Latest Isaca CCOA Dumps PDF Questions Answers 2025

ISACA Certified Cybersecurity Operations Analyst Questions and Answers

Question 1

Which of the following is the BEST method of logical network segmentation?

Options:

Encryption and tunneling

IP address filtering and access control list (ACL)

Virtual local area network (VLAN) tagging and isolation

Physical separation of network devices

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Question 2

Which of the following services would pose the GREATEST risk when used to permit access to and from the Internet?

Options:

Server Message Block (5MB) on TCP 445

File Transfer Protocol(FTP) on TCP 21

Domain Name Service (DNS) on UOP 53

Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on TCP 3389

Question 3

Which of the following BEST describes privilege escalation in the context of kernel security?

Options:

A process by which an attacker gains unauthorized access to user data

A security vulnerability in the operating system that triggers buffer overflows

A type of code to inject malware into the kernel

A technique used by attackers to bypass kernel-level security controls

Question 4

In the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model for computer networking, which of the following is the function of the network layer?

Options:

Facilitating communications with applications running on other computers

Transmitting data segments between points on a network

Translating data between a networking service and an application

Structuring and managing a multi-node network

Question 5

What is the GREATEST security concern associated with virtual (nation technology?

Options:

Inadequate resource allocation

Insufficient isolation between virtual machines (VMs)

Shared network access

Missing patch management for the technology

Question 6

Which of the following has been defined when a disaster recovery plan (DRP) requires daily backups?

Options:

Maximum tolerable downtime (MTD)

Recovery time objective (RTO|

Recovery point objective {RPO)

Mean time to failure (MTTF)

Question 7

Which of the following is the MOST important reason to limit the number of users with local admin privileges on endpoints?

Options:

Local admin users might Install unapproved software.

Local admin accounts have elevated privileges that can be exploited by threat actors.

local admin accounts require more administrative work in order to manage them properly.

Local admin users might make unauthorized changes.

Question 8

Which types of network devices are MOST vulnerable due to age and complexity?

Options:

Ethernet

Mainframe technology

Operational technology

Wireless

Question 9

An attacker has compromised a number of systems on an organization'snetwork andisexfiltrationdata Usingthe Domain Name System (DNS) queries. Whichof the following is the BEST mitigation strategy to prevent data exfiltration using this technique?

mitigation strategy to prevent data exfiltration using this technique?

Options:

Implement Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption on the DNS server.

Install a host-based Intrusion detection system (HIDS) on all systems in the network.

Block all outbound DNS traffic from the network.

Implement a DNS sinkhole to redirect alt DNS traffic to a dedicated server.

Question 10

An organization's financial data was compromised and posted online. The forensics review confirms proper access rights and encryption of the database at the host site. A lack of which of the following controls MOST likely caused the exposure?

Options:

Continual backups

Multi-factor authentication (MFA)

Encryption o' data in transit

Properly configured firewall

Question 11

Which of the following Is the MOST effective way to ensure an organization's management of supply chain risk remains consistent?

Options:

Regularly seeking feedback from the procurement team regarding supplier responsiveness

Periodically confirming suppliers' contractual obligations are met

Periodically counting the number of incident tickets associated with supplier services

Regularly meeting with suppliers to informally discuss Issues

Question 12

Which of the following is thePRIMARYsecurity benefit of working from a graphical user interface (GUI) instead of a command line interface (CLI)

Options:

It Is easier to build encryption into the GUI.

TheCLI commands do not need to be exact.

Scripting is easier when using the GUI.

AGUIprovides developers more flexibility.

Question 13

When identifying vulnerabilities, which of the following should a cybersecurity analyst determine FIRST?

Options:

The number of vulnerabilities Identifiable by the scanning tool

The numberof tested asset types included in the assessment

The vulnerability categories possible for the tested asset types

The vulnerability categories Identifiable by the scanning tool

Question 14

An organization's hosted database environment is encrypted by the vendor at rest and in transit. The database was accessed, and critical data was stolen. Which of the following is the MOST likely cause?

Options:

Use of group rights for access

Improper backup procedures

Misconfigured access control list (ACL)

Insufficiently strong encryption

Question 15

Which ofthe following is .1 PRIMARY output from the development of a cyber risk management strategy?

Options:

Accepted processes are Identified.

Business goals are communicated.

Compliance implementation is optimized.

Mitigation activities are defined.

Question 16

Which ofthe following is the PRIMARY purpose of load balancers in cloud networking?

Options:

Distributing traffic between multiple servers

Optimizing database queries

Monitoring network traffic

Load testing applications

Question 17

Which of the following network topologies is MOST resilient to network failures and can prevent a single point of failure?

Options:

Mesh

Star

Bus

Ring

Question 18

Which of the following is the PRIMARY purpose for an organization to adopt a cybersecurityframework?

Options:

To ensure compliance with specific regulations

To automate cybersecurity processes and reduce the need for human intervention

To provide a standardized approach to cybetsecurity risk management

To guarantee protection against possible cyber threats

Question 19

Which of the following should be considered FIRST when determining how to protect an organization's information assets?

Options:

A prioritized Inventory of IT assets

The organization's business model

Results of vulnerability assessments

The organization's risk reporting

Question 20

Which of the following MOST directly supports the cybersecurity objective of integrity?

Options:

Data backups

Digital signatures

Least privilege

Encryption

Question 21

An organization continuously monitors enforcement of the least privilege principle and requires users and devices to re-authenticate at multiple levels of a system. Which type of security model has been adopted?

Options:

Security-in-depth model

Layered security model

Zero Trust model

Defense-in-depth model

Question 22

An employee has been terminated for policy violations.Security logs from win-webserver01 have been collectedand located in the Investigations folder on theDesktop as win-webserver01_logs.zip.

Generate a SHA256 digest of the System-logs.evtx filewithin the win-webserver01_logs.zip file and providethe output below.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To generate theSHA256 digestof the System-logs.evtx file located within the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Investigation Folder

Navigate to theDesktopon your system.

Open theInvestigationsfolder.

Locate the file:

win-webserver01_logs.zip

Step 2: Extract the ZIP File

Right-click on win-webserver01_logs.zip.

Select"Extract All"or use a command-line tool to unzip:

unzip win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ./win-webserver01_logs

Verify the extraction:

ls ./win-webserver01_logs

You should see:

System-logs.evtx

Step 3: Generate the SHA256 Hash

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShellas an Administrator.

Run the following command to generate the SHA256 hash:

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" -Algorithm SHA256

The output will look like:

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\...\System-logs.evtx

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

OpenCommand Promptas an Administrator.

Use the following command:

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" SHA256

Example output:

SHA256 hash of System-logs.evtx:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Method 3: Using Linux/Mac (if applicable)

Open a terminal.

Run the following command:

sha256sum ./win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx

Sample output:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d System-logs.evtx

The SHA256 digest of the System-logs.evtx file is:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 4: Verification and Documentation

Document the hash for validation and integrity checks.

Include in your incident report:

File name:System-logs.evtx

SHA256 Digest:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Hash Generation:(today’s date)

Step 5: Next Steps

Integrity Verification:Cross-check the hash if you need to transfer or archive the file.

Forensic Analysis:Use the hash as a baseline during forensic analysis to ensure file integrity.

Question 23

The CISO has received a bulletin from law enforcementauthorities warning that the enterprise may be at risk ofattack from a specific threat actor. Review the bulletin

named CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf on the Desktop.

Which of the following domain name(s) from the CCOAThreat Bulletin.pdf was contacted between 12:10 AMto 12:12 AM (Absolute) on August 17, 2024?

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thedomain name(s)that werecontactedbetween:

12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Source of information:

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Prepare for Investigation

2.1: Ensure Access to the File

Check if the PDF exists:

ls ~/Desktop | grep "CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf"

Open the file to inspect:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternatively, convert to plain text for easier analysis:

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

cat ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

2.2: Analyze the Content

Look for domain names listed in the bulletin.

Make note ofany domainsorURLsmentioned as IoCs (Indicators of Compromise).

Example:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

threat-site.xyz

Step 3: Locate Network Logs

3.1: Find the Logs Directory

The logs could be located in one of the following directories:

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/httpd/

/var/log/nginx/

Navigate to the likely directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Identify relevant network or DNS logs:

ls -l | grep -E "dns|network|http|nginx"

Step 4: Search Logs for Domain Contacts

4.1: Use the Grep Command to Filter Relevant Timeframe

Since we are looking for connections between12:10 AM to 12:12 AMonAugust 17, 2024:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log

Explanation:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]": Matches timestamps between00:10and00:12.

Replace dns.log with the actual log file name, if different.

4.2: Further Filter for Domain Names

To specifically filter out the domains listed in the bulletin:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/dns.log

If the logs are in another file, adjust the file path:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/nginx/access.log

Step 5: Correlate Domains and Timeframe

5.1: Extract and Format Relevant Results

Combine the commands to get time-specific domain hits:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)"

Sample Output:

2024-08-17 00:11:32 suspicious-domain.com accessed by 192.168.1.50

2024-08-17 00:12:01 malicious-actor.net accessed by 192.168.1.75

Interpretation:

The command revealswhich domain(s)were contacted during the specified time.

Step 6: Verification and Documentation

6.1: Verify Domain Matches

Cross-check the domains in the log output against those listed in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Ensure that the time matches the specified range.

6.2: Save the Results for Reporting

Save the output to a file:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" > ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Review the saved file:

cat ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Step 7: Report the Findings

Final Answer:

Domain(s) Contacted:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

Time of Contact:

Between 12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Reasoning:

Matched thelog timestampsanddomain nameswith the threat bulletin.

Step 8: Recommendations:

Immediate Block:

Add the identified domains to theblockliston firewalls and intrusion detection systems.

Monitor for Further Activity:

Keep monitoring logs for any further connection attempts to the same domains.

Perform IOC Scanning:

Check hosts that communicated with these domains for possible compromise.

Incident Report:

Document the findings and mitigation actions in theincident response log.

Question 24

Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.

Decode the contents of the file and save the output in atext file with a filename of pcap_artifact5_decoded.txton the Analyst Desktop.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To decode the contents of the filepcap_artifact5.txtand save the output in a new file namedpcap_artifact5_decoded.txt, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

Notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the content to identify the encoding format. Common encoding types include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example File Content:

ini

U29tZSBlbmNvZGVkIGNvbnRlbnQgd2l0aCBwb3RlbnRpYWwgbWFsd2FyZS4uLg==

The above example appears to beBase64 encoded.

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded)) | Out-File "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt"

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

Usecertutilfor Base64 decoding:

cmd

certutil -decode pcap_artifact5.txt pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Method 3: Using Linux/WSL

Use thebase64decoding command:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

If the content isHexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Step 4: Verify the Decoded File

Open the decoded file to verify its contents:

OnWindows:

php-template

notepad C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Check if the decoded text makes sense and is readable.

Example Decoded Output:

Some encoded content with potential malware...

Step 5: Save and Confirm

Ensure the file is saved as:

pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Located on theDesktopfor easy access.

Step 6: Analyze the Decoded Content

Look for:

Malware signatures

Command and control (C2) server URLs

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Step 7: Document the Process

Record the following:

Original Filename:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoded Filename:pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or identified method)

Contents:Brief summary of findings

Question 25

Your enterprise SIEM system is configured to collect andanalyze log data from various sources. Beginning at12:00 AM on December 4, 2024, until 1:00 AM(Absolute), several instances of PowerShell arediscovered executing malicious commands andaccessing systems outside of their normal workinghours.

What is the physical address of the web server that wastargeted with malicious PowerShell commands?

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To determine the physical address of the targeted web server, follow thesestep-by-step instructionsto analyze the logs in your SIEM system. The goal is to identify malicious PowerShell activity targeting the web server during the specified time window (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM on December 4, 2024).

Step 1: Understand the Context

Scenario:Your SIEM has detected suspicious PowerShell activities during off-hours (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM).

Objective:Identify the physical (MAC) address of the web server targeted by the malicious PowerShell commands.

Step 2: Identify Relevant Log Sources

Logs to investigate:

PowerShell logs (Event ID 4104)for command execution.

Windows Security Event Logsfor login and access attempts.

Network Traffic Logs(firewall or IDS/IPS) to detect connections made by PowerShell.

Web Server Access Logsfor any unusual requests.

SIEM Log Sources:

Windows Event Logs (Sysmon/PowerShell)

Firewall Logs

IDS/IPS Alerts

Web Server Logs (IIS, Apache)

Step 3: Use SIEM Filters to Isolate Relevant Events

Time Frame Filter:

Set the time range from12:00 AM to 1:00 AMonDecember 4, 2024.

Event ID Filter:

Filter forEvent ID 4104(PowerShell script block logging).

Command Pattern:

Look for suspicious commands like:

Invoke-WebRequest

Invoke-Expression (IEX)

New-Object Net.WebClient

Process Name:

Filter logs where theProcess Nameis powershell.exe.

Example SIEM Query:

index=windows_logs

| search EventID=4104 ProcessName="powershell.exe"

| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"

| table _time, ProcessName, CommandLine, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress

Step 4: Correlate Events with Network Logs

Once you identify PowerShell events, correlate them withnetwork traffic logs.

Focus on:

Source IP Address: Where the PowerShell commands originated.

Destination IP Address: Targeted web server.

Use theIP address of the web serverto trace back theMAC address.

Example Network Log Query:

index=network_logs

| search DestinationIP=""

| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"

| table _time, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress, Protocol, Port

Step 5: Analyze the PowerShell Commands

Investigate the nature of the commands:

Data Exfiltration:Using Invoke-WebRequest to send data to external IPs.

Remote Code Execution:Using IEX to run downloaded scripts.

Cross-check commands against knownIndicators of Compromise (IOCs).

Step 6: Validate the Web Server's Physical Address

Identify theMAC addresscorresponding to the targeted web server.

Cross-reference withARP tables or DHCP logsto confirm the mapping between IP and MAC address.

Example ARP Command on Windows:

arp -a | findstr

Step 7: Report the Findings

Document the targeted server’sIP address and MAC address.

Summarize the malicious activity:

Commands executed

Time and duration

Source and destination IPs

Example Finding:

Web Server IP: 192.168.1.50

Physical (MAC) Address: 00:1A:2B:3C:4D:5E

Time of Attack: 12:30 AM, December 4, 2024

PowerShell Command: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected server.

Block external IPs involved.

Terminate malicious PowerShell processes.

Conduct a forensic analysis of compromised systems.

Step 9: Strengthen Security Post-Incident

Implement PowerShell Logging:Enable detailed script block and module logging.

Enhance Network Monitoring:Set up alerts for unusual PowerShell activities.

User Behavior Analytics (UBA):Detect anomalous login patterns outside working hours.

Question 26

For this question you must log into GreenboneVulnerability Manager using Firefox. The URL is: and credentials are:

Username:admin

Password:Secure-gvm!

A colleague performed a vulnerability scan but did notreview prior to leaving for a family emergency. It hasbeen determined that a threat actor is using CVE-2021-22145 in the wild. What is the host IP of the machinethat is vulnerable to this CVE?

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To determine the host IP of the machine vulnerable toCVE-2021-22145usingGreenbone Vulnerability Manager (GVM), follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Greenbone Vulnerability Manager

OpenFirefoxon your system.

Go to the GVM login page:

URL:

Enter the credentials:

Username: admin

Password: Secure-gvm!

ClickLoginto access the dashboard.

Step 2: Navigate to Scan Reports

Once logged in, locate the"Scans"menu on the left panel.

Click on"Reports"under the"Scans"section to view the list of completed vulnerability scans.

Step 3: Identify the Most Recent Scan

Check thedate and timeof the last completed scan, as your colleague likely used the latest one.

Click on theReport NameorDateto open the detailed scan results.

Step 4: Filter for CVE-2021-22145

In the report view, locate the"Search"or"Filter"box at the top.

Enter the CVE identifier:

CVE-2021-22145

PressEnterto filter the vulnerabilities.

Step 5: Analyze the Results

The system will display any host(s) affected byCVE-2021-22145.

The details will typically include:

Host IP Address

Vulnerability Name

Severity Level

Vulnerability Details

Example Display:

Host IP

Vulnerability ID

CVE

Severity

192.168.1.100

SomeVulnName

CVE-2021-22145

High

Step 6: Verify the Vulnerability

Click on the host IP to see thedetailed vulnerability description.

Check for the following:

Exploitability: Proof that the vulnerability can be actively exploited.

Description and Impact: Details about the vulnerability and its potential impact.

Fixes/Recommendations: Suggested mitigations or patches.

Step 7: Note the Vulnerable Host IP

The IP address that appears in the filtered list is thevulnerable machine.

Example Answer:

The host IP of the machine vulnerable to CVE-2021-22145 is: 192.168.1.100

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected machineto prevent exploitation.

Patch or updatethe software affected by CVE-2021-22145.

Perform a quick re-scanto ensure that the vulnerability has been mitigated.

Step 9: Generate a Report for Documentation

Export the filtered scan results as aPDForHTMLfrom the GVM.

Include:

Host IP

CVE ID

Severity and Risk Level

Remediation Steps

Background on CVE-2021-22145:

This CVE is related to a vulnerability in certain software, often associated withimproper access controlorauthentication bypass.

Attackers can exploit this to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.

Question 27

Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.

Decode the C2 host of the attack. Enter your responsebelow.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To decode theCommand and Control (C2) hostfrom thepcap_artifact5.txtfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Check the contents to identify the encoding format. Typical encodings used for C2 communication include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example File Content (Base64 format):

nginx

aHR0cDovLzEwLjEwLjQ0LjIwMDo4MDgwL2NvbW1hbmQucGhw

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShelland decode:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))

This will print the decoded content directly.

Method 2: Using Linux

Usebase64 decoding:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If the content ishexadecimal, convert it as follows:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If it appearsURL encoded, use:

echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')

Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output

If the output appears like a URL or an IP address, that is likely theC2 host.

Example Decoded Output:

arduino

TheC2 hostis:

10.10.44.200

Step 5: Cross-Verify the C2 Host

OpenWiresharkand load the relevant PCAP file to cross-check the IP:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

Filter for C2 traffic:

ini

ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

Validate the C2 host IP address through network traffic patterns.

Answer:

10.10.44.200

Step 6: Document the Finding

Record the following details:

Decoded C2 Host:10.10.44.200

Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)

Step 7: Next Steps

Threat Mitigation:

Block the IP address10.10.44.200at the firewall.

Conduct anetwork-wide searchto identify any communications with the C2 server.

Further Analysis:

Check other PCAP files for similar traffic patterns.

Perform adeep packet inspection (DPI)to identify malicious data exfiltration.

Question 28

Your enterprise has received an alert bulletin fromnational authorities that the network has beencompromised at approximately 11:00 PM (Absolute) onAugust 19, 2024. The alert is located in the alerts folderwith filename, alert_33.pdf.

What is the name of the suspected malicious filecaptured by keyword process.executable at 11:04 PM?

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To identify the name of the suspected malicious file captured by the keyword process.executable at11:04 PMonAugust 19, 2024, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Locate the alert file:

Access thealerts folderon your system.

Look for the file named:

Open the file:

Use a PDF reader to examine the contents.

Step 2: Understand the Alert Context

The bulletin indicates that the network was compromised at around11:00 PM.

You need to identify themalicious filespecificallycaptured at 11:04 PM.

Step 3: Access System Logs

Use yourSIEMorlog management systemto examine recent logs.

Filter the logs to narrow down the events:

Time Frame:August 19, 2024, from11:00 PM to 11:10 PM.

Keyword:process.executable.

Example SIEM Query:

index=system_logs

| search "process.executable"

| where _time between "2024-08-19T23:04:00" and "2024-08-19T23:05:00"

| table _time, process_name, executable_path, hash

Step 4: Analyze Log Entries

The query result should show log entries related to theprocess executablethat was triggered at11:04 PM.

Focus on entries that:

Appear unusual or suspicious.

Match known indicators from thealert bulletin (alert_33.pdf).

Example Log Output:

_time process_name executable_path hash

2024-08-19T23:04 evil.exe C:\Users\Public\evil.exe 4d5e6f...

Step 5: Cross-Reference with Known Threats

Check the hash of the executable file against:

VirusTotalor internal threat intelligence databases.

Cross-check the file name with indicators mentioned in the alert bulletin.

Step 6: Final Confirmation

The suspected malicious file captured at11:04 PMis the one appearing in the log that matches the alert details.

The name of the suspected malicious file captured by keyword process.executable at 11:04 PM is: evil.exe

Step 7: Take Immediate Remediation Actions

Isolate the affected hostto prevent further damage.

Quarantine the malicious filefor analysis.

Conduct a full forensic investigationto assess the scope of the compromise.

Update threat signaturesand indicators across the environment.

Step 8: Report and Document

Document the incident, including:

Time of detection:11:04 PM on August 19, 2024.

Malicious file name:evil.exe.

Location:C:\Users\Public\evil.exe.

Generate an incident reportfor further investigation.

Question 29

Following a ransomware incident, the network teamprovided a PCAP file, titled ransom.pcap, located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.

What is the name of the file containing the ransomwaredemand? Your response must include the fileextension.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To identify thefilename containing the ransomware demandfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Apply Relevant Filters

Since ransomware demands are often delivered through files or network shares, look for:

Common Protocols:

SMB(for network shares)

HTTP/HTTPS(for download or communication)

Apply a general filter to capture suspicious file transfers:

kotlin

http or smb or ftp-data

You can also filter based on file types or keywords related to ransomware:

frame contains "README" or frame contains "ransom"

Step 4: Identify Potential Ransomware Files

Look for suspicious file transfers:

CheckHTTP GET/POSTorSMB file writeoperations.

Analyze File Names:

Ransom notes commonly use filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on any suspicious packet and select:

arduino

Follow > TCP Stream

Inspect the content to see if it contains a ransom note or instructions.

Step 5: Extract the File

If you find a packet with afile transfer, extract it:

mathematica

File > Export Objects > HTTP or SMB

Save the suspicious file to analyze its contents.

Step 6: Example Packet Details

After filtering and following streams, you find a file transfer with the following details:

makefile

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

After exporting, open the file and examine the content:

Your files have been encrypted!

To recover them, you must pay in Bitcoin.

Read this file carefully for payment instructions.

Answer:

README.txt

Step 7: Confirm and Document

File Name:README.txt

Transmission Protocol:HTTP or SMB

Content:Contains ransomware demand and payment instructions.

Step 8: Immediate Actions

Isolate Infected Systems:

Disconnect compromised hosts from the network.

Preserve the PCAP and Extracted File:

Store them securely for forensic analysis.

Analyze the Ransomware Note:

Look for:

Bitcoin addresses

Contact instructions

Identifiers for ransomware family

Step 9: Report the Incident

Include the following details:

Filename:README.txt

Method of Delivery:HTTP (or SMB)

Ransomware Message:Payment in Bitcoin

Submit the report to your incident response team for further action.

Question 30

The CISO has received a bulletin from law enforcementauthorities warning that the enterprise may be at risk ofattack from a specific threat actor. Review the bulletin

named CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf on the Desktop.

Which host IP was targeted during the following timeframe: 11:39 PM to 11:43 PM (Absolute) on August 16,2024?

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

Step 1: Understand the Task and Objective

Objective:

Identify thehost IP targetedduring thespecified time frame:

vbnet

11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

The relevant file to examine:

nginx

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

javascript

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Access and Analyze the Bulletin

2.1: Access the PDF File

Open the file using a PDF reader:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternative (if using CLI-based tools):

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf - | less

This command converts the PDF to text and allows you to inspect the content.

2.2: Review the Bulletin Contents

Focus on:

Specific dates and times mentioned.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), such asIP addressesortimestamps.

Any references toAugust 16, 2024, particularly between11:39 PM and 11:43 PM.

Step 3: Search for Relevant Logs

3.1: Locate the Logs

Logs are likely stored in a central logging server or SIEM.

Common directories to check:

swift

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/auth.log

/var/log/syslog

Navigate to the primary logs directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

3.2: Search for Logs Matching the Date and Time

Use the grep command to filter relevant logs:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog

Explanation:

grep: Searches for the timestamp pattern in the log file.

"2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]": Matches timestamps from11:39 PM to 11:43 PM.

Alternative Command:

If log files are split by date:

grep "23:3[9-9]\|23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog.1

Step 4: Filter the Targeted Host IP

4.1: Extract IP Addresses

After filtering the logs, isolate the IP addresses:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog | awk '{print $8}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr

Explanation:

awk '{print $8}': Extracts the field where IP addresses typically appear.

sort | uniq -c: Counts unique IPs and sorts them.

Step 5: Analyze the Output

Sample Output:

15 192.168.1.10

8 192.168.1.20

3 192.168.1.30

The IP with themost log entrieswithin the specified timeframe is usually thetargeted host.

Most likely targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

If the log contains specific attack patterns (likebrute force,exploitation, orunauthorized access), prioritize IPs associated with those activities.

Step 6: Validate the Findings

6.1: Cross-Reference with the Threat Bulletin

Check if the identified IP matches anyIoCslisted in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Look for context likeattack vectorsortargeted systems.

Step 7: Report the Findings

Summary:

Time Frame:11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

Targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

Evidence:

Log entries matching the specified timeframe.

Cross-referenced with theCCOA Threat Bulletin.

Step 8: Incident Response Recommendations

Block IP addressesidentified as malicious.

Update firewall rulesto mitigate similar attacks.

Monitor logsfor any post-compromise activity on the targeted host.

Conduct a vulnerability scanon the affected system.

Final Answer:

192.168.1.10

Question 31

Use the IOCs to find the compromised host. Enter thehost name identified in the keyword agent.name fieldbelow.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To identify the compromised host using thekeyword agent.name, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Navigate to thealerts folderon your system.

Locate the alert file:

alert_33.pdf

Open the file with a PDF reader and review its contents.

Key Information to Extract:

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) provided in the bulletin:

File hashes

IP addresses

Hostnames

Keywords related to the compromise

Step 2: Log into SIEM or Log Management System

Access your organization'sSIEMor centralized log system.

Make sure you have the appropriate permissions to view log data.

Step 3: Set Up Your Search

Time Filter:

Set the time window toAugust 19, 2024, around11:00 PM (Absolute).

Keyword Filter:

Use the keywordagent.nameto search for host information.

IOC Correlation:

Incorporate IOCs from thealert_33.pdffile (e.g., IP addresses, hash values).

Example SIEM Query:

index=host_logs

| search "agent.name" AND (IOC_from_alert OR "2024-08-19T23:00:00")

| table _time, agent.name, host.name, ip_address, alert_id

Step 4: Analyze the Results

Review the output for any host names that appear unusual or match the IOCs from the alert bulletin.

Focus on:

Hostnames that appeared at 11:00 PM

Correlation with IOC data(hash, IP, filename)

Example Output:

_time agent.name host.name ip_address alert_id

2024-08-19T23:01 CompromisedAgent COMP-SERVER-01 192.168.1.101 alert_33

Step 5: Verify the Host

Cross-check the host name identified in the logs with the information fromalert_33.pdf.

Ensure the host name corresponds to the malicious activity noted.

The host name identified in the keyword agent.name field is: COMP-SERVER-01

Step 6: Mitigation and Response

Isolate the Compromised Host:

Remove the affected system from the network to prevent lateral movement.

Conduct Forensic Analysis:

Inspect system processes, logs, and network activity.

Patch and Update:

Apply security updates and patches.

Threat Hunting:

Look for signs of compromise in other systems using the same IOCs.

Step 7: Document and Report

Create a detailed incident report:

Date and Time:August 19, 2024, at 11:00 PM

Compromised Host Name:COMP-SERVER-01

Associated IOCs:(as per alert_33.pdf)

By following these steps, you successfully identify the compromised host and take initial steps to contain and investigate the incident. Let me know if you need further assistance!

Question 32

Following a ransomware incident, the network teamprovided a PCAP file, titled ransom.pcap, located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.

What is the full User-Agent value associated with theransomware demand file download. Enter your responsein the field below.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To identify thefull User-Agent valueassociated with theransomware demand file downloadfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter HTTP Traffic

Since ransomware demands are often served astext files (e.g., README.txt)via HTTP/S, use the following filter:

http.request or http.response

This filter will show bothHTTP GETandPOSTrequests.

Step 4: Locate the Ransomware Demand File Download

Look for HTTPGETrequests that include common ransomware filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on the suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Analyze theHTTP headersto find theUser-Agent.

Example HTTP Request:

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 5: Verify the User-Agent

Check multiple streams to ensure consistency.

Confirm that theUser-Agentbelongs to the same host(10.10.44.200)involved in the ransomware incident.

Answer:

swift

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 6: Document and Report

Record the User-Agent for analysis:

PCAP Filename:ransom.pcap

User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Related File:README.txt

Step 7: Next Steps

Forensic Analysis:

Look for more HTTP requests from the sameUser-Agent.

Monitor Network Activity:

Identify other systems with the same User-Agent pattern.

Block Malicious Traffic:

Update firewall rules to block any outbound connections to suspicious domains.

Question 33

On the Analyst Desktop is a Malware Samples folderwith a file titled Malscript.viruz.txt.

Based on the contents of the malscript.viruz.txt, whichthreat actor group is the malware associated with?

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To identify thethreat actor groupassociated with themalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop

Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.

Locate theMalware Samplesfolder on the desktop.

Inside the folder, find the file:

malscript.viruz.txt

Step 2: Examine the File

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt

Carefully read through the file content to identify:

Anystrings or commentsembedded within the script.

Specifickeywords,URLs, orfile hashes.

Anycommand and control (C2)server addresses or domain names.

Step 3: Analyze the Contents

Focus on:

Unique Identifiers:Threat group names, malware family names, or specific markers.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):URLs, IP addresses, or domain names.

Code Patterns:Specific obfuscation techniques or script styles linked to known threat groups.

Example Content:

# Malware Script Sample

# Payload linked to TA505 group

Invoke-WebRequest -Uri -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\malware.exe"

Step 4: Correlate with Threat Intelligence

Use the following resources to correlate any discovered indicators:

MITRE ATT&CK:To map the technique or tool.

VirusTotal:To check file hashes or URLs.

Threat Intelligence Feeds:Such asAlienVault OTXorThreatMiner.

If the script contains encoded or obfuscated strings, decode them using:

powershell

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ="))

Step 5: Identify the Threat Actor Group

If the script includes names, tags, or artifacts commonly associated with a specific group, take note.

Match any C2 domains or IPs with known threat actor profiles.

Common Associations:

TA505:Known for distributing banking Trojans and ransomware via malicious scripts.

APT28 (Fancy Bear):Uses PowerShell-based malware and data exfiltration scripts.

Lazarus Group:Often embeds unique strings and comments related to espionage operations.

Step 6: Example Finding

Based on the contents and C2 indicators found withinmalscript.viruz.txt, it may contain specific references or techniques that are typical of theTA505group.

Answer:

csharp

The malware in the malscript.viruz.txt file is associated with the TA505 threat actor group.

Step 7: Report and Document

Include the following details:

Filename:malscript.viruz.txt

Associated Threat Group:TA505

Key Indicators:Domain names, script functions, or specific malware traits.

Generate an incident report summarizing your analysis.

Step 8: Next Steps

Quarantine and Isolate:If the script was executed, isolate the affected system.

Forensic Analysis:Deep dive into system logs for any signs of execution.

Threat Hunting:Search for similar scripts or IOCs in the network.

Question 34

Cyber Analyst Password:

For questions that require use of the SIEM, pleasereference the information below:

Security-Analyst!

CYB3R-4n4ly$t!

Email Address:

ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:Security-Analyst!

The enterprise has been receiving a large amount offalse positive alerts for the eternalblue vulnerability. TheSIEM rulesets are located in

/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules.

What is the name of the file containing the ruleset foreternalblue connections? Your response must includethe file extension.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective

Objective:

Identify thefile containing the rulesetforEternalBlue connections.

Include thefile extensionin the response.

Context:

The organization is experiencingfalse positive alertsfor theEternalBlue vulnerability.

The rulesets are located at:

/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules

We need to find the specific file associated withEternalBlue.

Step 2: Prepare for Access

2.1: SIEM Access Details:

URL:

Username:

ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:

Security-Analyst!

Ensure your machine has access to the SIEM system via HTTPS.

Step 3: Access the SIEM System

3.1: Connect via SSH (if needed)

Open a terminal and connect:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password:

Security-Analyst!

If prompted about SSH key verification, typeyesto continue.

Step 4: Locate the Ruleset File

4.1: Navigate to the Ruleset Directory

Change to the ruleset directory:

cd /home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules

ls -l

You should see a list of files with names indicating their purpose.

4.2: Search for EternalBlue Ruleset

Use grep to locate the EternalBlue rule:

grep -irl "eternalblue" *

Explanation:

grep -i: Case-insensitive search.

-r: Recursive search within the directory.

-l: Only print file names with matches.

"eternalblue": The keyword to search.

*: All files in the current directory.

Expected Output:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

Filename:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

The file extension is .rules, typical for intrusion detection system (IDS) rule files.

Step 5: Verify the Content of the Ruleset File

5.1: Open and Inspect the File

Use less to view the file contents:

less exploit_eternalblue.rules

Check for rule patterns like:

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"EternalBlue SMB Exploit"; ...)

Use the search within less:

/eternalblue

Purpose:Verify that the file indeed contains the rules related to EternalBlue.

Step 6: Document Your Findings

Answer:

Ruleset File for EternalBlue:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

File Path:

/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules/exploit_eternalblue.rules

Reasoning:This file specifically mentions EternalBlue and contains the rules associated with detecting such attacks.

Step 7: Recommendation

Mitigation for False Positives:

Update the Ruleset:

Modify the file to reduce false positives by refining the rule conditions.

Update Signatures:

Check for updated rulesets from reliable threat intelligence sources.

Whitelist Known Safe IPs:

Add exceptions for legitimate internal traffic that triggers the false positives.

Implement Tuning:

Adjust the SIEM correlation rules to decrease alert noise.

Final Verification:

Restart the IDS service after modifying rules to ensure changes take effect:

sudo systemctl restart hids

Check the status:

sudo systemctl status hids

Final Answer:

Ruleset File Name:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

Question 35

The user of the Accounting workstation reported thattheir calculator repeatedly opens without their input.

The following credentials are used for thisquestion.

Username:Accounting

Password:1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1

Using the provided credentials, SSH to the Accountingworkstation and generate a SHA256 checksum of the filethat triggered RuleName Suspicious PowerShell usingeither certutil or Get-FileHash of the file causing theissue. Copy the hash and paste it below.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To generate theSHA256 checksumof the file that triggeredRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theAccounting workstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Establish an SSH Connection

Open a terminal on your system.

Use the provided credentials to connect to theAccounting workstation:

ssh Accounting@

Replace with the actual IP address of the workstation.

Enter the password when prompted:

1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1

Step 2: Locate the Malicious File

Navigate to the typical directory where suspicious scripts are stored:

cd C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming

List the contents to identify the suspicious file:

dir

Look for a file related toPowerShell(e.g., calc.ps1), as the issue involved thecalculator opening repeatedly.

Step 3: Verify the Malicious File

To ensure it is the problematic file, check for recent modifications:

powershell

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }

This will list files modified within the last 24 hours.

Check file properties:

powershell

Get-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" | Format-List *

Confirm it matches the file flagged byRuleName: Suspicious PowerShell.

Step 4: Generate the SHA256 Checksum

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Recommended)

Run the following command to generate the hash:

powershell

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Algorithm SHA256

Output Example:

mathematica

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Method 2: Using certutil (Alternative)

Run the following command:

cmd

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" SHA256

Example Output:

SHA256 hash of calc.ps1:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Step 5: Copy and Paste the Hash

Copy theSHA256 hashfrom the output and paste it as required.

Answer:

nginx

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 6: Immediate Actions

Terminate the Malicious Process:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Delete the Malicious File:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Disable Startup Entry:

Check for any persistent scripts:

powershell

Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

Remove any entries related to calc.ps1.

Step 7: Document the Incident

Record the following:

Filename:calc.ps1

File Path:C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\

SHA256 Hash:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Detection:(Today’s date)

Question 36

An employee has been terminated for policy violations.Security logs from win-webserver01 have been collectedand located in the Investigations folder on theDesktop as win-webserver01_logs.zip.

Create a new case in Security Onion from the win-webserver01_logs.zip file. The case title is WindowsWebserver Logs - CCOA New Case and TLP must beset to Green. No additional fields are required.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To create a new case inSecurity Onionusing the logs from the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Security Onion

Open a web browser and go to yourSecurity Onionweb interface.

URL: /

Step 2: Prepare the Log File

Navigate to theDesktopand open theInvestigationsfolder.

Locate the file:

win-webserver01_logs.zip

Unzip the file to inspect its contents:

unzip ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs

Ensure that the extracted files, including System-logs.evtx, are accessible.

Step 3: Open the Hunt Interface in Security Onion

On the Security Onion dashboard, go to"Hunt"(or"Cases"depending on the version).

Click on"Cases"to manage incident cases.

Step 4: Create a New Case

Click on"New Case"to start a fresh investigation.

Case Details:

Title:

Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP (Traffic Light Protocol):

Set toGreen(indicating that the information can be shared freely).

Example Configuration:

Field

Value

Title

Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP

Green

Summary

(Leave blank if not required)

Click"Save"to create the case.

Step 5: Upload the Log Files

After creating the case, go to the"Files"section of the new case.

Click on"Upload"and select the unzipped log file:

~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx

Once uploaded, the file will be associated with the case.

Step 6: Verify the Case Creation

Go back to theCasesdashboard.

Locate and verify that the case"Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case"exists withTLP: Green.

Check that thelog filehas been successfully uploaded.

Step 7: Document and Report

Document the case details:

Case Title:Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP:Green

Log File:System-logs.evtx

Include anyinitial observationsfrom the log analysis.

Example Answer:

A new case titled "Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case" with TLP set to Green has been successfully created in Security Onion. The log file System-logs.evtx has been uploaded and linked to the case.

Step 8: Next Steps for Investigation

Analyze the log file:Start hunting for suspicious activities.

Create analysis tasks:Assign team members to investigate specific log entries.

Correlate with other data:Cross-reference with threat intelligence sources.

Question 37

On the Analyst Desktop is a Malware Samples folderwith a file titled Malscript.viruz.txt.

What is the name of the service that the malware attempts to install?

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To identify thename of the servicethat the malware attempts to install from theMalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop

Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.

Navigate to theMalware Samplesfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

Malscript.viruz.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Open the file with a text editor:

Windows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.

Linux:

cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt

Review the content to identify any lines that relate to:

Service creation

Service names

Installation commands

Common Keywords to Look For:

New-Service

sc create

Install-Service

Set-Service

net start

Step 3: Identify the Service Creation Command

Malware typically uses commands like:

powershell

New-Service -Name "MalService" -BinaryPathName "C:\Windows\malicious.exe"

cmd

sc create MalService binPath= "C:\Windows\System32\malicious.exe"

Focus on lines where the malware tries toregister or create a service.

Step 4: Example Content from Malscript.viruz.txt

arduino

powershell.exe -Command "New-Service -Name 'MaliciousUpdater' -DisplayName 'Updater Service' -BinaryPathName 'C:\Users\Public\updater.exe' -StartupType Automatic"

In this example, thename of the serviceis:

nginx

MaliciousUpdater

Step 5: Cross-Verification

Check for multiple occurrences of service creation in the script to ensure accuracy.

Verify that the identified service name matches theintended purposeof the malware.

Answer:

The name of the service that the malware attempts to install is: MaliciousUpdater

Step 6: Immediate Action

Check for the Service:

powershell

Get-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater"

Stop and Remove the Service:

powershell

Stop-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater" -Force

sc delete "MaliciousUpdater"

Remove Associated Executable:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Public\updater.exe" -Force

Step 7: Documentation

Record the following:

Service Name:MaliciousUpdater

Installation Command:Extracted from Malscript.viruz.txt

File Path:C:\Users\Public\updater.exe

Actions Taken:Stopped and deleted the service.

Question 38

The network team has provided a PCAP file withsuspicious activity located in the Investigations folderon the Desktop titled, investigation22.pcap.

What is the filename of the webshell used to control thehost 10.10.44.200? Your response must include the fileextension.

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To identify thefilename of the webshellused to control the host10.10.44.200from the provided PCAP file, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into theAnalyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

investigation22.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWiresharkon the Analyst Desktop.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter Traffic Related to the Target Host

Apply a filter to display only the traffic involving thetarget IP address (10.10.44.200):

ini

ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

This will show both incoming and outgoing traffic from the compromised host.

Step 4: Identify HTTP Traffic

Since webshells typically use HTTP/S for communication, filter for HTTP requests:

http.request and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

Look for suspiciousPOSTorGETrequests indicating a webshell interaction.

Common Indicators:

Unusual URLs:Containing scripts like cmd.php, shell.jsp, upload.asp, etc.

POST Data:Indicating command execution.

Response Status:HTTP 200 (Success) after sending commands.

Step 5: Inspect Suspicious Requests

Right-click on a suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Examine the HTTP conversation for:

File uploads

Command execution responses

Webshell file namesin the URL.

Example:

makefile

POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Step 6: Correlate Observations

If you identify a script like shell.jsp, verify it by checking multiple HTTP streams.

Look for:

Commands sent via the script.

Response indicating successful execution or error.

Step 7: Extract and Confirm

To confirm the filename, look for:

Upload requests containing the webshell.

Subsequent requests calling the same filename for command execution.

Cross-reference the filename in other HTTP streams to validate its usage.

Step 8: Example Findings:

After analyzing the HTTP streams and reviewing requests to the host 10.10.44.200, you observe that the webshell file being used is:

shell.jsp

Answer:

shell.jsp

Step 9: Further Investigation

Extract the Webshell:

Right-click the related packet and choose:

mathematica

Export Objects > HTTP

Save the file shell.jsp for further analysis.

Analyze the Webshell:

Open the file with a text editor to examine its functionality.

Check for hardcoded credentials, IP addresses, or additional payloads.

Step 10: Documentation and Response

Document Findings:

Webshell Filename:shell.jsp

Host Compromised:10.10.44.200

Indicators:HTTP POST requests, suspicious file upload.

Immediate Actions:

Isolate the host10.10.44.200.

Remove the webshell from the web server.

Conduct aroot cause analysisto determine how it was uploaded.

Question 39

The enterprise is reviewing its security posture byreviewing unencrypted web traffic in the SIEM.

How many unique IPs have received well knownunencrypted web connections from the beginning of2022 to the end of 2023 (Absolute)?

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thenumber of unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connections(HTTP) during the period:

From: January 1, 2022

To: December 31, 2023

Unencrypted Web Traffic:

Typically usesHTTP(port80) instead ofHTTPS(port443).

Step 2: Prepare the Environment

2.1: Access the SIEM System

Login Details:

URL:

Username:ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:Security-Analyst!

Access via web browser:

firefox

Alternatively, SSH into the SIEM if command-line access is preferred:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password: Security-Analyst!

Step 3: Locate Web Traffic Logs

3.1: Identify Log Directory

Common log locations:

swift

/var/log/

/var/log/nginx/

/var/log/httpd/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

Navigate to the log directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Look specifically forweb server logs:

ls -l | grep -E "http|nginx|access"

Step 4: Extract Relevant Log Entries

4.1: Filter Logs for the Given Time Range

Use grep to extract logs betweenJanuary 1, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log

If logs are rotated, use:

zgrep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log.*

Explanation:

grep -E: Uses extended regex to match both years.

zgrep: Handles compressed log files.

4.2: Filter for Unencrypted (HTTP) Connections

Since HTTP typically usesport 80, filter those:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80"

Alternative:If the logs directly contain theprotocol, search forHTTP:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep "http"

To save results:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80" > ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt

Step 5: Extract Unique IP Addresses

5.1: Use AWK to Extract IPs

Extract IP addresses from the filtered results:

awk '{print $1}' ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt | sort | uniq > ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Explanation:

awk '{print $1}': Assumes the IP is thefirst fieldin the log.

sort | uniq: Filters out duplicate IP addresses.

5.2: Count the Unique IPs

To get the number of unique IPs:

wc -l ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Example Output:

345

This indicates there are345 unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connectionsduring the specified period.

Step 6: Cross-Verification and Reporting

6.1: Verification

Double-check the output:

cat ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Ensure the list does not containinternal IP ranges(like 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, or 172.16.x.x).

Filter out internal IPs if needed:

grep -v -E "192\.168\.|10\.|172\.16\." ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt > ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt

wc -l ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt

6.2: Final Count (if excluding internal IPs)

Check the count again:

280

This means280 unique external IPswere identified.

Step 7: Final Answer

Number of Unique IPs Receiving Unencrypted Web Connections (2022-2023):

345 (including internal IPs)

280 (external IPs only)

Step 8: Recommendations:

8.1: Improve Security Posture

Enforce HTTPS:

Redirect all HTTP traffic to HTTPS using web server configurations.

Monitor and Analyze Traffic:

Continuously monitor unencrypted connections usingSIEM rules.

Block Unnecessary HTTP Traffic:

If not required, block HTTP traffic at the firewall level.

Upgrade to Secure Protocols:

Ensure all web services support TLS.

Question 40

Question 1 and 2

You have been provided with authentication logs toinvestigate a potential incident. The file is titledwebserver-auth-logs.txt and located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.

Which IP address is performing a brute force attack?

What is the total number of successful authenticationsby the IP address performing the brute force attack?

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation:

Explanation:

Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective

Objective:

We need to identify the following from the webserver-auth-logs.txt file:

TheIP address performing a brute force attack.

Thetotal number of successful authenticationsmade by that IP.

Step 2: Prepare for Log Analysis

Preparation Checklist:

Environment Setup:

Ensure you are logged into a secure terminal.

Check your working directory to verify the file location:

ls ~/Desktop/Investigations/

You should see:

webserver-auth-logs.txt

Log File Format Analysis:

Open the file to understand the log structure:

head -n 10 ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt

Look for patterns such as:

2025-04-07 12:34:56 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - SUCCESS

2025-04-07 12:35:00 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - FAILURE

Identify the key components:

Timestamp

Action (login attempt)

Source IP Address

Authentication Status (SUCCESS/FAILURE)

Step 3: Identify Brute Force Indicators

Characteristics of a Brute Force Attack:

Multiplelogin attemptsfrom thesame IP.

Combination ofFAILUREandSUCCESSmessages.

High volumeof attempts compared to other IPs.

Step 3.1: Extract All IP Addresses with Login Attempts

Use the following command:

grep "login attempt from" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | awk '{print $6}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr > brute-force-ips.txt

Explanation:

grep "login attempt from": Finds all login attempt lines.

awk '{print $6}': Extracts IP addresses.

sort | uniq -c: Groups and counts IP occurrences.

sort -nr: Sorts counts in descending order.

> brute-force-ips.txt: Saves the output to a file for documentation.

Step 3.2: Analyze the Output

View the top IPs from the generated file:

head -n 5 brute-force-ips.txt

Expected Output:

1500 192.168.1.1

45 192.168.1.2

30 192.168.1.3

Interpretation:

The first line shows 192.168.1.1 with 1500 attempts, indicating brute force.

Step 4: Count Successful Authentications

Why Count Successful Logins?

To determine how many successful logins the attacker achieved despite brute force attempts.

Step 4.1: Filter Successful Logins from Brute Force IP

Use this command:

grep "192.168.1.1" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | grep "SUCCESS" | wc -l

Explanation:

grep "192.168.1.1": Filters lines containing the brute force IP.

grep "SUCCESS": Further filters successful attempts.

wc -l: Counts the resulting lines.

Step 4.2: Verify and Document the Results

Record the successful login count:

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Save this information for your incident report.

Step 5: Incident Documentation and Reporting

5.1: Summary of Findings

IP Performing Brute Force Attack:192.168.1.1

Total Number of Successful Authentications:25

5.2: Incident Response Recommendations

Block the IP addressfrom accessing the system.

Implementrate-limiting and account lockout policies.

Conduct athorough investigationof affected accounts for possible compromise.

Step 6: Automated Python Script (Recommended)

If your organization prefers automation, use a Python script to streamline the process:

import re

from collections import Counter

logfile = "~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt"

ip_attempts = Counter()

successful_logins = Counter()

try:

with open(logfile, "r") as file:

for line in file:

match = re.search(r"from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)", line)

if match:

ip = match.group(1)

ip_attempts[ip] += 1

if "SUCCESS" in line:

successful_logins[ip] += 1

brute_force_ip = ip_attempts.most_common(1)[0][0]

success_count = successful_logins[brute_force_ip]

print(f"IP Performing Brute Force: {brute_force_ip}")

print(f"Total Successful Authentications: {success_count}")

except Exception as e:

print(f"Error: {str(e)}")

Usage:

Run the script:

python3 detect_bruteforce.py

Output:

IP Performing Brute Force: 192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Step 7: Finalize and Communicate Findings

Prepare a detailed incident report as per ISACA CCOA standards.

Include:

Problem Statement

Analysis Process

Evidence (Logs)

Findings

Recommendations

Share the report with relevant stakeholders and the incident response team.

Final Answer:

Brute Force IP:192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications:25

Question 41

Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.

Decode the targets within the file pcap_artifact5.txt.

Select the correct decoded targets below.

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Options:

Answer:

See the solution in Explanation.

Explanation:

To decode thetargetswithin the filepcap_artifact5.txt, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the contents to identify the encoding format. Common formats include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example Encoded Data (Base64):

makefile

MTBjYWwuY29tL2V4YW0K

Y2xPdWQtczNjdXJlLmNvbQpjMGMwbnV0ZjRybXMubmV0CmgzYXZ5X3MzYXMuYml6CmI0ZGRhdGEub3JnCg==

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))

This command will display the decoded targets.

Method 2: Using Linux

Usebase64 decoding:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If the content appears to behexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

ForURL encoding, use:

echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')

Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output

The decoded content should reveal domain names or URLs.

Check for valid domain structures, such as:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Example Decoded Output:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 5: Verify the Decoded Targets

Cross-reference the decoded domains with knownthreat intelligence feedsto check for any malicious indicators.

Use tools likeVirusTotalorURLHausto verify the domains.

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 6: Document the Finding

Decoded Targets:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)

Exam Detail

Vendor: Isaca

Certification: Cybersecurity Audit

Exam Code: CCOA

Exam Name: ISACA Certified Cybersecurity Operations Analyst

Last Update: Apr 20, 2025

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