Directive, p. 12.

Here is the exact information from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Trust and Company Service Providers:

"Understanding the management and ownership structure of a trust is crucial in assessing the ML/TF risk it poses. This includes the identity of all settlors, trustees and beneficiaries, and their respective roles and responsibilities, as well as the nature and purpose of the trust."

"TCSPs should obtain and maintain up-to-date information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, the source of funds and wealth, and where relevant, the source of funds or wealth of the settlor and beneficiaries."

Based on this information, the correct answers are A and D. Trust and Company Service Providers must understand the responsibility and authority in the structure, as well as the general purpose behind the structure in order to assess the overall risk of the trust and ensure that any transactions with the trust are legitimate.

Typical events to identify and investigate potential AML activities include: A) blocked transactions involving individuals included in the Office of Foreign Assets Control Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List; B) internal tips from employees of the bank about potential suspicious activity; and C) alerts triggered by the automated AML monitoring system [1]. Blocked transactions are those which involve individuals included on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List – this is a list maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of individuals who are subject to economic or trade sanctions [1], or who may be involved in money laundering or terrorist activities [2]. Internal tips are those which are provided by employees of the bank who may have observed suspicious activity, or have reason to believe that certain transactions or activities may be related to potential money laundering. Alerts triggered by the automated AML monitoring system are those which are generated by the banks systems and processes which are designed to detect potential money laundering.

Using self-hosted wallets, or wallets that are stored on the user’s computer, is one of the tactics that may be used to finance terrorism with virtual assets such as Bitcoin. By creating many different donation addresses that are updated continuously, law enforcement will have a harder time tracing transactions. It is also important to note that using the same donation address across multiple donation campaigns and media types, as well as forming relationships with virtual asset service providers that have strong KYC processes in place, can draw attention from law enforcement and should be avoided.

According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, banks should adopt a risk-based approach to customer due diligence, which includes four essential elements1:

A customer acceptance policy that defines the types of customers that are likely to pose a higher than average risk to the bank.

A customer identification program that collects and verifies information about the customer’s identity, beneficial ownership, and purpose of the account or relationship.

An on-going monitoring of high-risk accounts to detect and report any unusual or suspicious activity, and to keep customer information up-to-date.

A risk management program that ensures that the bank’s policies and procedures are implemented effectively, and that the bank’s staff are trained and aware of their AML/CFT obligations.

Therefore, documenting a customer acceptance policy and establishing on-going monitoring of high-risk accounts are the correct choices for the essential elements that should be included in the program based on Basel’s KYC principles.

References: 1: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Customer due diligence for banks, October 2001, page 8.

Trade finance transactions involve the financing of the movement of goods and services across borders. Trade finance products include letters of credit, guarantees, documentary collections, open account, and supply chain finance. Trade finance transactions are exposed to various risks, such as credit risk, operational risk, fraud risk, and money laundering risk. Money laundering risk refers to the possibility that trade finance transactions are used to conceal the origin, ownership, or destination of illicit funds, or to evade taxes, sanctions, or exchange controls. Trade-based money laundering (TBML) is a form of money laundering that involves the manipulation of trade transactions, such as mispricing, misinvoicing, over- or under-shipping, or falsifying documents, to transfer value or obscure the true nature of the funds12.

An analyst reviewing trade finance transactions should be alert to any red flags or indicators of potential TBML, such as significant discrepancies between the value or quantity of the goods and the invoice, payment, or contract; unusual or complex shipment routes or methods; involvement of high-risk jurisdictions, entities, or commodities; or lack of transparency or documentation of the trade transaction12. If the analyst notices an increase in price of 25% over 12 months for commodities with the same specification and quantity, this could be a sign of mispricing, which is a common technique of TBML. Mispricing involves inflating or deflating the price of the goods to transfer value or evade taxes or duties. For example, an exporter may overprice the goods to move funds out of a country with exchange controls, or an importer may underprice the goods to reduce the customs duty payable12.

However, an increase in price of 25% over 12 months for commodities with the same specification and quantity does not necessarily indicate TBML, as there could be other legitimate factors that may have affected the transaction cost, such as market fluctuations, supply and demand, quality, transportation, insurance, or other fees. Therefore, the analyst should not jump to the conclusion that TBML is occurring, but rather conduct a thorough investigation to verify the validity and rationale of the price change. The analyst should produce an investigation report that considers the client activity and factors that may have legitimately affected the transaction cost, such as:

The nature and purpose of the client’s business and trade activities

The client’s profile, risk rating, and transaction history

The source and destination of the funds and the goods

The market price and trends of the commodities involved

The contractual terms and conditions of the trade transaction

The supporting documents, such as invoices, bills of lading, certificates of origin, inspection reports, etc.

The due diligence and verification procedures performed by the bank or the third parties

The compliance with the relevant laws, regulations, and standards of the jurisdictions involved

The investigation report should document the findings, analysis, and conclusions of the analyst, and provide evidence and references to support the assessment. The investigation report should also include any recommendations or actions to be taken by the bank or the authorities, such as:

Requesting additional information or clarification from the client or the counterparties

Conducting enhanced due diligence or monitoring of the client or the transaction

Escalating the case to the senior management or the compliance department

Reporting the case to the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) or the relevant regulator

Filing a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) or a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) if there are reasonable grounds to suspect TBML or other criminal activity

Therefore, the best action for the analyst to take is to produce an investigation report that considers the client activity and factors that may have legitimately affected the transaction cost, as this would allow the analyst to determine whether the price increase is justified or indicative of TBML, and to take appropriate measures accordingly.

References:

Trade Finance and Trade-Based Money Laundering

Trade-Based Money Laundering: Red Flag Indicators

The potential client is attempting to commit the illegal activity of using insider information to trade securities. Insider information is any material, non-public information that could affect the price or value of a security, such as earnings reports, mergers, acquisitions, or regulatory actions. Insider trading is the act of buying or selling securities based on insider information, which gives the trader an unfair advantage over other investors who do not have access to such information. Insider trading violates the principles of market integrity, fairness, and transparency, and can undermine investor confidence and trust. Insider trading is also a form of market abuse and financial crime, and is subject to civil and criminal penalties.

References:

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination - 6th Edition, Chapter 1: Risks and Methods of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, Section 1.3: Financial Crime, Subsection 1.3.3: Market Abuse, pp. 25-26

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 1: Risks and Methods of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, Lesson 1.3: Financial Crime, Sublesson 1.3.3: Market Abuse, Video Time: 2:00-3:30

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 12, Answer C

 Antiques are a potential tool for money laundering because they can be used to conceal, move, and convert illicit funds. Antiques can be of high value and often easily transported across borders, making them attractive for criminals who want to evade detection and reporting. Antiques can also be difficult to value and authenticate, creating a lack of transparency and accountability in the market. Criminals can exploit this to inflate or deflate the prices of antiques, or to use them as collateral for loans or other transactions. Antiques can also be used to layer or integrate illicit funds into the legitimate economy, by selling them through auction houses, dealers, or online platforms.

References:

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4: Conducting and Supporting the Investigation Process, pp. 97-98.

Anti-money laundering and the art and antiquities market - a US and UK perspective, Mishcon de Reya LLP, 2022.

Antiques: an unconventional money laundering tool, The Express Tribune, 2023.

Art and Antiquities an Attractive Market for Money Laundering, FATF Argues, OCCRP, 2021.

When assessing and managing money laundering risks while operating in foreign jurisdictions different from that of the head office, an effective AML monitoring program should conform to the foreign jurisdiction policies to align with the head office policies. This ensures that the organization's AML/CFT risk management remains consistent across all jurisdictions, while allowing local compliance staff to assess and manage the risks specific to their jurisdiction. Additionally, the program should be tailored to the higher of standards between the jurisdictions, and should be consistent with the head office audits. Providing all foreign jurisdiction reports to the head office for approval is not necessary, as long as the program is consistent with the head office policies.

free of payment asset transfer is a trading pattern that may be indicative of money laundering in capital markets. Free of payment asset transfer is a method of transferring securities without any corresponding payment, which can be used to avoid detection of the origin or destination of the funds. This can facilitate the layering or integration stages of money laundering, as the launderer can move the assets across different accounts, jurisdictions, or institutions without leaving a clear audit trail. Free of payment asset transfer can also be used to evade taxes, sanctions, or other regulatory requirements.

References:

ACAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, Chapter 1, Section 1.8, page 28: “Methods to launder money using broker-dealers, investment advisors, and the capital markets (e.g., securities, futures)”.

ExamTopics, Question 476: “Which trading pattern may be indicative of money laundering in capital markets?”

IT expanded the definition of criminal activity to all serious crimes. The first EU Directive on Money Laundering, adopted in 1990, was the first major international agreement to combat money laundering. It expanded the definition of criminal activity to all serious crimes and established drug trafficking as a predicate offense of money laundering. The Directive also extended the scope of money laundering beyond drug-related crimes, making it applicable to all serious crimes. This was a major step forward in the fight against money laundering, as it made it easier for law enforcement to investigate and prosecute money laundering cases.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, an effective anti-money laundering program should be subject to periodic independent testing by a qualified party, such as an internal or external auditor, a consultant, or a compliance professional1. This ensures that the program is compliant with the applicable laws and regulations, and that it meets the standards of sound risk management and internal controls2. The regulatory authorities, a member of senior management, or the anti-money laundering specialist may not have the necessary expertise, objectivity, or independence to conduct a thorough and unbiased evaluation of the program.

References:

1: CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, page 51

2: CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, Section 2.4, page 52

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is an international body that sets standards and guidelines for the prudential regulation of banks. One of its key publications is the Customer Due Diligence for Banks, which outlines the essential elements of Know Your Customer (KYC) standards for banks. According to this document, customer acceptance, customer due diligence, and record-keeping policies and procedures should be changed as necessary to address variations in risk among each line of business within the organization. This means that banks should adopt a risk-based approach to KYC, taking into account the different types, levels, and sources of risk associated with different customers, products, services, transactions, and delivery channels. By doing so, banks can allocate their resources more efficiently and effectively, and mitigate the potential for money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes.

References:

Customer Due Diligence for Banks, BCBS, October 2001, p. 5, 14-15.

The Basel Committee: The Important Set Of International Banking Regulations, Financial Crime Academy, November 2023.

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), financial institutions should apply a risk-based approach to customer due diligence (CDD), which includes obtaining and updating information on the identity, beneficial ownership, and business activities of their clients. If a client refuses to provide or update such information, or provides false or misleading information, the financial institution should consider this as a red flag for potential money laundering or terrorist financing, and should exit the relationship with the client, unless the circumstances warrant otherwise. Exiting the relationship with a client who refuses to update information is also consistent with the FATF’s Recommendation 10, which requires financial institutions to terminate the business relationship if they are unable to perform CDD measures.

References:

1: This document contains the FATF’s 40 Recommendations, which are the international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Recommendation 10 covers the CDD requirements for financial institutions, and paragraph 22 states that “If the financial institution is unable to comply with paragraphs 10 to 12, 15 and 17, it should not open the account, commence business relations or perform the transaction; or should terminate the business relationship; and should consider making a suspicious transactions report in relation to the customer.”

2: This document provides guidance on the implementation of the FATF’s Recommendations on transparency and beneficial ownership, which are relevant for CDD purposes. It explains the definition of beneficial owner, the risks associated with legal persons and arrangements, and the effective mechanisms to combat the misuse of such entities. It also provides examples of situations where financial institutions should exit the relationship with a client, such as when the client refuses to provide or update information on beneficial ownership or control, or when the client is a shell company or a trust with no legitimate economic purpose.

B. An internal auditor with the requisite knowledge and expertise of AML: An internal auditor with sufficient knowledge and expertise in AML regulations and compliance requirements can perform the AML audit.

D. Qualified bank staff if not involved in the AML function being tested: Qualified bank staff who are not involved in the AML function being audited can perform the AML audit.

According to the ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide (6th edition), one of the key steps of conducting an investigation of a suspicious activity is to maintain and secure supporting documentation used to perform the investigation. This includes the transaction activity that generated the alert, the analysis performed, the decision made, and the rationale for the decision. This documentation serves as evidence of the investigation process and the compliance with the relevant policies and procedures. It also helps to ensure consistency, accountability, and transparency in the investigation process1

References: 1: ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide (6th edition), page 156.

Money laundering can have serious consequences for financial institutions. They may face increased investigation costs and fines from regulators and law enforcement agencies for failing to detect or prevent money laundering activities. Additionally, money laundering can result in a loss of profitable business as customers and counterparties may no longer want to do business with the institution due to its reputation for being associated with illicit activity.

The board of directors or designated specialized committee should be provided with statistical data regarding SARs/STRs filed during the reported period, such as the number, type, value, and geographic distribution of the reports, as well as any trends or patterns identified. This information helps the board or committee to oversee the effectiveness of the firm’s AML program, assess the level of compliance risk, and allocate appropriate resources and training. Providing all possible details, names of customers, or copies of SARs/STRs may compromise the confidentiality of the reports, violate data protection laws, or expose the firm to legal liability.

References:

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (6th Edition), Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2, page 223.

The Role of the Money Laundering Reporting Officer - ICAEW, page 14.

Political system changes can have an impact on an organization's AML risk as they can affect the legal and regulatory framework in which the organization operates. For example, changes to the laws or regulations related to AML, or changes in the way in which the government enforces AML regulations, can have an impact on the organization's AML risk by increasing or decreasing the likelihood of it being exposed to AML risk. In addition, changes in the political environment or political stability in a specific jurisdiction can also affect the organization's AML risk.

According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a sound KYC program should include four essential elements: customer acceptance policy, customer identification, on-going monitoring of higher risk accounts, and risk management1. Customer acceptance policy defines the types of customers that the financial institution (FI) is willing to accept and the criteria for doing so. Customer identification involves verifying the identity and beneficial ownership of the customers and obtaining information on their activities and sources of funds. On-going monitoring of higher risk accounts involves reviewing the transactions and behavior of the customers that pose higher risks of money laundering or terrorist financing and updating their information and risk profiles. Risk management involves establishing appropriate policies, procedures, controls, and audit functions to ensure the effective implementation and oversight of the KYC program1.

References:

1: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - Bank for International Settlements1

Civil and Criminal Prosecution, Fines, and Imprisonment: The Chief AML Officer may face legal action, including both civil and criminal proceedings. This could result in fines and even imprisonment if found guilty of negligence or misconduct related to anti-money laundering compliance.

Ban from Employment: Regulators have the authority to ban individuals from working in the financial services industry if they are deemed unfit due to AML-related failures. Such a ban can significantly impact the individual’s career prospects.

Recommend Termination of Employment: While the regulator cannot directly terminate employment, they can recommend that the financial institution (FI) take appropriate action, including termination, based on the Chief AML Officer’s performance.

References:

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources.

ACAMS AML Glossary (definitions of terms related to AML).1

ACAMS AML Foundations Certificate (overview of AML concepts and responsibilities).2

ComplyAdvantage: 6th Money Laundering Directive (6AMLD) (details on AML regulations and penalties).3

The threat of US sanctions against foreign individuals and entities continues to exist despite the absence of a US nexus. This is stated in the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) manual on page 591, which states: “It is important to note that the threat of US sanctions against foreign individuals and entities continues to exist even when there is no direct US nexus (i.e., no US persons or assets involved).”

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), the financial institution (Fl) should take the following actions:

A. Review the client's activity, determine if suspicious activity exists, and report accordingly. The Fl should assess the risk of the situation and determine if there is any suspicious activity that needs to be reported to the appropriate authorities. This would involve conducting a review of the client's account activity and transactions to determine if there are any indicators of money laundering or terrorist financing.

D. Inform local LEA and regulator of the request for awareness. The Fl should inform the local law enforcement agency and regulator of the request from the foreign jurisdiction to raise awareness of the situation and determine if any further actions need to be taken.

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) Manual , 6th edition, if a bank's transaction surveillance system triggers an alert for a deposit of 250.000 USD into a client's account, the bank should take the following actions:

Request information and documentation from the client on the background of the transaction (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 46).

Contact the client advisor to learn if he has any insight on the transaction background (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 47).

Review the transaction background in the bank's transaction platform (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 47).

Discarding the alert as a false positive hit and reviewing the alert if the deposit is made in cash should not be done.

The bank should request additional information and documentation from the client to better understand the nature of the transaction. Additionally, the bank should reach out to the client advisor to learn if they have any insight on the transaction background. Finally, the bank should review the transaction background in the bank's transaction platform to determine if any additional alerts or anomalies are present. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Pages 117-118)

A country that does not have strong predicate offenses and is lax in prosecuting AML cases could suffer increased organized crime and corruption as a social/economic consequence. "Weaknesses in the AML/CFT regime can lead to a range of economic and social consequences, including...increased crime and corruption." (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, page 32)

Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) is a form of cooperation between different countries for the purpose of collecting and exchanging information and evidence in criminal matters. MLA is usually governed by bilateral or multilateral treaties that establish the procedures and requirements for requesting and providing assistance. The first valid step in the MLA process is to send a formal request from the central authority of the requesting country to the central authority of the requested country. The central authority is the designated entity that is responsible for making, receiving, and facilitating the execution of MLA requests. The request should contain the necessary information and documents to enable the requested country to assess and execute the request, such as the nature and purpose of the request, the legal basis, the description of the assistance sought, the identity of the persons involved, the applicable legal provisions, and the deadline for the response. The request may also be accompanied by a commission letter of request, which is a judicial document that authorizes a foreign authority to perform certain acts on behalf of the requesting authority, such as taking evidence or statements from witnesses or suspects.

References:

Guidelines on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Section 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, 2.20, 2.21, 2.22, 2.23, 2.24, 2.25, 2.26, 2.27, 2.28, 2.29, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.38, 2.39, 2.40, 2.41, 2.42, 2.43, 2.44, 2.45, 2.46, 2.47, 2.48, 2.49, 2.50, 2.51, 2.52, 2.53, 2.54, 2.55, 2.56, 2.57, 2.58, 2.59, 2.60, 2.61, 2.62, 2.63, 2.64, 2.65, 2.66, 2.67, 2.68, 2.69, 2.70, 2.71, 2.72, 2.73, 2.74, 2.75, 2.76, 2.77, 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.81, 2.82, 2.83, 2.84, 2.85, 2.86, 2.87, 2.88, 2.89, 2.90, 2.91, 2.92, 2.

The anti-money laundering specialist should secure all the documents related to the suspicious activity and the decision to report before submitting the suspicious transaction report (STR). This is to ensure that the evidence is preserved, the confidentiality is maintained, and the audit trail is documented. The documents may include the customer identification, transaction records, account statements, monitoring alerts, investigation reports, and any other relevant information12.

Checking with other financial institutions, adding information to the customer’s file, or contacting the customer are not appropriate actions to take before submitting the STR. These actions may compromise the confidentiality of the report, alert the customer of the suspicion, or interfere with the investigation by the competent authorities12.

References: 1: ACAMS (2020), Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, ACAMS, Miami, FL, USA, pp.  35-36. 2: ACAMS (2020), CAMS Examination Preparation Video, 6th Edition, ACAMS, Miami, FL, USA, Module 2.

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) study guide, 6th edition, page 105, the correct answer is C. It can be difficult to determine if there is negative media associated with counterparties solely from the customer's account activity and KYC file.

The study guide explains that negative media can include news articles, government sanctions lists, and other sources of public information that may indicate that a counterparty is involved in illicit activities. However, this information may not be readily available in a customer's account activity or KYC file, and may require additional research or investigation.

The Wolfsberg Group is an association of thirteen global banks that aims to develop guidance and standards for the management of financial crime risks. The Group has issued a number of documents since its inception to provide financial institutions with an industry perspective on effective financial crime risk management.

These options involve transferring funds to another country, which could indicate cross-border movement of illicit funds, and cashing out winnings in checks under 10,000 USD, which could indicate structuring to avoid reporting thresholds. The other options do not seem as suspicious or relevant to money laundering.

 A financial institution located in a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member country should address the following issues in its anti-money laundering program when dealing with customers located in countries/jurisdictions that are not members of FATF:

The requirement to identify the beneficial owners of accounts: Beneficial owners are the natural persons who ultimately own or control a customer or a legal entity. Identifying the beneficial owners of accounts is a key component of customer due diligence (CDD) and helps the financial institution to assess the risk profile of the customer, prevent the misuse of legal entities for money laundering or terrorist financing, and comply with the FATF Recommendations12.

The requirement for customer identification for the opening of new accounts: Customer identification is the process of verifying the identity of a customer using reliable and independent sources of information or documents. Customer identification is another essential element of CDD and helps the financial institution to establish a business relationship with the customer, prevent identity fraud, and comply with the FATF Recommendations13.

The financial institution’s obligation to report suspicious transactions: Suspicious transactions are transactions that have no apparent economic or lawful purpose, or are inconsistent with the customer’s known profile or business activities, or indicate involvement in money laundering or terrorist financing. Reporting suspicious transactions to the competent authorities is a core obligation of the financial institution under the FATF Recommendations14 and helps to detect and deter illicit activities and support law enforcement investigations.

The obligation to freeze funds involved in suspicious transactions is not an issue that should be addressed in the anti-money laundering program, as it is not a requirement under the FATF Recommendations. The FATF Recommendations require the financial institution to freeze funds or other assets of designated persons and entities that are subject to targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or other threats to the international financial system1 . However, the financial institution is not obliged to freeze funds involved in suspicious transactions, unless it receives a specific order from the competent authorities or the courts.

References:

The FATF Recommendations, as amended November 2023

Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10 (Customer Due Diligence), paragraphs 5(b) and 6

Recommendation 10 (Customer Due Diligence), paragraph 1

Recommendation 20 (Reporting of Suspicious Transactions)

Recommendation 6 (Targeted Financial Sanctions Related to Terrorism and Terrorist Financing), Recommendation 7 (Targeted Financial Sanctions Related to Proliferation), and Recommendation 8 (Non-Profit Organisations)

An oil exploration company based in France does business with oil refineries in Iran, which is subject to comprehensive Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions. What type of OFAC sanctions should be imposed against the French company?

A. Sectoral

B. Country-based

C. Secondary

D. List-based

Answer: C

 Submitting the concern anonymously to the bank’s internal Compliance Hotline is the most appropriate action that a bank CEO’s assistant should take when the bank CEO expenses large sums of money to a charitable organization run by the bank CEO’s direct family member. This is because this action would allow the assistant to report a potential case of fraud, conflict of interest, or misuse of funds without fear of retaliation or reprisal from the bank CEO. The Compliance Hotline is a confidential and secure channel for employees to raise any concerns or suspicions about unethical or illegal activities within the bank. The Compliance Hotline would then forward the concern to the relevant authorities or departments for further investigation and action.

References: = The main references for this question are the following sources:

The document titled “Anti-Fraud Policy” published by the World Bank Group. You can access it by clicking here. This document states that "The World Bank Group has established a Compliance Hotline to receive reports of suspected fraud or corruption in World Bank Group-financed projects or activities, or in the World Bank Group’s corporate procurement or administrative activities. The Compliance Hotline is available to all staff and external parties, such as contractors, consultants, beneficiaries of World Bank Group-financed projects, and the general public.

The potential red flag that alludes to money laundering is option B, where the trio engage in minimal gambling and combine the funds to request a casino cheque for the chips presented. This behavior is indicative of structuring, which involves breaking down large transactions into smaller ones to avoid detection by the casino and regulatory authorities. The fact that the trio only used a small amount of chips to play games, and then combined their funds to request a casino cheque, raises suspicions that they may be attempting to disguise the origin of their funds.

Compare customer and transaction records against periodically updated sanctions lists provided by governmental bodies. This is stated in the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) manual on page 595, which states: “Sanctions screening requirements include that a financial institution should compare customer and transaction records against periodically updated sanctions lists provided by governmental bodies.”

Lawyers who lack experience in providing specific services requested by clients or receive unusually high fees can raise red flags for money laundering. Inadequate documentation of case notes may also be suspicious, but the absence of experience and excessive fees are more significant indicators. These behaviors warrant further scrutiny to assess potential money laundering risks12.

References:

1. ComplyAdvantage: AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators?

2. HyperVerge: AML Red Flags: A Guide to Identification and Response

 A beneficial owner is the natural person who ultimately owns or controls a legal entity or arrangement, such as a company, a trust, or a foundation. Identifying the beneficial owner is essential for preventing and detecting money laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion, and other illicit activities that may involve the misuse of corporate vehicles. However, some individuals or entities may attempt to conceal the true beneficial ownership of a company by using various techniques, such as complex ownership structures, shell companies, bearer shares, or nominees. A nominee is a person or an entity that acts on behalf of another person or entity, usually for a fee or a commission, without disclosing the identity of the real owner or controller. Nominees can be used to protect or conceal the identity of the beneficial owner and controller of a company or asset. A nominee can help overcome jurisdictional controls on company ownership and circumvent directorship bans imposed by courts and government authorities. While the appointment of nominees is lawful in most countries, the use of nominees for money laundering purposes is illegal and a red flag for suspicious activity. Therefore, the person filling out an application on the company’s behalf indicating that a beneficial owner is a nominee for another person not named in the company’s documentation is an indicator that there is an attempt to conceal the company’s true beneficial ownership12.

The other options are not necessarily indicators of concealment of beneficial ownership, as they may have legitimate explanations or reasons. The company having a subsidiary in another jurisdiction with a local investor as a beneficial owner may be a normal business practice or a strategic decision, as long as the ownership information is transparent and accurate. Recent changes to the company’s ownership structure may reflect the company’s growth, development, or adaptation to market conditions, as long as they are documented and reported to the relevant authorities. Beneficial ownership information from the time that the company was formed several years ago not matching the current information may be due to natural changes in the company’s shareholders, directors, or managers, as long as they are updated and verified periodically.

References:

Concealment of Beneficial Ownership - Financial Action Task Force

What’s a Beneficial Owner and Why Does it Matter? - Dun & Bradstreet

[ACAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 6, pp. 171-172]

A personal banking customer who simultaneously opens several accounts with almost identical names will most likely cause further inquiry, as this could indicate an attempt to evade transaction monitoring, reporting, or identification requirements. For example, a customer could open accounts with slight variations of their name, such as John Smith, Jon Smith, J. Smith, or John Smyth, to avoid detection or aggregation of their transactions. This could also be a sign of identity theft, fraud, or money muling. Therefore, the bank should verify the customer’s identity and the purpose of the accounts, and monitor the activity for any suspicious patterns or behaviors.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2, p. 1051

ACAMS CAMS Certification Exam Outline, 6th Edition, Domain 2, Task 2.1, p. 52

FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for the Banking Sector, October 2014, p. 353

The most important risk factor in this scenario is the proposed offshore jurisdiction that is known for its strong privacy laws limiting access to customer information by law enforcement. This indicates that the customer may be trying to evade tax, hide the source or destination of funds, or engage in other illicit activities that could expose the bank to money laundering or terrorist financing risks. Offshore jurisdictions are often used by criminals to create complex corporate structures that obscure the beneficial ownership and control of the entities involved. The bank should conduct enhanced due diligence on the customer, the offshore company, and the nature and purpose of the transactions.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 35-36, 38-39

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 2, Lesson 2.3, Offshore Financial Centers

1, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Offshore Financial Centers and Money Laundering

2, CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS, CAMS Exam Outline, Domain 2, Task 2.3

This is a common red flag of money laundering that involves layering, which is the process of moving funds through multiple accounts or entities to conceal their origin and ownership. Layering often involves cross-border transfers, especially to high-risk jurisdictions, and rapid movement of funds to avoid detection or tracing. A compliance officer should prioritize this red flag for investigation, as it may indicate a complex money laundering scheme or the financing of terrorism or proliferation.

References:

AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators? - ComplyAdvantage, section “Red flags related to transaction patterns”

AML 101: The 10 Most Common Red Flags - KYC-Chain, section “Red flag indicators related to geographical risks”

Anti-money laundering red flags, page 2, bullet point 5

 The FATF conducts peer reviews of each member on an ongoing basis to assess levels of implementation of the FATF Recommendations, providing an in-depth description and analysis of each country’s system for preventing criminal abuse of the financial system. The FATF Methodology for assessing compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems sets out the evaluation process. Assessments focus on two areas, effectiveness and technical compliance. The effectiveness component will assess whether the AML/CFT systems are working, and the extent to which the country is achieving the defined set of outcomes. The technical compliance component will assess whether the necessary laws, regulations or other required measures are in force and effect, and whether the supporting AML/CFT institutional framework is in place.

References:

Mutual Evaluations - Financial Action Task Force

FATF Methodology for assessing compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems

Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide (the 6th edition), FIUs are central agencies that receive, analyze, and disseminate financial intelligence to support the detection and prevention of money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes1. FIUs have different legal powers and functions depending on their type and jurisdiction, but generally they can use various investigative techniques, such as requesting additional information from reporting entities, accessing databases, conducting analysis, and issuing guidance12. FIUs also have access to a wide range of financial information, such as suspicious activity reports, currency transaction reports, cross-border cash declarations, and other relevant data sources, to identify and assess potential illicit activities13. Moreover, FIUs can cooperate and exchange information with domestic and foreign counterparts, subject to certain legal and operational safeguards, to facilitate cross-border investigations and prosecutions of financial crimes14.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide (the 6th edition), Chapter 5: The Role of the Financial Intelligence Unit in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, pages 153-1631

What are Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)? | Dow Jones

Financial Intelligence Units - Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism - MONEYVAL - Coe

The role of financial intelligence units in combating money laundering (Chapter 6) - Money Laundering

A TCSP providing services should have policies and procedures in place to identify critical information of the signatory, as this is one of the key elements of the customer due diligence (CDD) process. The signatory is the person who has the authority to sign documents or contracts on behalf of the customer, such as a company, a trust, or a partnership. The signatory may also be the beneficial owner, the controller, or a nominee of the customer. The TCSP should verify the identity and the capacity of the signatory, as well as the source and origin of the funds or assets involved in the transaction or business relationship. The TCSP should also monitor the activities of the signatory and report any suspicious or unusual transactions or changes in the signatory’s behaviour or profile.

References:

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination - 6th Edition, Chapter 2: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Section 2.2: Customer Due Diligence (CDD), Subsection 2.2.1: CDD Process, pp. 51-52

RISK-BASED APPROACH GUIDANCE FOR TRUST AND COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS (TCSPs), Section III – Guidance for TCSPs, Subsection III.1: Risk Assessment, pp. 23-24

SRA | Trust and Company Service Provider guidance | Solicitors Regulation Authority, Section: Definition, Paragraph 2

A Trust and Company Service Provider (TCSP) providing services should have policies and procedures in place to identify critical information of the:, Answer B

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3, Section 3.2, the financial institution should implement the following measures in order to identify and investigate money laundering activity from their clients:

Adverse news screening: This is a process of checking the clients’ names and related parties against various sources of negative or adverse information, such as media reports, sanctions lists, watch lists, law enforcement databases, etc. Adverse news screening can help the financial institution to detect any potential red flags or indicators of money laundering or other criminal activities involving their clients, and to take appropriate actions, such as conducting enhanced due diligence, filing suspicious activity reports, or terminating the relationship.

Transaction monitoring: This is a process of reviewing and analyzing the clients’ transactions and activities, such as deposits, withdrawals, transfers, payments, etc., to identify any unusual or suspicious patterns or behaviors that deviate from their normal or expected profile. Transaction monitoring can help the financial institution to detect any possible signs of money laundering or other financial crimes, such as structuring, layering, integration, fraud, tax evasion, etc., and to investigate and report them accordingly.

The other options are not measures that the financial institution should implement in order to identify and investigate money laundering activity from their clients, although they may be part of the overall AML program or compliance culture:

Integrity policy: This is a document that outlines the ethical principles and values that guide the conduct and behavior of the financial institution and its employees. An integrity policy can help the financial institution to promote a culture of honesty, transparency, and accountability, and to prevent or deter any misconduct or corruption. However, an integrity policy alone is not sufficient or specific enough to identify and investigate money laundering activity from their clients.

Whistleblower hotline: This is a mechanism that allows the employees or other stakeholders of the financial institution to report any suspected or observed violations of the AML policies, procedures, or regulations, or any other wrongdoing or malpractice, without fear of retaliation or reprisal. A whistleblower hotline can help the financial institution to encourage and facilitate the reporting of any potential or actual money laundering activity from their clients or within the organization, and to protect the rights and interests of the whistleblowers. However, a whistleblower hotline is not a measure that the financial institution implements to identify and investigate money laundering activity from their clients, but rather a tool that supports the AML program and compliance function.

Code of conduct: This is a document that defines the standards and expectations of the financial institution and its employees regarding their professional and ethical behavior, responsibilities, and obligations. A code of conduct can help the financial institution to establish and maintain a culture of compliance and integrity, and to prevent or address any conflicts of interest, misconduct, or abuse of power. However, a code of conduct is not a measure that the financial institution implements to identify and investigate money laundering activity from their clients, but rather a framework that governs the AML program and compliance function.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3, Section 3.2

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)

When an existing customer becomes a politically exposed person (PEP), the KYC analyst should perform enhanced due diligence (EDD) for that customer. EDD involves gathering additional information about the customer, assessing the risk associated with their PEP status, and updating the KYC profile accordingly. The goal is to ensure compliance with regulations, verify customer identities, and mitigate the higher risk posed by PEPs. Regular monitoring and updates during the review/refresh period are essential to stay informed about any changes in the customer’s status or risk profile1.

References:

PEP in KYC & KYB: Requirements and Steps for PEP Screening

Politically Exposed Persons (PEP): Definition and Risks | Okta

How to effectively screen PEPs to meet KYC requirements - Castellum.AI

When a financial institution is requested to provide data and information to a law enforcement agency for matters related to the financing of terrorism, assistance cannot be refused on the grounds of tipping-off. Tipping-off refers to disclosing to a customer or any third party that a suspicious activity report (SAR) has been filed. However, in this specific context, the obligation to provide information to law enforcement takes precedence over any concerns related to tipping-off. Financial institutions must cooperate fully with law enforcement agencies in such cases to combat money laundering and terrorist financing12.

References:

31 CFR 1010.520 (a) (2)

FinCEN: Fact Sheet on the Rapid Response Program (RRP)

FinCEN.gov

Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) BSA/AML Examination Manual

Cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that uses cryptography to secure and verify transactions. Cryptocurrencies are decentralized and operate outside the control of any central authority, such as a government or a bank. This makes them attractive for money launderers, who can use them to transfer funds anonymously, quickly, and globally, without leaving a trace or being subject to regulation. Cryptocurrencies pose more risk of money laundering than other sources of money, such as wire transfers, credit cards, or money service businesses, which are subject to more oversight, verification, and reporting requirements.

References:

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 1, Section 1.9, page 37

CAMS eLearning Course, Module 1, Lesson 9

ACAMS Crypto Hub

The risk-based approach (RBA) is an essential foundation of the FATF Recommendations, as it allows countries, competent authorities and financial institutions to adopt a more flexible set of measures to target their resources more effectively and apply preventive measures that are commensurate to the nature of risks, in order to focus their efforts in the most effective way. The RBA is not optional, but a prerequisite for the effective implementation of the FATF Standards. The RBA requires the identification, assessment and understanding of the ML/TF risks to which the countries and FIs are exposed, and the implementation of AML/CFT measures that are proportionate and tailored to those risks. The RBA is not a “zero failure” approach, but a way to mitigate the risks in the most efficient and effective manner.

References:

FATF Recommendations, Introduction, page 11

FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing - High Level Principles and Procedures, page 3

Risk-based Approach (RBA), What is the Risk-based Approach (RBA)?

According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a sound KYC program should consist of four essential elements: (i) customer acceptance policy; (ii) customer identification; (iii) on-going monitoring of higher risk accounts; and (iv) risk management. Therefore, B and D are the correct choices among the given options. A customer acceptance policy defines the types of customers that the bank is willing to accept and the conditions for doing so. A risk management system ensures that the bank has adequate policies, procedures, and controls to identify, measure, monitor, and mitigate the risks arising from its KYC program.

References:

BCBS, Customer due diligence for banks, October 2001, p. 41

BCBS, Consolidated KYC Risk Management, October 2004, p. 42

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) Sixth Edition manual, elements that can trigger a review of the existing relationship during the opening of a new account include recent adverse media on the client (page 60) and incoming transfers from high-risk jurisdictions (page 61). The other elements listed, such as regular checks on the flow of funds, a false positive result for name screening, and an estimated total income decrease, are not triggers for a review.

The compliance officer should recommend an audit for cash transactions since the last compliance review, as this would help to identify the extent of the problem, the root causes, and the potential risks involved. The audit would also provide evidence for corrective actions and remedial measures to prevent future occurrences of non-compliance. The compliance officer should not recommend terminating or suspending the teller’s employment, as this would be premature and disproportionate without a thorough investigation and due process. The compliance officer should not recommend formally reprimanding the branch manager, as this would not address the underlying issues and could create a hostile work environment.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, page 1251

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 5, Lesson 12

ACAMS CAMS Certification Exam Outline, Domain 5, Task 33

Layering is the second stage of the money laundering process, in which the launderer moves the funds around to create distance and confusion between the source and the destination of the illicit proceeds. Layering often involves multiple transactions, such as wire transfers, shell companies, trusts, and offshore accounts, that make it difficult to trace the origin and ownership of the funds. Layering is intended to disguise the audit trail and provide anonymity for the launderer12.

Placement is the first stage of the money laundering process, in which the launderer introduces the illicit proceeds into the financial system, often by breaking them into smaller amounts or using cash-intensive businesses12.

Structuring is a technique used in the placement stage, in which the launderer deposits or withdraws cash in amounts below the reporting threshold to avoid detection or suspicion12.

Integration is the third and final stage of the money laundering process, in which the launderer reintroduces the funds into the legitimate economy, often by purchasing assets, investing in businesses, or mixing them with legal income12.

References: 1: ACAMS (2020), Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, ACAMS, Miami, FL, USA, pp.  12-14. 2: ACAMS (2020), CAMS Examination Preparation Video, 6th Edition, ACAMS, Miami, FL, USA, Module 1.

Retail banks typically have a high inherent risk of money laundering due to their provision of cash services. This is because cash is a preferred medium of exchange for criminals and terrorists, and retail banks provide a convenient way for them to move large sums of money without detection. Retail banks are also vulnerable to money laundering through the use of false identities and other deceptive practices. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 8).

The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) is a global network of FIUs that facilitates and promotes the exchange of information, knowledge, and cooperation among its members to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes1. The Egmont Group has developed operational guidance for international cooperation and information exchange among FIUs, which includes channels, procedures, and forms for making and receiving requests2. Filing a request under Egmont guidelines is therefore a common and effective way for a regulatory body to obtain international assistance in a money laundering inquiry, as it ensures that the request is made through the appropriate and secure channel, and that it meets the standards and expectations of the requested FIU.

References:

1: Home - Egmont Group

2: EGMONT GROUP OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR …

The product type that is subject to US extra jurisdictional reach over non-US banks and non-US persons under the USA PATRIOT Act is Correspondent Banking. According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) Study Guide, "The USA PATRIOT Act extends the reach of the Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-money laundering statutes to non-U.S. banks and non-U.S. persons. This extra jurisdictional reach includes, but is not limited to, correspondent banking."

 According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a financial institution must take certain steps to fulfill its customer due diligence (CDD) obligations [1][2]. These steps include verifying the customer's identity, understanding the customer's business, and assessing the customer's risk profile. Additionally, the financial institution must verify that the customer is not on any sanction lists, such as the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list. This step is important to ensure that the financial institution is not doing business with any individuals or entities that are subject to economic sanctions. Other steps include obtaining information on the intended nature of the banking relationship, securing a written declaration from the customer confirming the source of the funds, and identifying shareholders listed on the stock exchange of corporate entities holding fifty percent of the shares.

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), substantial growth in wealth during a short period of time is a red flag for money laundering or terrorist financing. Additionally, when a client is a family member of a politically exposed person (PEP) from a country known for corruption, it raises concerns about the potential for corruption, bribery, or influence peddling. In this case, the client's father became the president of Country B, which makes him a PEP.

An employee who witnesses suspicious activity from a coworker should not confront the coworker or discuss the activity with their supervisor. Instead, they should report the activity to their employer's conflict line or compliance department, who can investigate the matter and take the appropriate action. It is important to remember that employees are legally obligated to report any suspicious activity they witness.

The anti-money laundering officer should advise the bank that compliance should have been involved during product development to perform a risk assessment of the product. This is because stored-value cards are considered high-risk products for money laundering and terrorist financing, as they can be used to store, transfer, or access funds anonymously, across borders, or through third parties. A risk assessment would help the bank identify and mitigate the potential vulnerabilities and threats associated with the product, such as customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, record keeping, reporting, and training. A risk assessment would also help the bank comply with the regulatory requirements and expectations for offering such products, as well as the industry best practices and standards.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2, p. 140-1411

ACAMS CAMS Certification Exam Outline, 6th Edition, Domain 1, Task 1.1, p. 42

FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and Internet-Based Payment Services, June 2013, p. 9-103

The best course of action for the FI in this scenario is to consider retaining qualified, experienced legal counsel. This is because the investigation request from the local law enforcement agency may involve complex legal issues, such as confidentiality, privacy, data protection, and cooperation obligations. The FI may need to balance the interests of the customer, the law enforcement agency, and the FI itself, and ensure that it complies with the applicable laws and regulations in responding to the request. The legal counsel can advise the FI on the scope, validity, and implications of the request, and help the FI to prepare and submit the required information in a timely and appropriate manner. The legal counsel can also protect the FI from any potential liability or litigation arising from the investigation.

References:

1: Requests by Law Enforcement for Financial Institutions to Maintain Accounts and/or Conduct Transactions1

2: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting and Other Anti-Money Laundering Considerations2

3: ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination3

According to the FATF Recommendations, financial institutions should maintain all necessary records on transactions and customers for at least five years, and make them available to competent authorities upon appropriate authority1. This includes records and documents related to suspicious transactions that have been reported to the financial intelligence unit (FIU) or other designated authorities. Providing the supporting documentation to competent authorities upon request is essential for the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and terrorist financing offences, as well as for the identification and tracing of criminal assets2.

Hinting to the customer that she should come in and explain her behavior is not a correct answer, as it may tip off the customer about the suspicion and compromise the effectiveness of the reporting system. Financial institutions should not disclose to the customer or to third parties that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being reported to the FIU3.

Maintaining adequate written documentation of all individuals and transactions reported is not a sufficient answer, as it does not imply cooperation with competent authorities. Financial institutions should not only keep records, but also provide them to the authorities when requested.

Submitting information upon receiving a legal request from parties involved in a civil lawsuit is not a relevant answer, as it does not relate to the cooperation with competent authorities for AML/CFT purposes. Civil lawsuits are not part of the AML/CFT framework, and financial institutions should not disclose confidential information to private parties without proper legal grounds.

References:

FATF Recommendation 11: Record-keeping 1

FATF Recommendation 31: Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities 2

FATF Recommendation 21: Tipping-off and confidentiality 3

According to the ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide (6th edition), one of the red flags for money laundering is the structuring of cash transactions to avoid reporting thresholds. Structuring is the practice of breaking down large amounts of cash into smaller deposits or withdrawals that are below the reporting threshold of $10,000 in the United States or equivalent amounts in other jurisdictions. Structuring is done to evade the detection and reporting of cash transactions by financial institutions to the authorities. Therefore, when an accountable institution identifies that a customer is engaging in structuring or other forms of cash transaction manipulation, it should file a SAR/STR to report the suspicious activity1

References: 1: ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide (6th edition), page 64.

Wider exposure to organized crime and corruption: When individuals or communities are exposed to organized crime networks or corrupt practices, they may become more susceptible to engaging in illicit activities. Organized crime groups often exploit vulnerabilities, leading to money laundering.

Weaker development of economy and job opportunities: In regions with limited economic growth and scarce job prospects, individuals may turn to illicit activities as a means of survival. Poverty and lack of legitimate income sources can drive people toward money laundering.

References:

1. World Bank Document: “Illicit Activity and Money Laundering from an Economic Growth Perspective” 1.

2. The Social Impact Of Money Laundering 2.

3. Money Laundering: History, Regulations, and Techniques 3.

4. The IMF and the Fight Against Illicit Financial Flows 4.

5. SSRN Paper: “Illicit Activity and Money Laundering from an Economic Growth” 5.

 This is a red flag of money laundering or terrorist financing that involves the use of non-profit organizations (NPOs) as conduits for illicit funds. NPOs may be vulnerable to abuse by criminals who exploit their legitimate activities, reputation, and access to funds and resources. A transaction monitoring process that would alert a bank for this red flag activity is to analyze the source, destination, frequency, and purpose of the funds transferred to and from the charity account, and to compare them with the expected profile and activity of the NPO. If the bank detects any inconsistency, discrepancy, or deviation from the norm, it should raise an alert and conduct further investigation.

References:

FATF Report: Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-Profit Organisations, page 9

Transaction Monitoring Processes for Red Flag Activity in Banking

AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators? - ComplyAdvantage, section “Red flags related to the nature of transactions”

An anti-money laundering officer should coordinate with human resources when implementing a new hire screening program, because human resources is responsible for managing the recruitment, hiring, and training of employees, as well as ensuring compliance with labor laws and regulations. A new hire screening program is a key component of an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program, as it helps to prevent the hiring of individuals who may pose a risk of facilitating money laundering, terrorist financing, or other financial crimes, or who may have a criminal or disciplinary history that could compromise the integrity of the institution. A new hire screening program should include background checks, verification of credentials and references, and assessment of skills and competencies relevant to the AML function. An anti-money laundering officer should work closely with human resources to establish the criteria, procedures, and documentation for the screening program, as well as to monitor its implementation and effectiveness.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, Module 4: Developing an AML Program, Lesson 4.2: Developing an AML Program

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition2, Chapter 4: Developing an AML Program, Section 4.2: Developing an AML Program, pp. 81-82

ACAMS CAMS Examination Preparation Seminar, 6th Edition3, Chapter 4: Developing an AML Program, Section 4.2: Developing an AML Program, Slide 20

A bank employee who willfully violates anti-money laundering laws faces the risk of criminal investigation and imprisonment, as these are serious offenses that could result in felony charges and penalties. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, individuals who knowingly violate the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) or other anti-money laundering laws could face up to 10 years in prison and/or a fine of up to $500,0001. Similarly, in other jurisdictions, such as the UK, Canada, and Australia, individuals who commit money laundering offenses could face imprisonment and/or fines234.

References:

1: U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual, Title 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Laundering of Monetary Instruments, Section 2101 2: UK Government, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Part 7: Money Laundering Offences, Section 327-329 3: Government of Canada, Criminal Code, Part XII.1: Laundering of Proceeds of Crime, Section 462.31 4: Australian Government, Criminal Code Act 1995, Chapter 10: National Infrastructure, Part 10.2: Money Laundering, Section 400.3-400.9

Penalties for AML/CFT violations, including criminal and civil penalties, fines, jail terms, as well as internal sanctions, such as disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment.

 A U.S. bank must block or reject an international funds transfer when there is an OFAC designated party to the transaction, regardless of the beneficiary or the correspondent bank. This is because the U.S. bank is prohibited from dealing with any person or entity that is on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) or subject to any other OFAC sanctions program1. The SDN List includes individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers, that are designated under programs that are not country-specific2. The U.S. bank must also report any blocked or rejected transactions to OFAC within 10 business days3.

References: 1: FFIEC BSA/AML Office of Foreign Assets Control - Office of Foreign … 2: Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List (SDN) Human … 3: [Reporting Blocked Transactions | Office of Foreign Assets Control]

A Penza scheme, also known as a Ponzi scheme, is a form of fraud that lures investors and pays profits to earlier investors with funds from more recent investors1 The scheme relies on attracting new investors with unrealistic promises of high returns and low risk, while using their money to pay off the previous investors2 An unlicensed investment advisor who offers profits other investments cannot guarantee is likely to be involved in a Penza scheme, as this is a common way to entice unsuspecting victims3 The other options are not necessarily indicative of a Penza scheme, as they could be legitimate or involve other types of fraud.

References: 1 Ponzi scheme - Wikipedia; 2 Ponzi Schemes: Definition, Examples, and Origins - Investopedia; 3 What is Ponzi Scheme? - Sanction Scanner

The method of purchasing chips with cash and redeeming them for a check is used to launder money in casinos. This is because the check can be deposited into a bank account or cashed at another location, creating a paper trail that appears to be legitimate. The check can also be used to conceal the source and amount of the cash, as well as the identity of the person who obtained it. This method is also known as “chip washing” or “chip dumping” and is one of the common ways that money launderers exploit casinos12.

References:

1: CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, p. 32-33 2: FATF Report: Money Laundering through the Physical Transportation of Cash, October 2015, p. 28-29,

The U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. OFAC publishes lists of individuals and entities that are subject to various sanctions programs, such as the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSI List), and the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List (FSE List). These lists are updated frequently and can be accessed through OFAC’s website or other sources12.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. FATF publishes lists of jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) regimes, and calls on its members and other countries to apply enhanced due diligence or counter-measures to protect themselves from the risks emanating from these jurisdictions. These lists are updated periodically and can be accessed through FATF’s website or other sources34.

References:

1: CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 3: Sanctions, p. 63-64 2: U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, 3: CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 4: FATF Recommendations, p. 77-78 4: Financial Action Task Force,

The board of directors has the ultimate responsibility within a bank for ensuring that the bank has a comprehensive and effective BSA/AML program and oversight framework that is reasonably designed to ensure compliance with applicable regulations. According to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) BSA/AML Examination Manual, the board of directors must approve the BSA/AML compliance program, which includes the BSA/AML policy, internal controls, independent testing, designated BSA/AML compliance officer, and training1. The board of directors must also provide sufficient resources, ensure qualified staff, and hold senior management accountable for implementing and adhering to the BSA/AML compliance program1.

References:

1: FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Board of Directors and Senior Management Oversight

According to the CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition1, the ultimate responsibility for an institution’s anti-money laundering program rests with the institution’s board of directors. The board of directors is responsible for creating a culture of compliance, approving the AML policies and procedures, appointing the AML compliance officer, overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of the AML program, and ensuring adequate resources and training are provided to the staff. The board of directors is also accountable for any deficiencies or violations of the AML program and must take corrective actions when necessary.

References:

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS

According to the web search results, one of the methods that FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) use to understand the inherent money laundering and terrorist financing risks in their regions is to conduct regional-level research and analysis of the money laundering and terrorist financing methods and trends using standards and templates used for FATF typologies reports12. Typologies are the various techniques used to launder money or finance terrorism, and typologies reports are the documents that describe these techniques, identify the vulnerabilities and risks, and provide case studies and best practices to prevent and detect them3. The FATF and its FSRBs produce typologies reports on a regular basis, covering different topics and sectors relevant to their regions and the global community3. By conducting regional-level research and analysis, FSRBs can enhance their understanding of the specific money laundering and terrorist financing threats and challenges faced by their member countries, and provide them with useful guidance and recommendations to mitigate these risks12.

The other options are not correct because they are either not the methods used by FSRBs to understand the inherent money laundering and terrorist financing risks in their regions, or they are not consistent with the FATF standards and expectations. Requiring member countries to develop statistical metrics over money laundering and terrorist financing crimes may be a useful way to measure the effectiveness of their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) systems, but it is not a method used by FSRBs to understand the risks in their regions. Rather, it is a requirement imposed by the FATF on all countries to collect and maintain comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of their AML/CFT systems4. Requiring participating financial institutions of their members to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) to the regional body may be a violation of the FATF standards, which state that financial institutions should report any suspicious transactions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU) of their country, not to any regional or international body5. Moreover, STRs are confidential and protected by legal provisions, and should not be disclosed to any third party without the consent of the FIU5. Conducting global research on money laundering and terrorist financing trends and reporting their findings in their own typologies report may be a duplication of the FATF’s work, as the FATF is the global standard-setter and policy-maker for AML/CFT, and produces typologies reports that cover the global trends and issues3. FSRBs should focus on the regional-level research and analysis, and coordinate and cooperate with the FATF and other FSRBs to share information and experiences12.

References: 5678910

 it describes the organization that a national Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) should consider becoming a member of, which is the Egmont Group. The Egmont Group is an international network of FIUs that was established in 1995 to facilitate the exchange of financial intelligence and information among its members, and to promote cooperation and coordination in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. The Egmont Group currently has 166 member FIUs from different jurisdictions, and provides them with various benefits, such as access to secure communication channels, best practices, training, and technical assistance. The Egmont Group also works closely with other international organizations, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the United Nations, and the World Bank, to enhance the global anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) framework.

The other options are not necessarily organizations that a national FIU should consider becoming a member of, although they may have some relevance or influence on the AML/CTF field. Option B describes the Wolfsberg Group, which is an association of 13 global banks that was formed in 2000 to develop standards and guidance for the financial industry on AML/CTF and other financial crime issues. The Wolfsberg Group is not an organization for FIUs, but rather for financial institutions. Option C describes the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is an inter-governmental body that was established in 1989 to set the international standards and recommendations for AML/CTF and to monitor the compliance and effectiveness of its members and other jurisdictions. The FATF is not an organization for FIUs, but rather for governments and policy-makers. Option D describes the Basel Committee, which is a forum of central bank governors and heads of banking supervision authorities from 28 jurisdictions that was established in 1974 to enhance the quality and consistency of banking supervision and regulation. The Basel Committee is not an organization for FIUs, but rather for banking regulators and supervisors.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - 6th Edition1

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)2

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 5, pages 108-109

During an internal investigation, employees should be instructed to do the following actions:

Inform counsel of all request for documentation: This is to ensure that the legal rights and obligations of the organization and the employees are protected and respected. Counsel can also advise on the scope, relevance, and confidentiality of the requested documents1.

Make copies of all documents provided to law enforcement: This is to maintain a record of the information that has been disclosed and to prevent any loss or alteration of the original documents. Copies should be made before the documents are handed over to law enforcement2.

Keep a log of the documents requested: This is to track the progress and status of the investigation and to avoid any duplication or omission of the requested documents. The log should include the date, time, description, and location of the documents, as well as the name and contact details of the person who requested and received them3.

Providing corporate documents directly to law enforcement, on the other hand, is not an action that employees should be instructed to do during an internal investigation. This is because law enforcement may not have the legal authority or the proper warrant to access the documents, and doing so may violate the privacy or confidentiality of the organization or the employees. Employees should consult with counsel before providing any documents to law enforcement4.

References:

1: Internal money laundering reporting | The Law Society5 2: How to Conduct Effective AML Investigations - Blog | Unit212 3: What Is The Importance Of An Internal Investigation?4 4: Anti-Money Laundering: 5 Steps to Conduct an Audit3

Trade-based money laundering (TBML) is a method of disguising and moving illicit funds through the international trade system. Criminals often manipulate various aspects of trade transactions, such as pricing, quantity, documentation, and commodity type, to transfer value and obscure the source of funds. Some of the common red flags that may indicate TBML are:

The transaction involves the use of front (or shell) companies: Front or shell companies are entities that have no physical presence, no employees, and no business activity, but are used to facilitate money laundering. They often have vague or generic names, are registered in secrecy jurisdictions, and have no available ownership information. In this case, ABC Holdings Ltd. and Sunrise Holdings Ltd. could be front or shell companies that are used to launder money through trade transactions.

The type of commodity being shipped appears inconsistent with the exporter or importer’s regular business activities: Criminals may use commodities that are unrelated to their core business or that have low correlation with the market price to launder money. They may also use commodities that are difficult to value, verify, or trace, such as precious metals, gems, art, or antiquities. In this case, the automotive parts company and the silk flower supplier seem to have no logical connection, and the value of the silk flowers may be inflated or deflated to transfer funds.

References:

Trade-Based Money Laundering: Risk Indicators - Financial Action Task Force, pp. 9-10, 14-15

Identifying TBML: 8 Trade-Based Money Laundering Red Flags - Alessa, pp. 1-2

FFIEC BSA/AML Appendices - Appendix F – Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Red Flags, p. 7

AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators? - ComplyAdvantage, p. 1

 The important fact to include in the STR is the recent change in the timing of deposits and withdrawals in the account, as this indicates a possible change in the customer’s source and use of funds, and may suggest money laundering or other illicit activity. The customer’s work history, the amount of his monthly retirement check, the fact that he is well known to the bank staff, and the fact that he has lived in the area and banked at this bank for 25 years are not relevant for the STR, as they do not explain the unusual pattern of transactions in his account.

References:

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 4: Conducting and Supporting the Investigation Process, page 131

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS, CAMS Examination Preparation, page 8

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs, Video 4.2: Suspicious Transaction Reporting

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 97

According to the FATF typology report 2000-20011, lawyers can provide a range of functions that can be useful to a potential money launderer, such as:

Creating complex legal arrangements, such as trusts, foundations, or corporations, that can obscure the identity and ownership of the beneficial owners or the origin and destination of the funds.

Buying and selling property, such as real estate, art, or jewelry, that can be used to transfer or store illicit proceeds or to provide a legitimate cover for the source of funds.

Performing financial transactions on behalf of a client, such as opening bank accounts, transferring funds, issuing checks, or exchanging currencies, that can facilitate the movement or concealment of illicit funds.

Providing legal advice, on the other hand, is not a function that can be directly exploited by a money launderer, unless the advice is related to the above functions or to the avoidance or evasion of anti-money laundering laws and regulations.

References:

1: FATF Terrorist Financing Typologies Report - Financial Action Task Force2

The USA PATRIOT Act imposes several requirements on U.S. financial institutions when dealing with foreign financial institutions, especially those that pose a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Two of these requirements are:

Performing enhanced due diligence on shell banks: A shell bank is a bank that has no physical presence in any country and is not affiliated with a regulated financial group. The USA PATRIOT Act prohibits U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for shell banks, and requires them to take reasonable steps to ensure that their correspondent accounts are not being used by shell banks indirectly12.

Performing due diligence on correspondent accounts: A correspondent account is an account established by a financial institution to receive deposits from, make payments on behalf of, or handle other financial transactions for a foreign financial institution. The USA PATRIOT Act requires U.S. financial institutions to collect and verify certain information about the foreign financial institution, such as its ownership, licensing, and anti-money laundering policies, and to assess the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing associated with the correspondent account13.

References:

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 3: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), pages 82-84

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS, Candidate Handbook, page 14

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs, Video 3.4: Correspondent Banking and Money Laundering Risks

According to the ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, one of the red flags for money laundering is “transferring funds to or from foreign countries or jurisdictions that are known to have weak anti-money laundering standards or are considered high-risk for money laundering or terrorist financing” (Module 2, Lesson 3, Part 2). This is also consistent with the suspicious activity report (SAR) criteria, which require financial institutions to report transactions that “involve funds derived from illegal activity or are intended or conducted to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activity” or “involve the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity” (31 CFR § 1020.320(a)(2)). Therefore, the customer’s request to transfer funds to accounts in three different foreign jurisdictions should be the focus of the SAR, as it may indicate an attempt to launder money or finance terrorism.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course

[31 CFR § 1020.320 - Reports by banks of suspicious transactions]

Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional bodies (FSRBs) are organizations that associate countries from the same region or that face similar challenges to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. FSRBs have the same objectives as the FATF, which are to set international standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. One of the main functions of FSRBs is to provide technical assistance and training to their members in implementing the FATF recommendations, which are the global standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. FSRBs also conduct mutual evaluations of their members to assess their level of compliance with the FATF recommendations and provide follow-up reports and actions.

References:

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, Section 2.11

Certification Candidate Handbook, Section 3.22

FATF website, About Us, FATF-Style Regional Bodies3

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the best practices for dealing with law enforcement inquiries is to verify the identity and authority of the law enforcement officer before providing any information (p. 224). This is to ensure that the inquiry is legitimate and not a phishing attempt or a breach of confidentiality. The compliance officer should also document the inquiry and the information provided, and consult with legal counsel if necessary. The other options are not appropriate, as they may either violate the law, compromise the investigation, or create unnecessary work.

References:

ACAMS. (2020). Study Guide for the Certification Examination for Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (6th ed.). Miami, FL: ACAMS.

What Is An AML Officer1

Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering: Requests by Law Enforcement for Financial Institutions to Maintain Accounts 2

Wire transfers to high-risk jurisdictions and large cash deposits from a high-risk jurisdiction are two red flags that may indicate money laundering. These activities suggest that the customer is trying to move funds from or to a country that has weak anti-money laundering (AML) controls, or that is known to be a source or destination of illicit funds12. Wire transfers can also be used to obscure the origin or destination of the funds, or to layer transactions through multiple accounts or intermediaries3. Large cash deposits can indicate that the customer is trying to avoid the reporting or record-keeping requirements that apply to cash transactions, or that the customer is dealing with proceeds from illegal activities45. The other two options are not necessarily red flags, as the bank may have legitimate reasons to allow cash deposits, and the client may reside in a high-risk jurisdiction for legitimate reasons.

References: 1: FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Red Flags, Geographic Concerns, 6; 2: AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators?, ComplyAdvantage, 5; 3: FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Red Flags, Transaction Has Unusual Features, 6; 4: FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Red Flags, Unusual Source of Funds, 6; 5: Money Laundering Red Flags | Key Behaviours and Indicators, High Speed Training, 8.

The first thing the anti-money laundering specialist should do is to conduct a risk assessment of the bank’s international electronic fund transfer activity. This is to identify and measure the potential money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with the bank’s products, services, customers, and geographic locations. A risk assessment can help the anti-money laundering specialist to:

Understand the nature and extent of the bank’s exposure to money laundering and terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities.

Establish a risk-based approach to the design and implementation of the anti-money laundering compliance program, including policies, procedures, controls, monitoring, reporting, and training.

Allocate appropriate resources and prioritize actions to mitigate the identified risks and enhance the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering compliance program.

Demonstrate to the regulators and auditors that the bank has a sound and comprehensive anti-money laundering compliance program that is commensurate with its risk profile and business activities.

References:

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 6, pages 167-168

CAMS Certification Exam Outline, Domain 3, Task 3.1, Skill 3.1.1

Anti-Money Laundering Bulletin November 2021 - Central Bank of Ireland, pages 4-5

Money Laundering through Money Remittance and Currency Exchange Providers, FATF, June 2010, pages 7-8

REGULATIONS - FIU, Part III, Regulation 9, pages 9-10

Precious metals, such as gold and silver, pose a high risk of money laundering because they have some features that make them attractive to criminals. According to the FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones1, these features include:

Some precious metals can be formed into other objects, making easier to transport. For example, gold can be melted and shaped into jewellery, coins, bars, or other items that can be easily concealed and moved across borders. This makes it difficult for law enforcement and customs authorities to detect and seize the illicit proceeds of crime.

Precious metals have high intrinsic value in a relatively compact form and are easy to convert into currency. For example, gold has a stable and universal value that can be exchanged for cash or other assets in any market. This makes it easy for criminals to store, transfer, and launder their illicit funds without leaving a trace in the formal financial system.

The other two options, C and D, are not as relevant to the risk of money laundering. The value of precious metals is determined by the market forces of supply and demand, and it is not easy to inflate or manipulate it. Precious metals can be used in many high-tech commercial applications, but this does not necessarily make them more valuable or more prone to money laundering.

References:

1: FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones, 2008,

2: Money laundering and terrorist financing risks and vulnerabilities associated with gold, 2015,

3: The anti-money laundering framework for precious stones and metals dealers in Singapore, 2021,

4: Gold and Money Laundering, 2019,

Under the USA PATRIOT Act, a U.S. bank that maintains a correspondent account for a foreign bank operating under an offshore license must obtain from the foreign bank the name and address of a person residing in the United States who is authorized to accept service of legal process for records related to the correspondent account1. This requirement is intended to facilitate the U.S. authorities’ access to information and records regarding the correspondent account and its underlying transactions, especially in cases where the foreign bank is located in a jurisdiction that does not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement or regulatory requests2.

References:

USA PATRIOT Act, Section 319(b)(2)(A)1

ACAMS, CAMS Examination Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, pp. 151-152

An institution should incorporate on-going training, periodic audits, and ability to incorporate relevant legislative and regulatory AML changes in its AML policies and procedures. These are essential elements of an effective AML program, as they ensure that the staff are aware of their roles and responsibilities, the institution is compliant with the applicable laws and regulations, and the AML program is updated and adapted to the changing risks and environment.

References: =

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS1

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS2

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs3

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)4

The Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) is a trade-based money laundering technique commonly used by narcotics traffickers based in Colombia and Mexico. The central feature is the use of a money trader to ensure that the revenue from drug sales in the U.S. doesn’t actually cross any borders. Instead, those dollars are used to purchase any number of legitimate commodities from unsuspecting businesses on behalf of legitimate South American businesspersons, whose legitimate imports are used to obtain pesos for the drug cartels12. The BMPE involves six distinct steps:

Obtaining criminal proceeds: The drug cartels sell drugs for dollars in the U.S.

Involvement of intermediary services: The drug cartels sell the dollars to black market peso exchangers in Colombia at a discounted rate.

Identification of complicit companies: The black market peso exchangers identify exporting companies in the U.S. and importing companies in South America that are willing to participate in the scheme.

Placement of funds: The black market peso exchangers deposit the dollars into U.S. bank accounts or use money service businesses or other methods to transfer the funds.

Layering of funds: The black market peso exchangers use the funds to purchase monetary instruments such as checks, money orders, or wire transfers, or to pay for the goods ordered by the South American importers.

Integration of funds: The South American importers receive the goods or the monetary instruments and use them to pay for their imports or to sell them for pesos in the local market.

References:

1: Black Market Peso Exchange in Money Laundering - Financial Crime Academy

2: Overview - FinCEN.gov

The inherent level of anti-money laundering risk across the entire organization depends on various factors, such as the nature, size, complexity, and structure of the business, the customers, the products and services, and the countries or jurisdictions involved. Among the four options given, the transaction monitoring program and the customer due diligence program are not factors that determine the inherent risk, but rather measures that mitigate the risk. Therefore, they are not relevant for the compliance officer’s purpose. The countries that the bank operates in and the products and services offered by the bank are important factors that affect the inherent risk, as they may expose the bank to different levels of money laundering threats, vulnerabilities, and regulatory requirements. For example, some countries or jurisdictions have high levels of corruption, unstable governments, or are known as money laundering havens1. They could also have inadequate AML/CFT regulatory and judicial frameworks, or be subject to economic sanctions2. Similarly, some products and services may pose higher risks than others, such as those that involve cash transactions, cross-border transfers, anonymous or non-face-to-face customers, or complex or innovative features34.

References: =

1: AML risk-rating models | McKinsey

2: Money laundering and terrorist financing risks - Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

4: AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators? - ComplyAdvantage

5: Anti Money Laundering Risk Assessment - Financial Crime Academy

Money laundering can have negative effects on a country’s currencies and interest rates, as it distorts the allocation of resources and the demand and supply of money. According to the IMF1, money laundering can also adversely affect currencies and interest rates as launderers reinvest funds where their schemes are less likely to be detected, rather than where rates of return are higher. This can create artificial fluctuations and imbalances in the exchange and interest rates, and undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy. For example, if launderers invest in low-yield assets such as government bonds or real estate, they may drive up the prices and lower the yields of these assets, while reducing the availability of funds for more productive investments. This can also affect the inflation and growth prospects of the country.

References:

1: Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering by Peter J. Quirk, IMF Working Paper, 1996

2: Understanding Money Laundering: How It Impacts the Global Economy by Tookitaki, 2019

3: Money Laundering by U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2021

4: The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime by John McDowell and Gary Novis, U.S. Department of State, 2001

Wire stripping is a technique used by money launderers to remove or alter information that identifies the originator or beneficiary of a wire transfer, in order to avoid detection or tracing. To detect wire stripping, a bank employee should compare the wire transaction as it enters and after it leaves the bank, and look for any discrepancies or missing information in the fields related to the originator or beneficiary. The employee should also check for suspicious phrases usually used to conceal originator or beneficiary identity, such as “for further credit”, “in favor of”, “on behalf of”, or “as instructed”.

References:

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3, Section 3.21

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, Section 5.31

ACAMS Chapter 3 Exam Questions, Question 792

FATF Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, Section 3.23

This method is indicative of potential money laundering and terrorist financing activity because it involves several red flags, such as:

The use of cash, which is anonymous and difficult to trace

The urgency of the transfer, which may suggest a need to move funds quickly before they are detected

The destination of the transfer, which may be a high risk country with weak anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) controls or sanctions

The lack of information about the client and the beneficiary, which may indicate a lack of due diligence or customer identification

These factors may indicate that the client is trying to conceal the source, ownership, or purpose of the funds, or that the funds are related to illicit activities such as money laundering or terrorist financing.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, Module 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Lesson 2.2: Money Laundering Methods

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition2, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Section 2.2: Money Laundering Methods, pp. 35-36

ACAMS CAMS Examination Preparation Seminar, 6th Edition3, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Section 2.2: Money Laundering Methods, Slide 14

One of the main challenges and risks for online banks is the verification of customer identity and the prevention of identity fraud. Online banks are more vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing because they do not have face-to-face contact with their customers and may rely on third-party sources or digital methods to verify customer information. Therefore, the most important recommendation for the anti-money laundering expert to make is that the online bank ensures that prospective new customers can be properly identified and that their identity documents and information are verified using reliable and independent sources. This is also in line with the international standards and best practices for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, such as the FATF Recommendations, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision principles, and the EU’s Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive123

The other options are less important or less effective than ensuring customer identification. Limiting the amount that can be processed per transaction may reduce the exposure to large-scale money laundering, but it does not prevent the use of multiple transactions or accounts to launder smaller amounts. Setting up automated programs to analyze transactions for money laundering activity may enhance the detection and reporting of suspicious transactions, but it does not address the root cause of money laundering, which is the concealment of the source and ownership of illicit funds. Ensuring that a firewall is set up to protect the transactions may improve the security and confidentiality of the online banking system, but it does not prevent the misuse of the system by money launderers who have legitimate access to the system123

References:

1: Anti-Money Laundering Guide for Digital Banks by sanctions.io, 2022

2: The fight against money laundering: Machine learning is a game changer by McKinsey, 2021

3: FATF Guidance on Digital Identity, 2020

According to the Wolfsberg Principles on Private Banking, the bank should apply additional diligence to customers who present a higher risk of money laundering or other financial crimes. Some of the indicators for defining such customers are:

Persons residing in or having funds from countries with inadequate AML standards, sanctions, embargoes, or other measures that indicate a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing12.

Persons engaged in business activities known to be susceptible to money laundering, such as cash-intensive businesses, gambling, arms trade, precious metals and stones, art and antiquities, etc13.

Persons determined to be Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), who are individuals who hold or have held positions of public trust or influence, or their family members or close associates, and who may pose a higher risk of corruption, bribery, or abuse of power14.

Persons who receive funds from a correspondent banking relationship are not necessarily required additional diligence, unless they fall under any of the above categories or other risk factors. Correspondent banking is a service provided by one bank to another bank to facilitate cross-border transactions, and it is subject to its own set of AML standards and due diligence measures5.

References:

Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking (2012) 1

FATF High-Risk and Other Monitored Jurisdictions

FATF Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals

FATF Guidance on Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22)

FATF Guidance on Correspondent Banking Services

Alternative remittance, also known as underground banking or informal value transfer systems, is a method of transferring money or value without using formal financial institutions or channels. It is often used by migrant workers, refugees, or people who lack access to formal banking services. However, it can also be exploited by criminals and terrorists to move funds across borders without detection or regulation. The Wolfsberg Group, a group of leading international banks that promotes best practices in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, cited alternative remittance as one of the sectors and activities that are widely used for the financing of terrorism in its Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The Wolfsberg Group recommended that financial institutions apply enhanced and appropriate due diligence to customers engaged in alternative remittance and report any suspicious transactions to the relevant authorities.

References:

Wolfsberg Group (2002). Wolfsberg Statement on Anti-Terrorism Financing1

Pieth, M. (ed.) (2002). Financing Terrorism. Springer, Dordrecht2

ACAMS (2020). CAMS Certification Package (6th Edition)3

The activity of a teller distributing bank brochures to customers who regularly conduct cash transactions below reporting limits warrants further review. This is because the teller may be facilitating or encouraging structuring, which is a form of money laundering that involves breaking down large amounts of cash into smaller transactions to avoid detection or reporting requirements. Structuring is illegal and can expose the institution and the employee to civil or criminal penalties. The teller may also be acting as an agent or a recruiter for money launderers who use the bank’s services to launder their illicit funds12.

References:

1: CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, p. 28-29 2: FATF Report: Money Laundering through the Physical Transportation of Cash, October 2015, p. 23-24,

- page 12

Banks should gather sufficient information about their respondent banks to understand fully the nature of the respondent’s business. Factors to consider include: information about the respondent bank’s management, major business activities, where they are located and its money-laundering prevention and detection efforts; the purpose of the account; the identity of any third party entities that will use the correspondent banking services; and the condition of bank regulation and supervision in the respondent’s country. Banks should only establish correspondent relationships with foreign banks that are effectively supervised by the relevant authorities. For their part, respondent banks should have effective customer acceptance and KYC policies.

One of the most common methods of money laundering in the insurance industry is to purchase a policy with illicit funds and then request a refund of the premiums, either partially or fully, before the policy matures. This way, the money launderer can receive a legitimate payment from the insurance company, effectively washing the dirty money. This technique is also known as premium fraud or early surrender12

According to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the most significant money laundering and terrorist financing risks in the insurance industry are found in life insurance and annuity products, because such products allow a customer to place large amounts of funds into the financial system and seamlessly transfer such funds to disguise their true origin34

Some indicators of potential money laundering through insurance products are: 12

The customer pays the premiums with cash, cashier’s checks, money orders, or other anonymous or unusual payment methods.

The customer overpays the premiums or makes multiple payments in excess of the required amount.

The customer cancels the policy during the free-look or grace period and requests a refund to a different account or a third party.

The customer purchases a policy that is inconsistent with their income, age, or risk profile.

The customer shows little interest in the benefits or terms of the policy, but is more concerned about the cancellation or surrender options.

References:

1: AML in Insurance: How to Detect & Combat Money Laundering, ComplyAdvantage, 2022

2: Anti Money Laundering (AML) In Insurance Industry In 2021, Financial Crime Academy, 2023

3: Money laundering in the insurance industry, Insurance Commission, 2022

4: Money laundering in the insurance industry, Atty. Dennis B. Funa, Business Mirror, 2016

[5]: Anti-Money Laundering Requirements: FAQs for Insurance Companies, FinCEN, 2005

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the red flags for money laundering in cash-intensive businesses is “the presence of privately-owned ATMs on the premises” (p. 222). This could indicate that the business is using the ATM to deposit or withdraw large amounts of cash from illicit sources, or to facilitate the movement of funds across borders. The other options are not necessarily indicative of money laundering risk, as they could be explained by legitimate factors such as the change in customer preferences, the economic situation, or the expansion of the business.

References:

ACAMS. (2020). Study Guide for the Certification Examination for Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (6th ed.). Miami, FL: ACAMS.

CFI. (2023)Money Laundering - Overview, How It Works, Example 1. Retrieved from

CALERT. (2016)How Do Criminals Launder Money Through a Restaurant? 2. Retrieved from

According to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), a financial institution or business must establish an anti-money laundering (AML) program that includes at least four elements: (a) a system of internal policies, procedures and controls to prevent, detect and report money laundering and other illicit activities; (b) a designated compliance officer who is responsible for overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of the AML program; © an ongoing employee training program that covers the legal and regulatory obligations, the risks and red flags of money laundering, and the roles and responsibilities of the staff in the AML program; and (d) an independent audit function that tests and evaluates the adequacy and compliance of the AML program12.

While the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a key agency that enforces economic and trade sanctions against targeted foreign countries, entities and individuals, it is not part of the BSA or the AML program requirements. However, financial institutions and businesses are expected to comply with OFAC regulations and screen their customers and transactions against the OFAC lists of sanctioned parties. Failure to do so may result in civil or criminal penalties34. Therefore, it is advisable for financial institutions and businesses to have an OFAC program that is integrated with their AML program, but it is not a mandatory element that they have to specifically address in their AML program.

References:

1: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2020). Anti-Money Laundering Programs

2: ACAMS (2020). CAMS Certification Package (6th Edition)

3: Office of Foreign Assets Control (2023). Sanctions Programs and Country Information

4: Moses & Singer LLP (2023). Anti-Money Laundering, Bank Secrecy and OFAC Regulations

The correct answer is B, C, and E, as these three present the highest anti-money laundering or sanctions risk and will require controls prior to launch. According to the FATF Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers1, P2P transactions pose significant challenges for AML/CFT compliance, as they may involve anonymous or pseudonymous parties, cross-border transfers, real-time settlement, and limited information on the beneficiaries. These factors increase the risk of money laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion, as well as the difficulty of detecting and reporting suspicious activity. Therefore, the institution should implement appropriate controls to mitigate these risks, such as:

Conducting enhanced due diligence on customers who use the P2P service, especially if they are located in high-risk jurisdictions or are involved in high-risk activities1.

Implementing transaction monitoring systems that can identify and flag unusual or suspicious patterns of behavior, such as large or frequent transfers, transfers to or from sanctioned entities or countries, or transfers that do not match the customer’s profile or expected activity12.

Applying the travel rule, which requires the originator and beneficiary VASPs (or financial institutions) to exchange and retain information on the parties involved in the transfer, such as their names, account numbers, addresses, and national identification numbers13.

Establishing information-sharing and cooperation mechanisms with other VASPs, financial institutions, and regulators, to facilitate the exchange of relevant data and intelligence on P2P transactions and customers14.

References: 1: Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers - FATF, page 13-16, 28-29, 32-33, 40-412: AML and Compliance Solution for The P2P Industry - Sanction Scanner3: P2P Money Laundering: How to Comply - ComplyAdvantage4: 2024 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment - U.S. Department of the Treasury, page 17.

"Increasingly, countries are using economic sanctions instead of military force as an instrument of foreign policy"

The primary consideration the institution should keep in mind when deciding whether to agree to the law enforcement request is whether the institution can continue to meet its regulatory obligations with the accounts open. This is because the institution has a duty to comply with the applicable laws and regulations, and to protect its reputation and integrity from being associated with money laundering or terrorist financing. The institution should assess the risks and benefits of keeping the account open, and consult with its legal counsel and senior management before making a decision. The institution should also document its decision and the rationale behind it, and communicate it to the law enforcement agency12.

References:

1: CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 7: Conducting or Supporting the Investigation Process, p. 143-144 2: FATF Guidance: Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial Inclusion, February 2013, p. 50-51,

According to the ACAMS study guide1, some of the common red flags for money laundering or financing terrorism are:

Customers who provide insufficient or suspicious information, such as unusual or unverifiable identification documents, different taxpayer identification numbers, or vague or inconsistent information about their business or source of funds.

Transactions that have unusual features, such as large cash payments, unexplained payments from a third party, use of multiple or foreign accounts, complex or illogical transactions, or transactions that are inconsistent with the customer’s profile or expected behavior.

Geographic concerns, such as transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions, offshore financial centers, secrecy havens, or countries subject to sanctions or embargoes.

Ultimate beneficial ownership that is unclear, such as customers who use shell companies, trusts, or other legal entities to obscure their identity or the identity of the true owners or controllers of the funds or assets.

In this scenario, two red flags that could indicate money laundering or financing terrorism are:

B. The guarantor company’s ownership structure is overly complex. This could be an attempt to hide the true source or destination of the funds, or to evade regulatory or law enforcement scrutiny. The use of a trust formed in a Caribbean island and a holding company based in a European secrecy haven could also indicate geographic concerns, as these jurisdictions are known for their low transparency and high confidentiality.

D. The ultimate beneficial owner is a young lady who has gained her wealth through a small business. This could be a case of false or misleading information, as the source of funds is not commensurate with the size or nature of the transaction. The fitness studio business could be a front or a cover for illicit activities, or the young lady could be a nominee or a straw man for the real owner or beneficiary.

References: = 1 ACAMS. (2020). Study Guide for the Certification Examination: Sixth Edition. Miami, FL: ACAMS.

Assessing AML/CFT is an ongoing and evolving component of maintaining a compliant AML/CFT program. Evaluating the risk-scoring model and conducting the risk assessment itself may need to be performed annually, every 18 to 24 months, before the launch of a new product or when an acquisition of another financial institution occurs.

According to the CAMS study guide, chapter 1, page 91, placement is the first stage of money laundering, where the illicit funds are introduced into the financial system. This stage involves the highest risk of detection, as the money launderers may use various methods to avoid suspicion, such as structuring, commingling, or using cash-intensive businesses. Placement is followed by layering and integration, which are the second and third stages of money laundering, where the illicit funds are moved and disguised through multiple transactions and entities, and then integrated into the legitimate economy as seemingly legal assets.

The other options are not the financial stages of money laundering, although they may be related to some aspects or techniques of money laundering. Option A, integration, is the final stage of money laundering, not the first. Option B, structuring, is a method of placement, not a stage of money laundering. Structuring, also known as smurfing, is the practice of breaking down large amounts of cash into smaller deposits or transactions to avoid reporting thresholds or scrutiny. Option C, off shoring, is a term that refers to the relocation of assets or activities to another jurisdiction, usually for tax or regulatory advantages. Off shoring may be used by money launderers to exploit the differences or loopholes between jurisdictions, but it is not a stage of money laundering.

References:

1: ACAMS CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 1, page 9:

The correct answer is C, as mapping scenarios are helpful in mitigating the weakness of not generating alerts when activity is consistently abnormal over a long period of time. Mapping scenarios are used to compare a customer’s activity with their expected activity based on their profile, risk rating, or historical behavior1. By using mapping scenarios, the organization can identify customers whose activity deviates significantly from their normal or expected patterns, and flag them for further investigation. Mapping scenarios can also help detect changes in customer behavior over time, and alert the organization of any potential money laundering or terrorist financing risks.

References: 1: AML Scenarios: Transaction Monitoring Challenges - Unit21, page 1.

The European Union Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (4th AMLD) is a legal framework that aims to prevent the use of the Union’s financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. One of the provisions of the 4th AMLD is to lower the currency threshold for cash payments from €15,000 to €10,000. This means that any person who makes or receives cash payments of €10,000 or more, whether in a single transaction or in several linked transactions, is subject to customer due diligence and record-keeping obligations. The 4th AMLD also extends its applicability to providers of gambling services, which are now listed as ‘obliged entities’.

References:

Directive - 2015/849 - EN - Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive - EUR-Lex, Article 11 and Recital 23.

EUR-Lex - 02015L0849-20210630 - EN - EUR-Lex, Article 11 and Recital 23.

Key elements of the 4th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, Section: Cash payments.

Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism legislative package, Section: New EU AML/CFT Regulation.

According to the BSA/AML Manual1, a financial institution’s board of directors and senior management are ultimately responsible for ensuring that the institution has a comprehensive and effective BSA/AML compliance program and oversight framework. This includes ensuring that the institution timely identifies, reports, and responds to suspicious activity involving its products, services, customers, or employees. Therefore, when an anti-money laundering specialist is concerned that several suspicious transaction reports will discuss potential illegal activity of bank employees, the immediate concern for the institution is to ensure no delay in informing the board of directors and senior management of the situation, as well as the actions taken or planned to address the risks and mitigate the potential harm. The board and senior management should be kept informed of the status and outcome of any internal or external investigations, as well as any regulatory or law enforcement inquiries or actions, related to the suspicious activity involving bank employees.

References:

BSA/AML Manual1

Suspicious Activity Reporting - Overview2

Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Basics3

What’s Suspicious? Here’s How Banks Apply the Smell Test4

According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision principles, the most important question the banker should ask when opening a numbered or alternate name account is who will control the account. This is because such accounts pose a higher risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, as they can be used to conceal the identity and beneficial ownership of the funds. Therefore, the banker should perform enhanced due diligence and verify the identity and source of funds of the person who has the authority to operate the account, as well as the purpose and nature of the business relationship12

The other questions are less relevant or secondary to the issue of control. The inheritance of the proceeds in the event of the businessman’s death is a matter of succession law and does not affect the identification of the beneficial owner. The amount of money deposited into the account may indicate the level of risk, but does not reveal the origin or destination of the funds. The account-opening date is a procedural detail that does not affect the compliance with the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards12

References:

1: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - Core principles for effective banking supervision, 2012, Principle 14 and Essential Criterion 14.1

2: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism, 2014, Paragraphs 30 and 31

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the red flags for money laundering in crowdfunding platforms is “projects that are fully funded within a very short period of time, especially if the funding comes from a small number of donors or from a single donor” (p. 222). This could indicate that the project is a front for laundering illicit funds or financing terrorism. The other options are not necessarily indicative of money laundering risk, as they could be explained by legitimate factors such as the popularity, urgency, or ambition of the project.

References:

ACAMS. (2020). Study Guide for the Certification Examination for Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (6th ed.). Miami, FL: ACAMS.

ESMA. (2015)Questions and Answers: Investment-based crowdfunding and money laundering/terrorist financing 1. Paris, France: ESMA.

Screening customers at onboarding and quarterly thereafter is not sufficient to ensure compliance with economic sanctions, as sanctions lists may change frequently and the financial institution may not be aware of the latest updates. Screening should occur promptly after list updates to ensure that the financial institution is not dealing with a sanctioned individual or entity, or facilitating a prohibited transaction. This is recommended by the international guidance from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Wolfsberg Group12. Screening and performing enhanced due diligence on new relationships is also important, but not the only step to ensure compliance.

References:

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 3: Sanctions, page 86

The Wolfsberg Group Correspondent Banking Due Diligence Questionnaire 2014, Section 5: Sanctions Policy, page 12

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs, Video 3.1: Sanctions

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 109

The European Union Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (4th AMLD) is a legal framework that aims to prevent the use of the Union’s financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. One of the provisions of the 4th AMLD is to lower the currency threshold for cash payments from €15,000 to €10,000. This means that any person who makes or receives cash payments of €10,000 or more, whether in a single transaction or in several linked transactions, is subject to customer due diligence and record-keeping obligations. The 4th AMLD also extends its applicability to providers of gambling services, which are now listed as ‘obliged entities’.

References:

Directive - 2015/849 - EN - Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive - EUR-Lex, Article 11 and Recital 23.

EUR-Lex - 02015L0849-20210630 - EN - EUR-Lex, Article 11 and Recital 23.

Key elements of the 4th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, Section: Cash payments.

Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism legislative package, Section: New EU AML/CFT Regulation.

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations, countries should implement measures to prevent the abuse of non-profit organizations (NPOs) for the financing of terrorism. One of these measures is to ensure that NPOs cannot be used to conceal or obscure the diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorists’ organizations. This means that countries should have effective mechanisms to monitor and supervise NPOs, especially those that are at risk of terrorist financing abuse, and to take appropriate actions against NPOs that are involved in such activities. Countries should also ensure that NPOs maintain adequate records of their activities and transactions, and that these records are accessible to competent authorities. Furthermore, countries should promote transparency and accountability in the NPO sector, and encourage NPOs to conduct due diligence on their donors, beneficiaries, and associates.

References: =

FATF 40 Recommendations, Recommendation 8 and Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8

Best Practices on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations, FATF, June 2015

COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS (RECOMMENDATION 8), FATF, June 2015

 The correct answer is B, as a customer acceptance policy is an essential element of KYC standards according to the Basel Committee’s Customer Due Diligence for Banks paper1. A customer acceptance policy defines the types of customers that the bank is willing to accept, and the conditions and limitations that apply to such relationships. A customer acceptance policy helps the bank to avoid customers who are likely to pose a higher than average risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, or who are not willing to provide sufficient information for identification and verification purposes1.

References: 1: Customer due diligence for banks - Bank for International Settlements, page 9.

The junior account manager should file a suspicious transaction report (STR) with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of Country A, as he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the customer is involved in money laundering or terrorist financing. The customer’s attempt to deposit a large sum of cash, followed by a series of smaller wire transfers from a high-risk jurisdiction, indicates a possible case of structuring or smurfing, which are techniques used by criminals to avoid detection and reporting thresholds. The junior account manager should not close the account, as this could alert the customer and disrupt the investigation by the FIU or law enforcement. The junior account manager should also not notify the anti-money laundering specialist of his bank, as this could create a conflict of interest or breach of confidentiality, unless the bank’s policy requires such notification. The junior account manager should also not offer the customer a more secure method of depositing, as this could be seen as facilitating or condoning the customer’s illicit activities, or exposing the bank to legal or reputational risks.

References:

CAMS Study Guide, pages 97-98, 103-104, 107-108.

CAMS Exam Questions and Free Practice Test, Question 272.

This is when a customer or a transaction does not provide sufficient or credible information about their identity, source of funds, business activity, or purpose of the transaction. Lack of transparency can indicate that the customer or the transaction is trying to conceal the origin, ownership, or destination of illicit funds, or to evade regulatory scrutiny or reporting obligations. Lack of transparency is a common risk factor for money laundering and terrorist financing, especially in high-risk jurisdictions or sectors.

The other options are not necessarily red flags, although they may increase the risk or require further due diligence depending on the circumstances and the risk profile of the customers and countries involved. Option A describes a referral by a longtime friend of the dealer, which may be a legitimate source of trust or business relationship, but it does not substitute the need for proper customer identification and verification. Option B describes the location of the precious metals dealer, which may be a high-risk jurisdiction due to factors such as weak governance, corruption, crime, or sanctions, but it does not imply that the dealer or the customer is involved in money laundering. Option C describes the amount and nature of the transaction, which may be unusual or large, but it does not necessarily indicate money laundering, as long as the customer can provide a reasonable explanation and evidence for the source and use of funds.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - 6th Edition1

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)2

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 3, pages 64-65

A compliance officer should communicate with regulatory and law enforcement authorities in line with applicable local laws during an ongoing investigation into a client’s activities by a competent authority. This is because the compliance officer has a duty to cooperate with the authorities and provide relevant information and documents as requested, while also protecting the confidentiality and privacy of the client and the institution. The compliance officer should not restrict the communication to senior management only, as this could hinder the investigation or create a perception of obstruction. The compliance officer should not communicate only in writing, as this could limit the effectiveness and timeliness of the communication. The compliance officer should not limit the communication to the absolute minimum, as this could imply a lack of cooperation or transparency.

References: =

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS1

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS2

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs3

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)4

According to Section 313 of the USA PATRIOT Act, U.S. financial institutions are prohibited from maintaining correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks, which are banks that have no physical presence in any country and are not affiliated with a regulated financial group. Therefore, a non-U.S. bank must provide the name and address of all shell banks that it maintains accounts for, if any, to its U.S. correspondent. This is to ensure that the U.S. financial institution does not indirectly provide services to shell banks, which pose a high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.

According to Section 319 (b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, U.S. financial institutions that provide a correspondent account to a foreign bank must maintain records of the owners of the foreign bank and the name and address of a U.S. person who is authorized to receive service of legal process for records regarding the correspondent account. This is to facilitate the access of U.S. law enforcement authorities to information related to the correspondent account in case of an investigation or a subpoena.

The other two options, B and C, are not required by the USA PATRIOT Act, although they may be part of the due diligence or enhanced due diligence procedures that U.S. financial institutions apply to their foreign correspondent accounts, as per Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act.

References:

USA PATRIOT Act

FACT SHEET for Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act Final Regulation and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

US PATRIOT ACT

CAMS Exam: USA PATRIOT Act Requirements for Opening a Correspondent Account

The bank’s existing anti-money laundering training is not adequate to be delivered to the employees of the newly acquired credit card business, because anti-money laundering training needs to be tailored and focused on the risks specific to the business. Credit card businesses face different types of money laundering risks than retail banks, such as card-not-present fraud, identity theft, card skimming, and prepaid card abuse. Therefore, the anti-money laundering training for credit card businesses should cover the specific red flags, indicators, typologies, and mitigation measures related to these risks, as well as the relevant laws and regulations that apply to credit card businesses.

References:

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, Section 4.31

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, Section 5.21

Certification Candidate Handbook, Section 3.22

Latest CAMS Exam Questions, Question 433

"The Egmont Group is a united body of 165 Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The Egmont Group provides a platform for the secure exchange of expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF). This is especially relevant as FIUs are uniquely positioned to cooperate and support national and international efforts to counter terrorist financing and are the trusted gateway for sharing financial information domestically and internationally in accordance with global Anti Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards.

 Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act grants the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to designate foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions, classes of transactions, or types of accounts as being of primary money laundering concern, and to impose one or more of five special measures on them. These special measures range from requiring enhanced recordkeeping and reporting to prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for the designated entities. The purpose of these special measures is to protect the U.S. financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by the designated entities.

References:

USA PATRIOT Act | FinCEN.gov

FACT SHEET for Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act Final Regulation and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking | FinCEN.gov

International Financial Crime: Treasury’s Roles and Responsibilities Should Be Updated - GovInfo

 A financial institution can verify the nature and purpose of a business and its legitimacy by using an independent information verification process, such as by accessing public and private databases. This method can help the financial institution to check the names of businesses against anti-money laundering (AML) watchlists, parse and analyze ownership information to determine beneficial ownership structure, and run the beneficial owners themselves through identity verification and AML watchlist checks1. This can also help the financial institution to comply with the regulatory requirements for customer due diligence (CDD), which include obtaining and analyzing sufficient customer information to understand the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile2. Other methods, such as reviewing a copy of the corporation’s latest audited reports and accounts, undertaking a company search or other commercial inquiries, or reviewing the company’s website, may not provide sufficient or reliable information to verify the nature and purpose of a business and its legitimacy.

References:

Customer due diligence for banks by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, October 2001.

How to Verify Legitimate Businesses and Merchants by Trulioo, March 2021.

 Under USA PATRIOT Act Section 311, the U.S. government can impose special measures against a foreign jurisdiction, institution, or transaction that is of primary money laundering concern1. These measures can range from requiring additional recordkeeping and reporting to prohibiting or restricting the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts for the designated entity2. A payable-through account is a type of correspondent account that allows customers of a foreign bank to access the U.S. financial system by writing checks or making wire transfers from the foreign bank’s account at a U.S. bank3.

In this case, the U.S. government has enacted special measures against a designated entity that has a payable-through account with an EU bank, which in turn has a correspondent banking relationship with a U.S. bank. One of the possible actions that the U.S. bank might be required to take regarding the EU bank’s services for the designated entity is to obtain additional information about customers permitted to use this account. This is to ensure that the U.S. bank can identify and monitor the transactions and activities of the designated entity and its customers, and to prevent any money laundering or terrorist financing risks4.

The other actions listed are not likely to be required by the U.S. government under Section 311. Ensuring the designated entity’s confidential information is not shared with other entities is not a special measure, but a general obligation of any financial institution under privacy laws. Verifying that the EU bank serves the designated entity is not a relevant action, since the U.S. government has already designated the entity as a primary money laundering concern. Performing enhanced due diligence on the EU bank is not a specific action related to the payable-through account, but a broader requirement for any correspondent account under Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act5.

References:

1: USA PATRIOT Act | FinCEN.gov1 2: 311 Actions | U.S. Department of the Treasury2 3: Overview of Correspondent Banking and “De Risking” Issues - CRS Reports3 4: U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS4 5: Fact Sheet: Overview of Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act5

According to the FATF Recommendations, the international standard for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, beneficial owners are the natural persons who ultimately own or control a customer or the natural persons on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted1 The beneficial ownership criterion is not based on the legal title or the nominal ownership of the funds, but on the effective control or the ultimate entitlement to the funds. Therefore, having signature authority over the account, being the person in whose name an account is opened, or being a trusted party in a correspondent banking relationship are not sufficient to determine the beneficial ownership of funds. These may be indicators of legal ownership or nominee arrangements, but they do not necessarily reflect the true ownership or control of the funds. The most effective criterion for determining the beneficial ownership of funds is having control over such funds or entitlement to such funds, either directly or indirectly, through ownership, voting rights, contractual agreements, trusts, or other means2345

References:

1: FATF Recommendations, 2012, Recommendation 10 and Interpretive Note

2: Beneficial Ownership Meaning and Regulation, Investopedia, 2022

3: Ultimate Beneficial Ownership: Understanding Where The Money Comes From, ComplyAdvantage, 2022

4: Beneficial ownership and Irish investment funds, A&L Goodbody, 2021

5: Asset Management and Investment Funds Legal and Regulatory Update, Arthur Cox, 2020

it describes a reason why trusts established in certain offshore jurisdictions make good vehicles to layer money, which is names of the settlor and beneficiaries are not publicly available. This means that the true owners and controllers of the funds or assets held by the trust are hidden from the public and the authorities, and can only be accessed by the trustee or the protector, who may be complicit or unaware of the money laundering scheme. This creates a high level of anonymity and secrecy for the money launderers, who can use the trust to move, disguise, or conceal the origin and destination of their illicit funds.

The other options are not necessarily reasons why trusts established in certain offshore jurisdictions make good vehicles to layer money, although they may have some advantages or disadvantages depending on the circumstances and the risk profile of the customers and countries involved. Option B describes a possible motive for setting up a trust in an offshore jurisdiction, which is to minimize taxes, but this does not imply that the trust is used to layer money, as there may be legitimate tax planning or optimization purposes. Option C describes a possible challenge or obstacle for setting up a trust in an offshore jurisdiction, which is offshore jurisdictions are unfamiliar with trust, but this does not imply that the trust is used to layer money, as there may be other legal or financial vehicles available in those jurisdictions. Option D describes a possible characteristic or feature of a trust, which is trusts may hold assets of significant size, but this does not imply that the trust is used to layer money, as there may be valid reasons or sources for the large assets.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - 6th Edition1

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)2

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, pages 86-87

The most important consideration when deciding whether to recommend closing the account is the requests from the competent authority, such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the regulator, or the law enforcement. According to the FAQs related to Suspicious Transaction Reporting issued by the Financial Monitoring Unit of Pakistan1, reporting entities should not terminate the relationship with the customer after filing a STR, unless instructed by the competent authority. This is because closing the account may alert the customer of the STR, compromise the investigation, or hinder the collection of further evidence. Therefore, the reporting entity should consult with the competent authority before taking any action to close the account.

The other options are less important or irrelevant considerations. The institution’s anti-money laundering policy may provide some guidance on how to handle high-risk customers or accounts, but it should not override the requests from the competent authority. Customer relations and the Chief Executive’s reputational risk are not valid reasons to keep the account open if there is evidence of money laundering or terrorist financing. The reporting entity should act in accordance with the law and the best interests of the public, not the personal or business interests of the customer or the bank’s management.

References:

1: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) related to Suspicious Transaction Reporting, 5

Reviewing parameter settings based on the latest risk assessment should be included in the evaluation of system settings for anti-money laundering alert surveillance. This is because parameter settings determine the thresholds and criteria for generating alerts based on the risk profile of the customers, products, services, channels, and jurisdictions involved in the transactions. A risk assessment is a periodic and comprehensive analysis of the potential money laundering and terrorist financing risks faced by an organization, and it should inform the design and implementation of an effective anti-money laundering program, including the alert surveillance system. By aligning the parameter settings with the risk assessment, an organization can ensure that the system is capturing the most relevant and high-risk transactions, and reducing the number of false positives or irrelevant alerts.

References:

CAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, page 37-38.

Implementing AML Transaction Monitoring Systems: Critical Considerations, page 2-3.

3 techniques to improve AML transaction monitoring strategies, page 2.

 If an employee of a financial institution is found to have assisted in money laundering or any other criminal activity, the institution should take appropriate disciplinary action and report the employee to the relevant authorities. This is not only a legal obligation, but also a sound compliance practice to protect the institution’s reputation and integrity. Disciplining the employee without informing the authorities would be insufficient and potentially expose the institution to further legal risks. Ignoring the employee’s involvement or requiring additional training for all employees would be ineffective and inappropriate responses.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 5: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), pp. 121-1221

ACAMS CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 6: AML Compliance Program, pp. 143-1441

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 5: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Lesson 5.2: International Standards and Best Practices2

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 6: AML Compliance Program, Lesson 6.4: Internal Controls2

 MLROs are responsible for implementing and enforcing an appropriate risk-based approach for their firm, ensuring compliance with the relevant laws and regulations, and reporting any suspicious activities to the authorities. If they fail to discharge their duties, they may face personal liability and civil or criminal sanctions. MLROs are not the only individuals that can be held responsible for AML program deficiencies, as other senior managers, directors, or partners may also be liable depending on their role and involvement. However, MLROs are often the primary focus of enforcement actions due to their specific responsibilities and obligations. MLROs cannot avoid liability by agreeing to a civil penalty, as this does not absolve them from their legal duties or potential criminal prosecution. Banks can also be found liable for AML program deficiencies and face fines, penalties, or other sanctions.

References:

Technical factsheet The role of the money laundering reporting officer

Consequences of not complying | AUSTRAC

Money Laundering Reporting Officer: The Role Of MLRO

FinCEN Penalizes U.S. Bank Official for Corporate Anti-Money Laundering Failures

The bank’s internal investigation is aimed at understanding the activities and legitimacy of the client who wants to open multiple accounts for their swimming pool company, with each account assigned to a debit card for the company’s technicians. The purpose of these accounts, as stated by the client, is to facilitate the purchase of pool chemicals. To conduct a thorough investigation, the bank can consider several available sources of information. Let’s analyze each option:

A. Client’s credit bureau report: The client’s credit bureau report primarily contains information related to the individual’s credit history, including loans, credit cards, payment patterns, and any financial obligations. While this information may be useful in assessing the client’s creditworthiness, it may not provide substantial insight into the specific activities and legitimacy of the swimming pool company or the need for multiple accounts.

B. Local law enforcement investigation report: The local law enforcement investigation report may contain information about any criminal or suspicious activities involving the client or the swimming pool company, such as fraud, money laundering, tax evasion, or other offenses. However, this source may not be readily available to the bank, as it may require a formal request or a subpoena to access. Moreover, the report may not be comprehensive or up-to-date, as it may depend on the scope and progress of the law enforcement investigation.

C. Interview swimming pool technicians and chemical suppliers: The interview with the swimming pool technicians and chemical suppliers may provide some information about the nature and frequency of the transactions involving the pool chemicals, such as the amount, the price, the payment method, and the delivery mode. However, this source may not be reliable or verifiable, as the technicians and suppliers may be biased or influenced by the client. Moreover, the interview may not be feasible or practical, as it may require the bank to contact and arrange meetings with multiple parties, which may be time-consuming and costly.

D. Internet search showing how such business are typically operated: The internet search showing how such business are typically operated may provide some information about the industry standards and best practices for running a swimming pool company, such as the average number of technicians, the typical expenses, the common suppliers, and the expected revenue. This source may be useful in comparing and contrasting the client’s business model and operations with the industry norms and identifying any red flags or anomalies. Moreover, this source may be easily accessible and inexpensive, as it may only require the bank to use a web browser and a search engine.

Therefore, the best available source for the bank’s internal investigation on this client’s activities is option D.

References:

1: CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS 2: CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS 3: ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs 4: Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) 5: Bank’s Internal Investigation on Client’s Activities | CAMS Exam Prep 6: South Florida: Couple arrested for more than $2 million fraud 7: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting and Other Anti-Money Laundering Considerations

Shell companies are business entities that exist only on paper, with no physical presence, no employees, and no operations. They are often used for legitimate purposes, such as facilitating mergers and acquisitions, protecting assets, or managing investments. However, they are also frequently exploited for illegal activities, such as tax evasion and money laundering, due to their ability to obscure ownership and financial transactions12. Money launderers can use shell companies to disguise the origin of illicit funds, evade sanctions, and avoid the anti-money laundering (AML) measures that financial institutions use to detect suspicious activity23. The process typically involves setting up a shell company in a jurisdiction known for strict privacy laws, such as a tax haven, and then using it to move and hide illicit funds while hiding the identity of the ultimate beneficiaries13.

In this scenario, the fact that the company has been a client for many years does not rule out the possibility of money laundering. The company could have changed its ownership, activities, or risk profile over time, or it could have been involved in money laundering all along without being detected. The fact that the company has added several new subsidiaries that are recently created shell companies is a red flag that indicates potential money laundering. The company could be using the shell companies to hide the source and destination of its funds, or to conceal the identity of its beneficial owners. The institution should perform enhanced due diligence on the company and its subsidiaries, and report any suspicious transactions or activities to the relevant authorities.

References:

How Shell Companies Are Used in Money Laundering: A Detailed Guide

Shell Companies and Money Laundering

The Role of Shell Companies in Money Laundering

 the compliance officer should cooperate with the law enforcement investigation, but only after receiving a formal written request that specifies the scope and purpose of the information sought. This is to ensure that the compliance officer complies with the legal and regulatory obligations of the bank, such as confidentiality, privacy, and data protection. The compliance officer should also document the request and the information provided, and report the incident to the senior management and the board of directors as appropriate.

References:

FFIEC BSA/AML Assessing the BSA/AML Compliance Program - BSA Compliance Officer, section “BSA Compliance Officer”, paragraph 3: “The BSA compliance officer is responsible for ensuring that the bank’s BSA/AML compliance program is implemented effectively, including timely updates in response to changes in regulations or business activities, and for managing all aspects of the BSA/AML compliance program. The BSA compliance officer is also responsible for ensuring that the bank’s BSA/AML compliance program is communicated to all personnel and that adequate training is provided to appropriate personnel.”

Guidelines on the role of AML/CFT compliance officers, section “Guidelines on the role of AML/CFT compliance officers”, paragraph 36: “The AML/CFT compliance officer should ensure that the institution cooperates with the competent authorities, including by providing them with all the information they require in a timely manner, in accordance with the applicable legal and regulatory framework.”

Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Officer Job Description, section “Responsibilities of an AML Compliance Officer”, bullet point 6: “Cooperate with law enforcement and regulatory bodies as required.”

The Egmont Group is a global network of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) that aims to enhance the capabilities and cooperation of its members in combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes. The Egmont Group supports its FIU members by helping them to expand and systematize the exchange of financial intelligence and information, improve expertise and capabilities of personnel, and enable secure communication with one another12. The Egmont Group does not issue due diligence models for financial institutions, as this is the responsibility of national regulators and standard-setting bodies. The Egmont Group does not issue strategic products for law enforcement agencies and FIUs, as this is the role of other international organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The Egmont Group does not expand the ability of FIUs to enforce laws and exchange information globally, as this depends on the legal and operational frameworks of each FIU and the bilateral or multilateral agreements they have with other FIUs.

References:

Egmont Group

Working Groups - Egmont Group

Overview of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units

The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units | FinCEN.gov

Egmont Group - Qatar Financial Information Unit

According to the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Principles for Correspondent Banking, one of the key aspects of establishing and maintaining a correspondent relationship is to conduct a risk-based due diligence on the respondent bank, which includes obtaining approval from at least one person other than the person sponsoring the relationship12. This is to ensure that the correspondent bank has a clear understanding of the nature, purpose, and expected activity of the relationship, as well as the respondent bank’s ownership, governance, AML policies, and customer base12.

Another aspect of the Wolfsberg AML Principles is to recognize and assess the factors that may increase the risk inherent in a correspondent relationship, such as the involvement of politically exposed persons (PEPs), the presence of downstream (nested) correspondents, the geographic location of the respondent bank and its customers, and the types of products and services offered by the respondent bank12. These factors may require enhanced due diligence, monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activities by the correspondent bank, as well as the application of appropriate risk mitigation measures12.

References:

1: Wolfsberg Correspondent Banking Principles 20221

2: Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking2

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that sets the global standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF). The FATF also monitors the compliance and implementation of its recommendations by its members and other jurisdictions. To enhance its global reach and effectiveness, the FATF works with nine FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) that cover different regions of the world. These FSRBs have similar objectives and functions as the FATF, but they also take into account the specific characteristics and challenges of their regions. Two ways that FSRBs influence AML/CTF standards within their respective regions are:

They issue typologies specific to their geographical region. Typologies are reports or studies that analyze the methods, trends, and patterns of money laundering and terrorist financing in a particular sector, industry, or region. FSRBs produce typologies that reflect the regional context and risks of their members and provide guidance and best practices to address them. For example, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) has issued typologies on trade-based money laundering, wildlife trafficking, and virtual assets in the Asia-Pacific region12.

They administer mutual evaluations of participating members. Mutual evaluations are peer reviews that assess the level of compliance and effectiveness of a country’s AML/CTF system against the FATF standards. FSRBs conduct mutual evaluations of their members and publish the results and recommendations in detailed reports. These reports help identify the strengths and weaknesses of each country’s AML/CTF regime and provide a basis for follow-up actions and technical assistance. For example, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) has conducted mutual evaluations of its members such as Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago34.

References:

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, page 27

APG website, section on Typologies

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, page 28

CFATF website, section on Mutual Evaluations

The following were the key features of the Second Directive:

• It extended the scope of the First Directive beyond drug-related crimes. The definition of “criminal activity” was expanded to cover not just drug trafficking, but all serious crimes, including corruption and fraud against the financial interests of the European community.

• It explicitly brought bureaux de change and money remittance offices under AML coverage.

• It clarified that knowledge of criminal conduct can be inferred from objective factual circumstances.

Sanctions screening and transaction monitoring rules are two of the most common controls that FIs use to identify suspicious money-laundering activity. Sanctions screening is the process of checking customers, transactions, and counterparties against various lists of sanctioned individuals, entities, and countries issued by national and international authorities. Sanctions screening helps FIs to avoid doing business with or facilitating the activities of those who are involved in terrorism, proliferation, human rights violations, or other criminal activities. Transaction monitoring rules are the criteria or scenarios that FIs use to detect unusual or potentially suspicious patterns of transactions or behaviors of customers or accounts. Transaction monitoring rules help FIs to identify transactions that deviate from the expected norms, such as large cash deposits, frequent wire transfers, or transactions with high-risk jurisdictions. Transaction monitoring rules also help FIs to comply with their reporting obligations, such as filing Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) or Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs).

References: = ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Chapter 4: Developing an Effective Anti-Money Laundering Program, Section 4.2: Customer Identification Program (CIP) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD); Money laundering and terrorist financing, Section: Anti Money Laundering (AML) regulations; The Three Stages Of Money Laundering And How Money Laundering Works, Section: How to Prevent Money Laundering.

According to the FATF 40 recommendations, the focus of AML efforts has been expanded beyond financial institutions to include other businesses and professions that are vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing risks. These include:

Casinos, when customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above a designated threshold. Casinos are required to identify and verify the identity of their customers, keep records of transactions, report suspicious transactions, and implement internal controls and compliance programs to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. The designated threshold is USD/EUR 3,000 or more1.

Real estate agents, when they are involved in transactions for clients concerning buying and selling properties. Real estate agents are required to identify and verify the identity of their customers and beneficial owners, keep records of transactions, report suspicious transactions, and implement internal controls and compliance programs to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Real estate transactions can involve large amounts of money and complex legal arrangements that can be used to conceal the source or destination of illicit funds2.

Trust and company service providers, when they prepare for or carry out transactions for a client concerning the creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements. Trust and company service providers are required to identify and verify the identity of their customers and beneficial owners, keep records of transactions, report suspicious transactions, and implement internal controls and compliance programs to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Trust and company service providers can facilitate the misuse of legal persons or arrangements, such as shell companies or trusts, to hide the true ownership and control of assets or funds3.

The other option, dealers in art, when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer at or above a designated threshold, is not covered by the FATF 40 recommendations. However, dealers in precious metals and stones are covered when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer at or above a designated threshold of USD/EUR 15,000 or more. Dealers in art may be subject to national or regional regulations that impose AML obligations on them, depending on the jurisdiction.

References:

FATF Recommendation 22: Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions: Customer Due Diligence

FATF Recommendation 23: Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions: Other Measures

FATF Recommendation 24: Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons

[FATF Recommendation 25: Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Arrangements]

When implementing a risk-based approach related to casinos, the risks related to the customer as an individual are mainly based on the customer’s profile, behaviour, source of funds, and geographic location. Among the options given, B and D are the most relevant factors that could indicate a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Casual customers are those who do not have a regular or established relationship with the casino, and who may visit the casino only once or occasionally. They may not provide sufficient or reliable identification information, or may use false or stolen identities. They may also engage in suspicious transactions, such as large cash purchases of chips, minimal or no gaming activity, or frequent transfers of chips between customers. Casual customers pose a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing because they are harder to verify, monitor, and trace by the casino operators.

Customer from a high-risk country is a customer who resides in, or has links to, a country that is subject to sanctions, embargoes, or similar measures, or that is identified by credible sources as having significant levels of corruption, or as being a source, transit, or destination of illicit funds. Such customers pose a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing because they may be involved in, or connected to, criminal or terrorist activities, or may be using funds that are derived from or intended for such activities.

References: = The main reference for this question is the document titled “FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for Casinos” published by the FATF in October 2008. You can access it by clicking here. You can also find more information about the risk-based approach and the customer risks for casinos on the Gambling Commission website and the Exam Answer website.

 According to the AML Directive of the EU, obliged entities, such as banks and other financial institutions, are required to apply enhanced vigilance in business relationships and transactions involving high-risk third countries, which are those identified by the Commission as having strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism regimes1. The types of enhanced vigilance requirements are basically extra checks and control measures which are defined in article 18a of the Directive1. However, these requirements are not exhaustive, and obliged entities should also implement additional mitigating measures that are complementary to the enhanced customer due diligence procedures, in accordance with a risk based approach1. This means that obliged entities should assess the level of risk posed by each customer, product, service, transaction, or delivery channel, and apply appropriate measures to mitigate those risks2. The additional mitigating measures may include, for example, obtaining additional information on the customer and the beneficial owner, applying additional elements of enhanced monitoring, increasing the frequency and intensity of transaction testing, or requiring the first payment to be carried out through an account in the customer’s name with a bank subject to similar customer due diligence standards1.

References:

1: Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance)

2: Guidance on Risk Factors, EBA, 2021

Wire transfer requests initiated by phone and internet should be included in the review of the customer’s activity, as they may indicate a higher risk of fraud, identity theft, or money laundering. Phone and internet wire transfers are more vulnerable to cyberattacks, phishing, or social engineering, and may bypass some of the verification and authentication procedures that are applied to in-person or paper-based requests. Therefore, the compliance officer should monitor these requests for any signs of unusual or suspicious activity, such as changes in beneficiary, amount, frequency, or destination of the wires.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, page 41

ACAMS CAMS Certification Exam Outline, 6th Edition, Domain 2, Task 2.1

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 2, Lesson 2.1

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 325

A qualified independent party/auditor is the most effective resource to evaluate the effectiveness of an anti-money laundering program. This is because an independent auditor can provide an objective and unbiased assessment of the program, identify any weaknesses or gaps, and make recommendations for improvement. An independent auditor can also verify the compliance of the program with the relevant regulations and best practices, and test the adequacy and functionality of the internal controls, customer due diligence processes, and transaction monitoring systems. An independent auditor can also help an organization prepare for regulatory examinations and audits, and avoid potential penalties or sanctions.

References: = The main references for this question are the following sources:

The document titled “Frequently Asked Questions Conducting Independent Reviews of Money Services Business Anti-Money Laundering Programs” published by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in July 2010. You can access it by clicking here.

The document titled “AML Audit: How to Effectively Assess Your Compliance Program” published by Alessa in May 2023. You can access it by clicking here.

The document titled “Mutual Evaluations” published by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). You can access it by clicking here.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, when a financial institution receives a law enforcement request to keep an account open that may be associated with suspicious or criminal activity, it should take the following two steps:

Maintain account records for at least five years after the request expires. This is to ensure that the financial institution can provide evidence of its compliance with the law enforcement request and the applicable anti-money laundering regulations. The five-year retention period is based on the international standard set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and adopted by many jurisdictions12.

Ask for a written request from the law enforcement agency that defines the duration. This is to protect the financial institution from potential liability and to clarify the scope and purpose of the law enforcement request. The written request should specify the time period for which the account should remain open, the reason for the request, the contact information of the law enforcement officer, and the legal authority for the request34.

References:

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, page 57

FATF Recommendation 11, paragraph 2

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, page 58

Money Laundering website, article on “Law Enforcement Requests to Keep Accounts Open”

One of the key components of an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program is customer due diligence (CDD), which involves verifying the identity of the customer, understanding the nature and purpose of the customer’s relationship with the financial institution (FI), and assessing the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing that the customer poses. CDD is essential for preventing and detecting the misuse of the FI’s services by criminals, and for complying with the relevant laws and regulations.

However, CDD can be challenging for FIs that offer online services to customers, as there is a greater difficulty in matching the customer with the provided identification documentation. Unlike face-to-face interactions, online services rely on electronic or remote methods of identification and verification, such as scanned copies of documents, biometric data, digital signatures, or third-party verification services. These methods may not be as reliable or secure as physical verification, and may expose the FI to the risk of identity fraud, document forgery, or impersonation. Moreover, online services may attract customers from different jurisdictions, which may have different standards and requirements for identification and verification, and may pose different levels of risk.

Therefore, FIs that offer online services to customers should implement enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures to mitigate the risk of money laundering, such as obtaining additional information or documentation from the customer, applying more stringent verification procedures, conducting more frequent and intensive monitoring of the customer’s transactions and behavior, and restricting or limiting the types or amounts of transactions that the customer can perform online.

References:

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 3, Section 3.4, page 82

Anti-Money Laundering in a Nutshell, Chapter 4, Section 4.2, page 63

Guidance on Digital Identity, Section 2, page 8

Anti-Money Laundering, The Basics: Installment 1, Section 3.2, page 5

account opening documents and account statements are examples of supporting documentation that can help the law enforcement agency to verify the identity, profile, and activity of the customer involved in the suspicious transaction. These documents can provide useful information such as the customer’s name, address, date of birth, identification number, occupation, source of funds, transaction history, and beneficiaries. These documents can also help to establish the baseline of normal and expected activity for the customer, and to identify any deviations or anomalies that may indicate money laundering, fraud, or other criminal activities.

References:

Suspicious Activity Report Supporting Documentation, section “What Constitutes Supporting Documentation”, paragraph 2: “Supporting documentation may include, for example, transaction records, new account information, tape recordings, e-mail messages, and correspondence.”

Documentation Requirements: Suspicious Activity Report Supporting Documentation, section “SARs Documentation Requirements”, paragraph 2: “Keep all documents with evidence of the background, the purpose of the transactions, the trigger, the investigation carried out, and all findings and conclusions.”

BSA/AML Manual, section “Assessing the BSA/AML Compliance Program - BSA Compliance Officer”, paragraph 3: “The BSA compliance officer is responsible for ensuring that the bank’s BSA/AML compliance program is implemented effectively, including timely updates in response to changes in regulations or business activities, and for managing all aspects of the BSA/AML compliance program. The BSA compliance officer is also responsible for ensuring that the bank’s BSA/AML compliance program is communicated to all personnel and that adequate training is provided to appropriate personnel.”

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, the Egmont Group is an international network of FIUs that facilitates and prompts the exchange of information, knowledge, and cooperation among its members to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and associated predicate offences1. The Egmont Group suggests that one of the core objectives that would lead to an effective national FIU is to have absolute trust amongst national and international stakeholders before sensitive information will be exchanged with confidence2. This means that the FIU should establish and maintain a high level of credibility, professionalism, and integrity in its operations, and ensure that the information it receives and disseminates is protected and used appropriately. The FIU should also comply with the Egmont Group’s principles and standards for information exchange, and foster a culture of mutual trust and cooperation with other FIUs and relevant authorities3.

The other three options are incorrect because:

The FIU must operate from physically separated premises from other law enforcement agencies and government offices is not a core objective that the Egmont Group suggests for an effective national FIU. While the FIU should have operational independence and autonomy, and be free from undue influence or interference, it does not necessarily have to be physically separated from other agencies or offices. The FIU may be located within the judicial, law enforcement, administrative, or hybrid model, depending on the country’s legal and institutional framework4.

The FIU meets the Egmont Group assessment criteria is not a core objective that the Egmont Group suggests for an effective national FIU. While meeting the Egmont Group assessment criteria is a requirement for becoming and remaining a member of the Egmont Group, it is not an objective in itself. The assessment criteria are based on the FATF recommendations and the Egmont Group’s own documents, and they serve as a benchmark for evaluating the FIU’s compliance and effectiveness5.

The FIU must be able to promote the value of the government’s commitment to embed a corruption free society within the country is not a core objective that the Egmont Group suggests for an effective national FIU. While the FIU may contribute to the prevention and detection of corruption, as well as the recovery of illicit assets, by analyzing and sharing financial intelligence, it is not the sole or primary responsibility of the FIU to promote the value of the government’s commitment to embed a corruption free society within the country. This is a broader and more complex goal that involves multiple actors and factors, such as political will, legal framework, institutional capacity, civil society, media, and international cooperation.

References:

1: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3, p. 64 2: Egmont Group, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units, June 2013, 3, p. 2 3: Egmont Group, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units, June 2013, 3, p. 3-4 4: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3, p. 67 5: Egmont Group, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Support and Compliance Process, June 2013, [6], p. 3-4 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, p. 91-92

Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) are national agencies that collect, analyze, and disseminate information on suspicious or unusual financial activity, such as money laundering and terrorist financing, to relevant authorities. One of their main functions is to disseminate the results of their analysis to law enforcement agencies in a timely manner, so that they can initiate investigations or prosecutions. This is also one of the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global body that sets the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) policies and recommendations. The other options are not the primary responsibilities of FIUs, although they may perform them as part of their mandate or in cooperation with other agencies.

References:

What are Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)? | Dow Jones

Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview - IMF

Financial Intelligence Units - Egmont Group

FATF Recommendation 29 - Financial Intelligence Units (page 17)

The 40 Recommendations provide a complete set of countermeasures against money laundering

and terrorist financing, covering

• the identification of risks and development of appropriate policies;

• the criminal justice system and law enforcement;

• the financial system and its regulation;

• the transparency of legal persons and arrangements; and

• international cooperation.

High-risk: The risks here are significant, but are not necessarily prohibited. To mitigate the heightened risk presented, the financial institution should apply more stringent controls to reduce the ML/FT risk, such as conducting enhanced due diligence and more rigorous transaction monitoring. Countries that maintain a reputation for corruption or drug trafficking are generally considered high-risk. High-risk customers may include politically exposed persons (PEPs) or certain types of money services businesses or cash-intensive businesses; high-risk products and services may include correspondent banking and private banking.

 A free-look provision is a period of time, typically 10 to 30 days, in which a new life insurance policy owner can terminate the policy and have their premium refunded1. This can help criminals to launder money by purchasing a policy with illicit funds and then cancelling it within the free-look period to receive a clean check from the insurance company2. This way, they can disguise the source and origin of their funds and avoid any penalties or charges that would otherwise apply to early termination of the policy.

References:

1: Investopedia, What Is a Free Look Period and How Does It Work?

2: FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering Program and Suspicious Activity Reporting Requirements for Insurance Companies

 The key goal of EU Directives on money laundering is to establish a consistent regulatory environment across the EU to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, and to align EU policy with international standards and best practices. EU Directives are legal acts that set out the objectives and principles that member states must achieve, but leave the choice of methods and measures to the national authorities. EU Directives on money laundering aim to harmonize the rules and obligations for FIs and other obliged entities in the areas of customer due diligence, record-keeping, reporting, supervision, and sanctions. They also aim to address the emerging threats and vulnerabilities of the financial system, such as the use of virtual assets, prepaid cards, high-risk third countries, and beneficial ownership. By creating a consistent regulatory environment across the EU, the Directives seek to enhance the effectiveness and cooperation of the AML/CFT regime, and to protect the integrity and stability of the internal market and the financial system.

References:

1: Guide to EU Anti Money Laundering Directives (AMLD) - ComplyAdvantage1

2: Directive - 2015/849 - EN - Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive - EUR-Lex2

3: EU context of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism3

A compliance officer should consider the following three factors as part of the approach to implement an enterprise-wide anti-money laundering program for a bank that operates in multiple countries:

The types of customers serviced by the bank: Different types of customers may pose different levels of money laundering risk, depending on their nature, source of funds, geographic location, transaction patterns, and other factors. A compliance officer should identify and assess the money laundering risk associated with each customer type and segment, and apply appropriate due diligence measures, monitoring systems, and risk mitigation strategies accordingly12.

The extent of anti-money laundering regulations in the various countries: A compliance officer should be aware of the legal and regulatory requirements and expectations for anti-money laundering compliance in each country where the bank operates, and ensure that the bank’s policies and procedures are consistent with them. A compliance officer should also monitor any changes or updates in the anti-money laundering laws and regulations in the various countries, and adjust the bank’s program accordingly34.

The anti-money laundering risk posed by the products and services offered by the bank: Different products and services may have different features and functionalities that could be exploited by money launderers, such as anonymity, cross-border transfers, cash transactions, complex structures, or new technologies. A compliance officer should evaluate the money laundering risk associated with each product and service offered by the bank, and implement appropriate controls, safeguards, and oversight mechanisms to prevent and detect money laundering activities5 .

References:

1: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2: Risk Assessments

2: FATF, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: The Banking Sector

3: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)

4: Deloitte, AML Program Effectiveness Reform

5: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4: AML Program Design

[6]: OCC, Money Laundering: A Banker’s Guide to Avoiding Problems

A financial institution should examine the country or location where the customer is from or does business, the type and size of the business the customer runs, and the legal structure of the customer’s business, because these factors can indicate the level of money laundering risk associated with the customer. For example, some countries or locations may have weak anti-money laundering laws or high levels of corruption, some types or sizes of businesses may be more prone to generating or concealing illicit funds, and some legal structures may be more complex or opaque than others, making it harder to identify the beneficial owners or controllers of the customer.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, Module 2: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Lesson 2: Know Your Customer (KYC) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD)

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide2, Chapter 2: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Section 2.2: Know Your Customer (KYC) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD), Pages 42-44

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, the institution should develop a system to monitor all the activity of the customer’s accounts to mitigate the risk associated with these accounts. This is because the customer’s behavior and profile may indicate some red flags of money laundering, such as:

Operating an import-export business, which is a common sector for trade-based money laundering, where trade transactions are used to disguise the movement of illicit funds, either by over- or under-invoicing, misrepresenting the quantity or quality of goods, or falsifying documents1.

Receiving funds from a jurisdiction perceived as highly corrupt, which may increase the risk of the funds being derived from bribery, embezzlement, fraud, or other predicate offences2. Transparency International is a global civil society organization that publishes an annual Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks countries by their perceived levels of public sector corruption based on expert assessments and surveys3.

Making frequent transfers among the accounts, which may indicate a layering technique, where funds are moved through multiple accounts, institutions, or jurisdictions to obscure the audit trail and the source and ownership of the funds4.

Preferring to manage the accounts separately, which may indicate a lack of transparency or an attempt to avoid detection or reporting by the institution.

By developing a system to monitor all the activity of the customer’s accounts, the institution can:

Identify and verify the identity and beneficial ownership of the customer and the parties involved in the transactions.

Obtain and verify information on the nature and purpose of the business relationship and the source and destination of the funds.

Conduct a risk assessment of the customer and the transactions based on the customer’s profile, behavior, and geographic locations.

Apply enhanced due diligence and ongoing monitoring measures for higher-risk customers and transactions, such as obtaining additional information, documentation, or approval, or conducting more frequent or in-depth reviews.

Detect and report any suspicious or unusual transactions or activities to the relevant authorities.

The other three options are incorrect because:

File a suspicious transaction report is not the best answer, as it is a reactive measure that should be taken after the institution has identified or suspected money laundering or terrorist financing activity, not before. The institution should first conduct due diligence and monitoring of the customer and the transactions, and then file a report if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the activity is suspicious or unusual.

Diminish the importance of the subjective Transparency International rating is not the best answer, as it is a complacent and irresponsible attitude that may expose the institution to legal, regulatory, reputational, or operational risks. The Transparency International rating is not subjective, but based on credible sources and methodologies, and it is widely used as a reference by governments, businesses, civil society, and the public to assess the level of corruption in different countries3. The institution should not ignore or downplay the rating, but rather use it as one of the factors to evaluate the risk of the customer and the transactions.

Conduct a trade-price manipulation analysis is not the best answer, as it is a specific and technical measure that may not be sufficient or appropriate to mitigate the risk associated with these accounts. A trade-price manipulation analysis is a method of detecting trade-based money laundering by comparing the prices of goods or services in a transaction with the market prices or other benchmarks, and identifying any significant discrepancies or anomalies. However, this measure may not be feasible or effective if the institution does not have access to reliable and comparable data, or if the goods or services are not standardized or homogeneous. Moreover, this measure may not address other aspects of the risk, such as the identity, ownership, or behavior of the customer and the parties involved in the transactions.

References:

1: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 108 2: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 107 3: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 3 4: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 106 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 103 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 103 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 104 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 105 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 105 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 109

As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals and companies are called "Specially Designated Nationals" or "SDNs." Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them. So it's covering all

A financial institution (FI) should exit a relationship when the suspicious conduct of the account holder or the FI’s stated policies and procedures for closing an account warrant such action. A FI has the right and responsibility to terminate a customer relationship that poses an unacceptable level of risk to the FI or violates its AML/CFT program. A FI should have clear and consistent criteria for exiting a relationship, such as the number and severity of SARs filed, the nature and extent of due diligence conducted, the availability and effectiveness of mitigating controls, and the alignment of the customer profile with the FI’s risk appetite. A FI should also document the rationale and process for exiting a relationship, communicate the decision to the customer and relevant stakeholders, and monitor the account until closure.

The reputational risk to the FI posed by closing the account or the request from law enforcement to close the account are not valid reasons for exiting a relationship by themselves. A FI should consider the potential reputational impact of closing an account, but it should not outweigh the legal and regulatory obligations of the FI to prevent and detect money laundering and terrorist financing. A FI should also cooperate with law enforcement requests, but it should not automatically close an account based on such requests, as they may interfere with ongoing investigations or intelligence gathering. A FI should exercise its own judgment and discretion in deciding whether to exit a relationship, based on its own policies and procedures and the facts and circumstances of each case.

References:

Exiting Relationships: Ten Steps to a Successful Client Exit Strategy

De-risking your SARs: Building SAR relationship exit strategies into your AML/CFT program

Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting and Other Anti-Money Laundering Considerations

an employee who avoids taking periodic vacations despite having accrued vacation time may be trying to conceal fraudulent or illegal activities that would be exposed in their absence. This is a common red flag for internal fraud and money laundering, as it indicates a lack of segregation of duties, internal controls, and oversight. Employees who engage in such behavior may also exhibit other signs of stress, defensiveness, or secrecy.

References:

Learn about red flags for internal fraud, section “An employee may be a higher internal fraud risk when a combination of the following red flags are present”, bullet point 1: “Unwilling to share duties or take leave.”

Money Laundering Red Flags | Key Behaviours and Indicators, section “Employee Red Flags”, bullet point 1: “Avoiding taking holidays or time off work.”

Top 10 AML Red Flags: Warning Signs and Financial Risks, section “AML Red Flags Categories”, sub-section “Employee Red Flags”, bullet point 1: “Avoiding taking vacations or sick leaves.”

2.4 Senior Management Approval

The bank's internal policies should indicate whether, for any one or more among these categories, Senior

Management must approve entering into new relationships.

Relationships with Politically Exposed Persons may only be entered into with the approval of Senior Management.

A commission rogatory, also known as a letter rogatory or a letter of request, is a formal request from a court in one country to a court in another country for some type of judicial assistance, such as service of process, taking of evidence, or enforcement of judgments1. A commission rogatory would be used in the context of a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) request, which is a bilateral or multilateral agreement that enables countries to cooperate and provide legal assistance to each other in criminal matters2. MLATs are one of the main gateways for obtaining information from another country, especially when the information is not available through other means, such as financial intelligence units (FIUs), supervisory authorities, or international organizations3. FIUs are national agencies that collect, analyze, and disseminate financial information related to money laundering and terrorist financing, and they can exchange information with their counterparts in other countries under the Egmont principles. Supervisory authorities are regulators that oversee the compliance of financial institutions and other entities with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) obligations, and they can share information with their peers in other jurisdictions through supervisory channels, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and monitors the implementation of AML/CFT measures, and it can provide information and guidance to its members and other jurisdictions, but it does not have the authority to request or compel information from them.

References:

1: Letters rogatory - Wikipedia

2: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory: A Guide for Judges | Federal Judicial Center

3: How US Authorities Obtain Foreign Evidence in Cross-Border Investigations | Global Investigations Review

: What is an FIU? | Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units

: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision | Bank for International Settlements

: What is the FATF? | FATF

 the bank teller should not provide any information to the police officer without consulting the compliance officer first. The compliance officer is responsible for ensuring that the bank follows the applicable laws and regulations regarding customer privacy, data protection, and anti-money laundering. The compliance officer can verify the authenticity and validity of the request, determine the appropriate response, and obtain any necessary approvals or authorizations before releasing any information. The bank teller should not reject the request outright, as this could be seen as uncooperative or obstructive. The bank teller should also not provide the information after management approval, as this could bypass the compliance officer’s role and expose the bank to legal or regulatory risks.

References:

Bank Records and Financial Privacy Laws - FindLaw1

Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Risk Assessment | ACAMS2

What is the Difference Between Smurfing and Structuring?3

Based on the USA PATRIOT Act, one action that the US might take to demonstrate extraterritorial reach is to send requests for information to a non-US based financial institution (FI). The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the authority of the US government to issue subpoenas and other legal orders to foreign banks that maintain a correspondent account in the US, requiring them to produce records relating to such account or any account at the foreign bank, including records maintained outside the US12. This provision was intended to enhance the ability of the US to investigate and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing activities that involve foreign FIs3.

References:

1: USA PATRIOT Act, Section 319(b)

2: Britannica, USA PATRIOT Act, History & Society

3: Princeton Legal Journal, FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act: Reforms and Legal Implications

 The compliance officer should provide a high level summary of the activity and the interactions with law enforcement to the board of directors, as this would be the most appropriate way to escalate the information without compromising the confidentiality of the STR or the ongoing investigation. Providing a copy of the STR or the letter from law enforcement could expose the bank to legal risks or jeopardize the investigation. Informing the regulator to bring it up with the board would not be sufficient, as the compliance officer has the responsibility to report directly to the board on significant compliance issues.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 5: Risk Management, Lesson 5.3: Reporting to Senior Management and the Board1

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5: Risk Management, Section 5.3: Reporting to Senior Management and the Board2

A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) is an agreement between two or more countries for the purpose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public or criminal laws1. MLATs provide a legal basis for transmitting evidence that can be used for prosecution and judicial proceedings, such as witness statements, bank records, search and seizure orders, and asset forfeiture2. MLATs also facilitate the cooperation and coordination between law enforcement authorities of different jurisdictions in investigating and prosecuting transnational crimes, such as money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption, and cybercrime3. The other options are incorrect because:

B. MLATs do not receive reports of suspicious transactions from financial institutions, but rather request specific information or evidence from foreign authorities. Financial institutions report suspicious transactions to their domestic Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), which may then share the information with foreign FIUs through other mechanisms, such as the Egmont Group or bilateral agreements4.

C. MLATs do not obtain intelligence that might lead to evidence, but rather request evidence that is already available or can be obtained by foreign authorities. Intelligence is a broader term that refers to any information that is relevant to the security or interests of a country, and may not be admissible as evidence in a court of law5. Intelligence may be obtained through other means, such as covert operations, surveillance, or informants6.

D. MLATs do not issue the Principles of Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), but rather follow them. The Principles of Information Exchange are a set of guidelines that were adopted by the Egmont Group of FIUs in 2001, and aim to enhance the cooperation and communication among FIUs in exchanging financial information and intelligence7. The Principles of Information Exchange are not legally binding, but rather reflect the best practices and standards of the FIU community.

References:

1: Mutual legal assistance treaty - Wikipedia

2: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, page 1

3: The Mutual Legal Assistance Problem explained | wilmap

4: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 125

5: Intelligence - Wikipedia

6: Intelligence cycle - Wikipedia

7: Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units - Wikipedia

: Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units for Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Cases

shell banks are banks that have no physical presence in any country and are not affiliated with any regulated financial institution. They are often used by money launderers and terrorist financiers to hide their illicit activities and evade regulatory oversight. The USA PATRIOT Act prohibits US financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts with shell banks, and requires them to take reasonable steps to ensure that their foreign correspondent banks do not provide services to shell banks12. Therefore, the US does not have jurisdiction over shell banks operating in foreign jurisdictions, unless they are involved in transactions that violate US laws or sanctions.

References:

USA PATRIOT Act Section 313: Prohibition on U.S. Correspondent Accounts with Foreign Shell Banks1

Fact Sheet Regarding the Treasury Department’s Use of Sanctions Authorities to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing3

A suspicious transaction report (STR) is a document that financial institutions must file with the relevant authorities when they detect or suspect any activity that may be related to money laundering, terrorist financing, or other criminal offences. An STR should include the details of the customer, the transaction, the reason for suspicion, and any other relevant information.

One of the indicators of suspicious activity is the use of financial instruments, such as checks, money orders, or cashier’s checks, that are drawn on other institutions and deposited in amounts under the currency reporting thresholds. This may suggest that the customer is trying to avoid the detection and reporting of large cash transactions, which is a technique known as structuring or smurfing. Structuring is illegal and may indicate that the customer is laundering money from illicit sources or evading taxes.

Another indicator of suspicious activity is the use of financial instruments that are sequentially numbered, meaning that they have consecutive serial numbers. This may suggest that the customer has obtained the instruments from the same source or issuer, and that they are using them to launder money or finance illegal activities. Sequentially numbered instruments may also indicate that the customer is involved in fraud, such as check kiting or counterfeit checks.

Therefore, if a bank conducts a quarterly review on a retail customer’s account and finds that the customer has made a number of large deposits of financial instruments drawn on other institutions in amounts under the thresholds, and that the instruments were sequentially numbered, the bank will most likely file an STR. This is because this activity does not fit the customer’s historical profile, and it raises a high level of suspicion that the customer is engaged in money laundering or other criminal activities.

References:

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, Section 4.2, page 108

Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting and Other Anti-Money Laundering Considerations, Question 5, page 7

Anti-money laundering – handling suspicious activity, Section 6.3, page 3

Tell us about suspicious activity that may be linked to money laundering, Section 3, page 1

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a department of the U.S. Treasury that administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals1. OFAC regulations cover all persons and entities within the U.S., all U.S.-domiciled entities and their foreign branches, and all U.S. citizens, wherever located or employed2. These include U.S. banks, U.S. corporations, U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations, U.S. residents, and U.S. citizens living or traveling abroad3. OFAC regulations do not cover foreign-based entities that have U.S. customers, unless they are owned or controlled by U.S. persons or entities4.

References: 1: Home | Office of Foreign Assets Control 2: eCFR :: 31 CFR Chapter V – Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury 3: FFIEC BSA/AML Office of Foreign Assets Control - Office of Foreign Assets Control 4: Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): Definition, Sanctions

 Bearer shares are unregistered equity securities owned by the possessor of the physical share documents. The issuing company does not record the identity or ownership of the shareholders, nor does it track the transfers of ownership. This means that the holder of the bearer share can claim ownership and exercise the rights associated with the share, such as voting and receiving dividends, by simply presenting the physical certificate. This also makes the transfer of ownership very easy, as it only requires the delivery of the physical document, without any formalities or intermediaries. Bearer shares are therefore attractive for those who seek anonymity, privacy, and flexibility in their corporate structures.

References:

Investopedia: Bearer Share

SuperMoney: Bearer Shares: Definition, Examples, and Implications

ACAMS: Bearer Shares

Results of related audits and examinations are the most useful report for an anti-money laundering specialist to inform senior management about the status of the anti-money laundering program across the organization. This is because audits and examinations provide an independent and objective assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance of the anti-money laundering program, as well as identify any gaps, weaknesses, or areas for improvement. Audits and examinations can also help senior management to monitor the performance of the anti-money laundering program, ensure accountability and oversight, and demonstrate commitment to regulatory expectations and best practices.

References:

Anti-Money Laundering Preparedness Survey Report 2020 - Deloitte US, page 4.

CAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, page 39.

 According to the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, which is a global network of FIUs that promotes information exchange and cooperation, FIUs making requests to another FIU should disclose the reason and purpose for the request, and provide feedback on how the information was used12. These actions are intended to enhance mutual trust, transparency, and accountability between FIUs, and to facilitate the effective use of financial intelligence and information for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes12. FIUs making requests should also respect the confidentiality and data protection requirements of the FIU receiving the request, and avoid imposing unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions12.

FIUs making requests should not send the same request to all FIUs, as this would be inefficient, unnecessary, and potentially harmful. FIUs should only send requests to FIUs that are relevant and competent to provide the information they need, based on the nature and scope of the case12. Sending the same request to all FIUs could overload the system, create duplication, and compromise the security and confidentiality of the information12. FIUs making requests should also make best efforts to provide complete and factual information, but this is not an action they should take when submitting a request, but rather when responding to a request from another FIU12.

References:

Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Operational Guidance for FIU Activities and the Exchange of Information

Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units

Organized crime groups often use front companies to disguise the origin and destination of their illicit funds, and to integrate them into the legitimate economy. Front companies are businesses that appear to be engaged in lawful activities, but are actually controlled by criminals for money laundering purposes.

One reason why organized crime groups use front companies is to gain control over an entire sector of the economy, such as construction, transportation, or gambling. By using multiple front companies, they can create a network of interrelated businesses that can manipulate prices, evade taxes, and influence public contracts. This can give them a competitive advantage over legitimate businesses, and allow them to launder large amounts of money through seemingly legitimate transactions.

Another reason why organized crime groups use front companies is to comingle their illicit funds with those of legal businesses. By using the bank accounts of front companies, they can deposit cash from criminal activities along with the revenues from legitimate operations, making it harder to trace the source of the funds. They can also transfer funds between different front companies, or use them to pay for goods and services, creating layers of transactions that obscure the money trail.

References:

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 2, Section 2.2, page 43

A Guide to the 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, Part 2, page 9

Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, Chapter 2, page 29

According to Section 319(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, U.S. financial institutions that provide correspondent accounts to foreign banks must maintain records of the owners of the foreign banks and the name and address of a U.S. resident authorized to accept service of legal process for records regarding the correspondent accounts. This requirement is intended to prevent foreign shell banks from accessing the U.S. financial system and to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and terrorist financing activities involving foreign banks.

References:

US PATRIOT ACT | State Street

Foreign Correspondent Banking Fact Sheet - U.S. Department of the Treasury

FACT SHEET for Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act Final Regulation and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking | FinCEN.gov

A fundraising organization is a type of non-profit organization that may be vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing risks, as they often operate in high-risk areas, deal with large amounts of cash, and have complex and opaque structures. Therefore, a fundraising organization warrants enhanced due diligence, which is a higher level of customer verification and monitoring that goes beyond the standard customer due diligence measures. Enhanced due diligence may include obtaining additional information on the source of funds, the purpose of the relationship, the beneficiaries, and the governance of the organization.

References:

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 2: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Section 2.2: Customer Due Diligence, p. 33-34

Anti-money laundering – a guide to customer due diligence

Customer due diligence | The Law Society

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, individuals who violate anti-money laundering laws can face severe consequences, such as imprisonment, fines, asset forfeiture, and sanctions. These penalties can apply not only to the perpetrators of money laundering, but also to the employees, managers, directors, and officers of financial institutions or other entities that fail to comply with their anti-money laundering obligations. Therefore, violations of anti-money laundering laws can pose a significant risk to individuals, both personally and professionally.

References:

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, page 9

ACAMS website, section on CAMS certification

Money Laundering website, article on “The Consequences of Non-Compliance with Anti-Money Laundering Laws”

purchasing a low volume of chips with cash and turning them in for a casino check is a common technique of money laundering in casinos. This method allows the launderer to convert “dirty” money into physical casino chips, which are then played with for a short while, and then cashed out as “clean” money in the form of a check. This way, the launderer can avoid the reporting requirements and the traceability of cash transactions.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs1

Understanding Money Laundering in Casinos | ComplyAdvantage2

Casino Money Laundering: Red Flag Indicators - Alessa3

 A key reason why a FI conducts an enterprise-wide AML risk assessment is to assess money laundering and terrorist financing risks and ensure there are adequate controls to mitigate those risks. An enterprise-wide AML risk assessment allows the FI to identify and appropriately manage the ML/TF and other illicit financial activity risks within its banking operations. It also helps the FI to establish global AML control standards and determine the effectiveness of its AML risk management program, including internal preventive and detective controls. By understanding its risk profile, the FI can better apply appropriate risk management processes to the BSA/AML compliance program to mitigate and manage risk and comply with BSA regulatory requirements. The BSA/AML risk assessment should provide a comprehensive analysis of the FI’s ML/TF and other illicit financial activity risks, and should be documented in writing and communicated to all relevant stakeholders.

References:

1: Enterprise Wide AML, CTF, Sanctions Risk Assessment (EWRA … - Eloquens2

3: BSA/AML Risk Assessment - FFIEC BSA/AML3

2: ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination2

The USA PATRIOT Act is a comprehensive legislation that was enacted in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and aimed to strengthen the US government’s ability to prevent, detect, and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing. Among its many provisions, the USA PATRIOT Act contains several sections that have extraterritorial reach, meaning that they apply to foreign entities or activities that have a nexus with the US. Three of these sections are:

Section 319(b), which allows for the US Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a subpoena or other legal order to any foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account in the US, requiring the production of records relating to such account or any account at the foreign bank, including records maintained outside the US12. This section also allows foreign banks to voluntarily designate a registered agent in the US to accept service of such subpoenas or orders12.

Section 313, which prohibits US financial institutions from establishing, maintaining, administering, or managing correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks, which are banks that have no physical presence in any country and are not affiliated with a regulated financial group34. This section also requires US financial institutions to take reasonable steps to ensure that their correspondent accounts with foreign banks are not being used to provide banking services indirectly to foreign shell banks34.

Section 311, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to designate foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions, classes of transactions, or types of accounts as being of “primary money laundering concern” and to impose special measures to address such concerns . These special measures may include requiring US financial institutions to obtain and retain information on the beneficial owners of foreign accounts, prohibiting or imposing conditions on the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts for foreign financial institutions, or requiring US financial institutions to identify the customers of their foreign correspondent account holders . The Secretary of the Treasury may also order a US financial institution to terminate a correspondent account within 10 days if the foreign bank fails to comply with a subpoena or other request for information under Section 319(b) .

References:

1: USA PATRIOT Act, Section 319(b)

2: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 121

3: USA PATRIOT Act, Section 313

4: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 120

: USA PATRIOT Act, Section 311

: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 119

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, an AML training program should include the requirement that new staff receive training during employee orientation or shortly thereafter on bank procedures. This is because new staff need to be aware of the bank’s policies and procedures for complying with the money laundering regulations, such as customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting of suspicious activities. Training new staff as soon as possible also helps to reduce the risk of human errors or oversights that could facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing.

References:

: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 5, page 143

: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 5, page 144

: Technical factsheet Anti-money laundering (AML) training: frequently asked questions, page 1

Wire stripping is the process of removing or altering the identifying information associated with a wire transfer to make it difficult to trace the origin or destination of the funds. This technique is commonly used in money laundering schemes to conceal the illicit source of funds and avoid detection by authorities or sanctions screening systems. In this case, the bank’s operations team deliberately removed the reference to the sanctioned company from the wire transfer message, thus violating the FinCEN “Travel Rule” and facilitating the evasion of sanctions.

References:

Wire Stripping in Anti Money Laundering Parlance

Wire Transfer Red Flags: Understanding Money Laundering and Fraud Risks

Wire Stripping

The line of business is responsible for creating, implementing and maintaining policies and procedures, as well as communicating these to all personnel. It must also establish processes for screening employees to ensure high ethical and professional standards and deliver appropriate training on AML policies and procedures based on roles and functions performed so employees aware of their responsibilities. To facilitate this, employees should be trained as soon as possible after being hired, with refresher training as appropriate.

According to the FATF Guidance on Private Sector Information Sharing, FIs should establish sufficient safeguards concerning the confidentiality of information shared for AML purposes, both within the same financial group and between FIs not belonging to the same group. These safeguards include ensuring that the information is shared only with authorized personnel who have a need to know, that the information is used only for the intended AML purpose, and that the information is protected from unauthorized access, disclosure, or misuse. FIs should also comply with the applicable legal and regulatory requirements on data protection and privacy, and respect the rights and interests of the customers whose information is shared1.

References:

1: FATF Guidance on Private Sector Information Sharing1

 An automated transaction monitoring system is a tool that analyzes transactions and customer behavior for signs of money laundering or other financial crimes, and generates alerts when suspicious or unusual activity is detected. The system relies on a set of rules and parameters that define what constitutes normal and abnormal transactions, based on the risk profile and business nature of the financial institution or business. These rules and parameters need to be periodically reviewed and updated to ensure that they are effective and compliant with the latest regulations and best practices.

One of the factors that would most likely result in a change in the monitoring system parameters is when the national Financial intelligence Unit (FIU) issues new risk indicators. The FIU is a central authority that collects, analyzes, and disseminates financial intelligence related to money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes. The FIU also provides guidance and feedback to financial institutions and businesses on how to comply with their anti-money laundering (AML) obligations and improve their transaction monitoring systems. The FIU may issue new risk indicators based on its analysis of emerging trends, typologies, and threats in the financial sector, or based on international standards and recommendations. These risk indicators are intended to help financial institutions and businesses identify and report suspicious transactions more effectively and efficiently.

Therefore, when the FIU issues new risk indicators, the financial institution or business should review its existing monitoring system parameters and adjust them accordingly to reflect the new risks and scenarios. For example, the FIU may issue new risk indicators related to the use of cryptocurrencies, virtual assets, or online platforms for money laundering or terrorist financing. In that case, the financial institution or business should update its monitoring system parameters to include new rules, thresholds, or patterns that capture these activities and generate alerts for further investigation.

References:

1: The Complete Guide to Transaction Monitoring: Everything to Know

2: AML Scenarios: Transaction Monitoring Challenges

3: Setting AML Transaction Monitoring Thresholds

4: Automated Transaction Monitoring – Considerations for System Implementation

5: ACAMS (2020). CAMS Certification Package (6th Edition)

Economic sanctions are a tool that governments and multi-national bodies can use to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by imposing restrictions on trade, financial transactions, travel, or other activities with targeted countries, entities, or individuals that are involved or suspected of being involved in WMD programs. Economic sanctions aim to disrupt the supply chains, funding sources, and incentives for developing or acquiring WMDs, as well as to deter and punish any violations of international norms and obligations regarding WMDs. Economic sanctions can be imposed unilaterally by a country or multilaterally by a group of countries or an international organization, such as the United Nations, the European Union, or the Financial Action Task Force.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 4: Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Lesson 4.2: Sanctions1

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4: Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Section 4.2: Sanctions2

having an outdated and incomplete risk assessment could expose the financial institution to significant money laundering and terrorist financing risks that are not identified, measured, or mitigated. The risk assessment is a key component of an effective anti-money laundering program, and it should be updated regularly to reflect the changes in the business environment, customer profile, product offerings, delivery channels, and regulatory requirements12. A risk assessment that is several years old and does not cover all current products and services could fail to capture the emerging threats and vulnerabilities that the financial institution faces, and could result in inadequate or inappropriate controls, policies, and procedures. This could lead to the highest potential for unmitigated risk, as the financial institution could be exploited by money launderers and terrorist financiers, and face regulatory sanctions, reputational damage, and financial losses.

References:

Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Risk Assessment | ACAMS1

Risk assess your business for money laundering supervision - GOV.UK2

This potential action is authorized by Section 319 of the USA PATRIOT ACT, which allows the U.S. government to seize funds from a foreign bank’s correspondent account in the U.S. if the foreign bank refuses to cooperate with a request for records relating to an investigation of money laundering or terrorist financing. The U.S. government can seize an amount equal to the funds in the account of the target of the investigation, regardless of whether those funds are actually in the correspondent account. In this case, the U.S. government can seize $1 million from Bank A’s correspondent account in the U.S. because Bank A holds $1 million in the account of the WTS, which is the target of the forfeiture action.

The other potential actions are not authorized by the USA PATRIOT ACT or other U.S. laws. The U.S. government cannot seize Bank A’s entire $5 million correspondent account in the U.S. because that would exceed the amount in the WTS’s account and would violate the principle of proportionality. The U.S. government cannot seize the WTS’s $1 million account at the non-U.S. branch of Bank A because that would require the cooperation of the foreign jurisdiction where the branch is located, which may not be forthcoming. The U.S. government cannot seize $5 million from the non-U.S. branch of Bank A where the WTS’s account is located because that would also require the cooperation of the foreign jurisdiction and would exceed the amount in the WTS’s account.

References:

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 3: International Standards and Global Initiatives, pp. 67-68

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, pp. 54-55

How Does the Patriot Act Affect Criminal Investigations? | Nolo, Section 319: Forfeiture of Funds in United States Interbank Accounts

The USA PATRIOT Act at 20: Sneak and Peek Searches - CRS Reports, Section 319: Forfeiture of Funds in United States Interbank Accounts

International wire transfers are considered to be of highest money laundering risk because they can facilitate the rapid and anonymous movement of funds across borders and jurisdictions, making it difficult for law enforcement and regulators to trace the origin and destination of the funds, and to identify the beneficial owners and controllers of the accounts involved. International wire transfers can also be used to layer and integrate illicit proceeds into the legitimate financial system, by disguising the source, ownership, and purpose of the funds. International wire transfers can involve multiple intermediaries, complex payment chains, and inconsistent or incomplete information, which can increase the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. Therefore, international wire transfers are subject to enhanced due diligence, record-keeping, and reporting requirements under various anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) regulations and standards, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations1, the European Union (EU) Funds Transfer Regulation2, and the United States (US) Bank Secrecy Act3.

References:

1: FATF (2012), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, FATF, Paris, France, Recommendation 16 and Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16. 2: Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 1) 4 3: 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 and 31 C.F.R. Chapter X

V

You cannot make international money transfers unless the money is credited to the account. So first priority saving account, subsequent risk international wire transfer

"A savings account, as well as a checking account, can be one of the riskiest financial instruments for money laundering operations given the ease with which it can be opened and operated".

"The first European Union Directive, “Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (Directive 91/308/EEC),” was adopted by the Council of the European Communities in June 1991. Like all directives adopted by the Council, it required member states to achieve (by amending national law, if necessary) the specified results. This First Directive required the members to enact legislation to prevent their domestic financial systems from being used for money laundering"

When an FI is being investigated for possible money laundering, it is important that it cooperates with the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in a professional and transparent manner. This means that the FI should take the following steps:

Maintain centralized control over all requests and responses to ensure completeness and timely responses. This will help the FI to avoid duplication, inconsistency, or omission of information, as well as to track the status and progress of the requests and responses. It will also facilitate the communication and coordination between the FI and the LEAs, and demonstrate the FI’s willingness to cooperate12.

Review subpoenas and other information requests by senior management and an investigations group or counsel. This will help the FI to assess the scope, relevance, and legality of the requests, as well as to identify any potential risks, conflicts, or sensitivities. It will also enable the FI to prepare and provide the requested information in an accurate and timely manner, and to seek clarification or negotiation if necessary13.

The other options are not advisable, as they may indicate a lack of cooperation, obstruct the investigation, or damage the FI’s reputation. For example:

Making employees, including corporate officers, unavailable for interviews and refusing documents upon receipt of a subpoena may be considered as non-compliance, evasion, or contempt of court, and may result in legal sanctions or penalties4.

Addressing the document destruction policy to ensure the relevant documents are destroyed may be seen as tampering with evidence, destroying records, or concealing information, and may constitute a criminal offence or a breach of regulatory obligations5.

Not answering inquiries from the media directly, but rather replying, “No comment” may create a negative impression, fuel speculation, or invite criticism, and may harm the FI’s image, credibility, or trustworthiness.

References:

Cooperation between FIUs, Law Enforcement Authorities, and Prosecutors

AML and Financial crimes investigation

Mechanisms for interaction of law enforcement agencies in the field of counteracting and combating money laundering

Recommendation 30: Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities

Money laundering and illicit finance

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, one of the common methods of money laundering and terrorist financing is to structure transactions to avoid reporting or record keeping requirements. Structuring involves breaking down a large amount of cash into smaller transactions that fall below a specified threshold, or using different accounts, agents, locations, or days to conduct the transactions. Therefore, the fact that the two customers remit the same amount of funds, $2,500, each week to the same recipient in a high-risk country is a red flag for possible money laundering or terrorist financing activity, as it suggests that they are trying to evade the record keeping threshold of $3,000 for money transmitters in the United States12.

References:

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, page 27

FFIEC BSA/AML Appendices - Appendix F – Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Red Flags1

AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators? - ComplyAdvantage2