Swift CSP-Assessor Online Access

Alliance Lite2 is a cloud-based solution for smaller institutions, providing a lightweight interface to the SWIFT network. The messaging operator in Alliance Lite2 is a role responsible for managing message-related activities, typically through the Alliance Lite2 Business Application (L2BA) interface. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Can create and modify messages

This is correct. The primary role of a messaging operator in Alliance Lite2 is to create and modify SWIFT messages, such as payment instructions (e.g., MT103) or other FIN messages. This is a core function of the L2BA interface, which provides a browser-based platform for operators to input, edit, and send messages. SWIFT documentation for Alliance Lite2 confirms that messaging operators have the necessary permissions to perform these tasks, aligning with the operational workflows supported by the platform.

•Option B: Can assign RBAC roles to RMA operators and messaging operators

This is incorrect. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) role assignment in Alliance Lite2 is typically managed by a security officer or administrator role, not the messaging operator. The messaging operator’s scope is limited to message-related activities, not user or role management. In Alliance Lite2, RBAC is managed through the Alliance Web Platform, where a security officer (e.g., LSO) assigns roles to operators, including RMA (Relationship Management Application) operators and messaging operators. The CSCF Control "6.1 Security Awareness" emphasizes the separation of duties, ensuring that operational roles like messaging operators do not overlap with administrative roles.

•Option C: Can approve the Customer Security Officer change requests

This is incorrect. Approving Customer Security Officer (CSO) change requests is a high-level administrative task that falls under the purview of SWIFT’s security and compliance processes, often involving SWIFT’s support team or a designated administrator within the institution. In Alliance Lite2, this responsibility does not lie with the messaging operator, whose role is focused on message handling. The CSCF mandates strict controls for CSO changes, typically requiring multi-party approval outside the messaging operator’s scope.

•Option D: Can approve messages

This is correct. In Alliance Lite2, messaging operators can approve messages as part of the workflow, depending on the institution’s configuration. For example, a message created by one operator may require approval by another operator (or the same operator if configured with dual roles) before it is sent to the SWIFT network. This approval process ensures accuracy and compliance with internal controls, a feature supported by the L2BA interface in Alliance Lite2. SWIFT documentation highlights this capability as part of the messaging workflow.

Summary of Correct Answers:

The messaging operator in Alliance Lite2 can create and modify messages (A) and can approve messages (D), consistent with their operational role.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 6.1 emphasizes role separation, limiting messaging operators to message-related tasks.

•SWIFT Alliance Lite2 Documentation: Details the messaging operator’s role in creating, modifying, and approving messages via L2BA.

•SWIFT Security Guidelines: Highlights administrative roles for RBAC and CSO changes, excluding messaging operators.

This question asks whether a Swift user can implement security controls (e.g., logging and monitoring) in systems not directly in scope of the CSCF. Let’s analyze this based on Swift CSP guidelines.

Step 1: Define CSCF Scope and Security Controls

TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024defines its scope as the Swift-related infrastructure, including messaging interfaces, communication interfaces, and operator systems (asdetailed in Question 4). Security controls likelogging and monitoringare mandated underControl Objective 6: Detect Anomalous Activity, specifically in controls likeControl 6.1: Security Event Logging.

Step 2: Analyze the Question

The question focuses on whether a Swift user can apply CSCF security controls (e.g., logging and monitoring) to systemsnot directly in scopeof the CSCF. Systems not in scope include back-office systems, general-purpose servers, or other infrastructure that does not directly process Swift messages or connect to the Swift network.

Step 3: Evaluate Swift CSP Guidance

The CSCF mandates that security controls must be applied to in-scope systems to ensure the security of the Swift environment. However, Swift also encourages adefense-in-depthapproach, as outlined in theSwift Customer Security Programme – Security Best Practices. This approach recommends extending security practices beyond the minimum scope to enhance overall security.

Control 6.1: Security Event Loggingrequires logging and monitoring for in-scope systems to detect anomalous activity. While this control is mandatory for in-scope systems, the CSCF does not prohibit applying similar controls to out-of-scope systems. In fact, theSwift CSP FAQ(available on swift.com) clarifies that users may implement additional security measures on out-of-scope systems to reduce risks to the Swift environment (e.g., monitoring back-office systems that interact with Swift middleware).

Implementing logging and monitoring on out-of-scope systems can help detect threats that might indirectly affect the Swift environment, such as lateral movement from a compromised back-office system to a Swift-related system.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

A Swift usercanchoose to implement security controls like logging and monitoring on systems not directly in scope of the CSCF. This is not mandatory but is considered a best practice under Swift’s defense-in-depth strategy. The CSCF does not restrict users from applying additional security measures beyond its defined scope, and such actions align with the broader goal of enhancing cybersecurity across the user’s environment.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 6.1: Security Event Logging.

Swift Customer Security Programme – Security Best Practices, Section: Defense-in-Depth.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Scope and Applicability of Security Controls.

CSCF Control "3.1 Database Integrity" focuses on ensuring the integrity of databases used by SWIFT-related components. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Nothing is further expected when the messaging interface or connector integrates/embeds an integrity check functionality at each SWIFT transaction record level

This is incorrect as a sole expectation. While embedding integrity checks (e.g., checksums or hashes) in a messaging interface or connector is a valid measure, the CSCF expects additional protections for the database itself, not just reliance on application-level checks. The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" requires broader database security.

•Option B: When a database is used by a messaging interface or connector, the related hosted database and its supporting system is expected to be protected as a SWIFT-related component, the identified exceptions alerted and followed-up

This is correct. Control 3.1 mandates that databases supporting SWIFT components (e.g., storing transaction data for Alliance Access) be protected as in-scope components. This includes securing the database and its system (e.g., via access controls, encryption) and addressing integrity exceptions through alerts and follow-up, as detailed in the "Assessment template for Mandatory controls."

•Option C: Alerts generated from performed integrity checks are captured and analyzed for appropriate treatment

This is correct. The CSCF expects institutions to monitor database integrity (e.g., via logging) and analyze alerts to detect and respond to anomalies, aligning with Control "3.1" and "5.1 Operational Incident Response." The "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" includes this as a compliance criterion.

Summary of Correct Answers:

The CSCF expects the database and its system to be protected with alerts and follow-up (B) and alerts to be captured and analyzed (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 3.1 defines database integrity requirements.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Includes protection and alert management.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Tests database integrity measures.

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This question addresses the internet connectivity restriction control and its application to CSCF in-scope components. Let’s verify this against Swift CSP guidelines.

Step 1: Understand the Internet Connectivity Restriction Control

TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, underControl 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restriction, mandates that in-scope components (e.g., Swift messaging interfaces, communication interfaces) must not have direct internet access to prevent exposure to external threats. However, this control allows for exceptions under specific conditions.

Step 2: Analyze the Statement

The statement claims that the internet connectivity restriction control “prevents having internet access on any CSCF in-scope components.” The key is to determine if this is an absolute prohibition or if exceptions exist.

Step 3: Evaluate Against CSCF Guidelines

Control 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restrictionrequires that Swift-related systems be isolated from the internet to minimize attack surfaces. This includes components like messaging interfaces (e.g., Alliance Access) and communication interfaces (e.g., SNL).

However, theCSCF v2024andSwift CSP FAQallow for controlled internet access under specific circumstances, such as:

Use of secure tunnels (e.g., VPNs) or proxies for authorized management purposes.

Temporary access for software updates or patches, provided it is tightly controlled and monitored (perControl 6.1: Security Event Logging).

The control does not impose an absolute ban but requires that any internet access be restricted, audited, and justified. Thus, the statement that it “prevents having internet access on any CSCF in-scope components” is too absolute.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The statement isFALSEbecause, while internet access is heavily restricted for in-scope components, it is not entirely prevented under all circumstances (e.g., controlled access for maintenance). This aligns with the flexible yet secure approach of theCSCF v2024.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restriction.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Internet Access Exceptions.