A bank maintains a number of United States (U.S.) dollar correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions. Upon a routine review of a U.S. dollar correspondent account owned by Foreign Bank A, a number of transactions appear to have been originated by Foreign Bank B outside the expected activity for this account. These transactions appear suspicious and a suspicious transaction report was filed by the compliance officer.
Which step should the compliance officer take?
File a report with the appropriate tax authorities in the jurisdictions of Foreign Bank A and Foreign Bank B
Notify senior management of the money laundering risks by allowing Foreign Bank A to maintain its U.S. dollar correspondent account
Notify Foreign Bank A of the discovery and seek documentation supporting Foreign Bank A was collusive and a willing partner with Foreign Bank B in the activity
Notify other U.S. financial institutions who maintain U.S. dollar correspondent accounts for Foreign Bank A and Foreign Bank B in an effort to shut down the activity
According to the FFIEC BSA/AML Manual1, a U.S. bank should have policies, procedures, and processes to monitor and report suspicious activity associated with U.S. dollar drafts, which are bank drafts or checks denominated in U.S. dollars and made available at foreign financial institutions. These drafts are drawn on a U.S. correspondent account by a foreign financial institution and can be used to facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing. The manual states that "[t]he potential for facilitating money laundering or terrorist financing, OFAC violations, and other serious crimes increases when a U.S. bank is unable to identify and adequately understand the transactions of the ultimate users (all or most of whom are outside of the United States) of its account with a foreign correspondent."2 Therefore, the compliance officer should notify Foreign Bank A of the discovery and seek documentation supporting Foreign Bank A was collusive and a willing partner with Foreign Bank B in the activity, as this would indicate a breach of the correspondent banking agreement and a possible violation of U.S. laws and regulations. The compliance officer should also document the findings and actions taken, and escalate the matter to senior management and the board of directors as appropriate.
The other options are not the best steps for the compliance officer to take. Option A is not relevant, as the issue is not related to tax evasion, but to money laundering or terrorist financing. Option B is premature, as the compliance officer should first verify the nature and extent of the suspicious activity and the involvement of Foreign Bank A before deciding whether to terminate or restrict the correspondent relationship. Option D is not feasible, as the compliance officer does not have the authority or the means to notify other U.S. financial institutions who maintain U.S. dollar correspondent accounts forForeign Bank A and Foreign Bank B, and this could also interfere with ongoing investigations or law enforcement actions.
FFIEC BSA/AML Manual, Risks Associated with Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, U.S. Dollar Drafts
Denting Dirty Dollar-Clearing: US Court of Appeals Upholds Money-Laundering Convictions Based on the Use of US Correspondent Banking Accounts, Freshfields Blog
AMLA Expands DOJ Grand Jury Subpoena Power Over Correspondent Bank Accounts and Foreign Banks, Money Laundering News
A precious metals dealer opens a new account with a bank. Which requires a referral to AML Investigations for further review?
International outgoing wires to diamond dealers that are part of the diamond pipeline.
Payments received on the account reference unknown companies in the instructions.
International incoming payments from foreign companies in which the precious metals dealer has an established relationship.
Multiple daily point of sale transactions from third parties that appear to be individuals.
payments received on the account that reference unknown companies in the instructions indicate a possible attempt to obscure the source or purpose of the funds. This could be a sign of money laundering, tax evasion, fraud, or other illicit activities. Such payments should be referred to AML Investigations for further review and verification of the identity and legitimacy of the companies involved.
FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones, page 18, paragraph 57: “The dealer should also pay attention to the information provided by the customer on the source and origin of the funds or assets, and verify it where possible. For example, the dealer should be alert to situations where the customer provides vague, incomplete or inconsistent information about the source and origin of the funds or assets, or where the information provided does not match with the customer’s profile or business activity.”
Risk-Based Approach For Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones (DPMS), section “Business-based risk approach”, sub-section “2- Geographical location”: “You must also assess the geographical location of your business and the countries you deal with. You must be aware of the countries that are high-risk or non-cooperative jurisdictions as per the FATF recommendations. You must also consider the countries that are subject to sanctions, embargoes, or similar measures issued by the United Nations, the European Union, or any other relevant organization. You must also be careful of the countries that are known to have significant levels of corruption, organized crime, or terrorist activity.”
What are the Risks of Money Laundering for Precious Metals Dealers?, section “Money Laundering Red Flags for DPMS”, bullet point 4: “The customer provides vague, incomplete, or inconsistent information about the source and origin of the funds or assets.”
A compliance officer is conducting a review of the automated transaction monitoring system. What would be most likely to result in a change in the monitoring system parameters?
The local paper runs stories that sully the institution’s reputation in the marketplace
Law enforcement issues a subpoena for a particular customer’s account records
The national Financial intelligence Unit issues new risk indicators
The institution’s creditworthiness thresholds change
An automated transaction monitoring system is a tool that analyzes transactions and customer behavior for signs of money laundering or other financial crimes, and generates alerts when suspicious or unusual activity is detected. The system relies on a set of rules and parameters that define what constitutes normal and abnormal transactions, based on the risk profile and business nature of the financial institution or business. These rules and parameters need to be periodically reviewed and updated to ensure that they are effective and compliant with the latest regulations and best practices.
One of the factors that would most likely result in a change in the monitoring system parameters is when the national Financial intelligence Unit (FIU) issues new risk indicators. The FIU is a central authority that collects, analyzes, and disseminates financial intelligence related to money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes. The FIU also provides guidance and feedback to financial institutions and businesses on how to comply with their anti-money laundering (AML) obligations and improve their transaction monitoring systems. The FIU may issue new risk indicators based on its analysis of emerging trends, typologies, and threats in the financial sector, or based on international standards and recommendations. These risk indicators are intended to help financial institutions and businesses identify and report suspicious transactions more effectively and efficiently.
Therefore, when the FIU issues new risk indicators, the financial institution or business should review its existing monitoring system parameters and adjust them accordingly to reflect the new risks and scenarios. For example, the FIU may issue new risk indicators related to the use of cryptocurrencies, virtual assets, or online platforms for money laundering or terrorist financing. In that case, the financial institution or business should update its monitoring system parameters to include new rules, thresholds, or patterns that capture these activities and generate alerts for further investigation.
1: The Complete Guide to Transaction Monitoring: Everything to Know
2: AML Scenarios: Transaction Monitoring Challenges
3: Setting AML Transaction Monitoring Thresholds
4: Automated Transaction Monitoring – Considerations for System Implementation
5: ACAMS (2020). CAMS Certification Package (6th Edition)
Which activity would require an update to the first line training program?
The implementation of a new system that provides information for monitoring customer accounts.
The expansion to customer segments that will utilize newly established products.
The maintenance of regulatory requirements for onboarding documentation collections of a customer base.
The onboarding of a new customer type which was previously reviewed and risk rated.
The first line training program is the training that is provided to the employees who are directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the business, such as sales, customerservice, or compliance staff1. The first line training program should cover the essential knowledge and skills that are required for the employees to perform their roles effectively and in compliance with the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) policies and procedures of the organization2. The first line training program should also be updated regularly to reflect any changes in the business environment, the regulatory framework, the customer base, the products and services, or the risk assessment of the organization2.
Among the four activities listed, the one that would require an update to the first line training program is the expansion to customer segments that will utilize newly established products. This is because the new customer segments and products may pose different or higher AML/CFT risks than the existing ones, and the employees need to be aware of these risks and how to mitigate them. For example, the new customer segments may include politically exposed persons, non-resident customers, or high-net-worth individuals, who may have higher exposure to corruption, tax evasion, or fraud risks3. The new products may include prepaid cards, mobile payments, or cryptocurrencies, which may have higher vulnerability to money laundering, terrorist financing, or cybercrime risks. Therefore, the first line training program should be updated to include the relevant information and guidance on how to identify, verify, monitor, and report these new customer segments and products, and how to apply the appropriate customer due diligence and transaction monitoring measures2.
The other three activities do not necessarily require an update to the first line training program, unless they involve significant changes in the AML/CFT policies and procedures of the organization. The implementation of a new system that provides information for monitoring customer accounts may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the existing AML/CFT processes, but it does not change the nature or level of the AML/CFT risks. The maintenance of regulatory requirements for onboarding documentation collections of a customer base is a routine and ongoing task that should already be covered by the existing first line training program. The onboarding of a new customer type which was previously reviewed and risk rated does not introduce any new AML/CFT risks, as long as the risk rating and the corresponding controls are consistent with the organization’s risk appetite and policy.
1: What is First Line of Defense? | Definition and Overview
2: Training and Awareness | FATF
3: Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22) | FATF
Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers | FATF
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