PDF HPE6-A78 Study Guide

When responding to the detection of a Rogue AP, it's important to consider legal implications and to gather forensic evidence:

You should receive permission before containing an AP (Option C), as containing it could disrupt service and may have legal implications, especially if the AP is on a network that the organization does not own.

For forensic purposes, it is essential to document the event by copying out logs with relevant information, such as the time the AP was detected and the AP's MAC address (Option D). This information could be crucial if legal action is taken or if a detailed analysis of the security breach is required.

Automatically containing an AP without consideration for the context (Options A and E) can be problematic, as it might inadvertently interfere with neighboring networks and cause legal issues. Immediate containment without consideration of company policy (Option B) could also violate established incident response procedures.

Referring to the exhibit, the ArubaOS Mobility Controller treats HTTPS packets based on the firewall rules applied to the client. The rule that allows svc-https service for destination IP range 10.1.0.0 255.255.0.0 would permit an HTTPS packet to 10.1.10.10 since this IP address falls within the specified range. There are no rules shown that would allow traffic to the IP address 203.0.13.5; hence, the packet to this address would be dropped.

The scenario involves an AOS-CX switch configured for 802.1X port-access authentication. The configuration defines several roles and their associated VLANs:

port-access role role1 vlan access 11: Role1 assigns VLAN 11.

port-access role role2 vlan access 12: Role2 assigns VLAN 12.

port-access role role3 vlan access 13: Role3 assigns VLAN 13.

port-access role role4 vlan access 14: Role4 assigns VLAN 14.

The switch has 802.1X authentication enabled globally (aaa authentication port-access dot1x authenticator enable). Two ports are configured:

Interface 1/1/1:

vlan access 1: Default VLAN is 1.

aaa authentication port-access critical-role role1: If the RADIUS server is unavailable, assign role1 (VLAN 11).

aaa authentication port-access preauth-role role2: Before authentication, assign role2 (VLAN 12).

aaa authentication port-access auth-role role3: After successful authentication, assign role3 (VLAN 13) unless overridden by a VSA.

Interface 1/1/2: Same configuration as 1/1/1.

Client1 on port 1/1/1:

Client1 authenticates successfully, and CPPM sends an Access-Accept with the VSA Aruba-User-Role: role4.

In AOS-CX, the auth-role (role3) is applied after successful authentication unless the RADIUS server specifies a different role via the Aruba-User-Role VSA. Since CPPM sends Aruba-User-Role: role4, and role4 exists on the switch, Client1 is assigned role4 (VLAN 14), overriding the default auth-role (role3).

Client2 on port 1/1/2:

Client2 does not attempt to authenticate (i.e., does not send 802.1X credentials).

In AOS-CX, if a client does not attempt authentication and no other authentication method (e.g., MAC authentication) is configured, the client is placed in the preauth-role (role2, VLAN 12). This role is applied before authentication or when authentication is not attempted, allowing the client limited access (e.g., to perform authentication or access a captive portal).

Option A, "Client1 = role3; Client2 = role2," is incorrect because Client1 should be assigned role4 (from the VSA), not role3.

Option B, "Client1 = role4; Client2 = role1," is incorrect because Client2 should be assigned the preauth-role (role2), not the critical-role (role1), since the RADIUS server is reachable (Client1 authenticated successfully).

Option C, "Client1 = role4; Client2 = role2," is correct. Client1 gets role4 from the VSA, and Client2 gets the preauth-role (role2) since it does not attempt authentication.

Option D, "Client1 = role3; Client2 = role1," is incorrect for the same reasons as Option A and Option B.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

"After successful 802.1X authentication, the AOS-CX switch assigns the client to the auth-role configured for the port (e.g., aaa authentication port-access auth-role role3). However, if the RADIUS server returns an Aruba-User-Role VSA (e.g., Aruba-User-Role: role4), and the specified role exists on the switch, the client is assigned that role instead of the auth-role. If a client does not attempt authentication and no other authentication method is configured, the client is assigned the preauth-role (e.g., aaa authentication port-access preauth-role role2), which provides limited access before authentication." (Page 132, 802.1X Authentication Section)

Additionally, the guide notes:

"The critical-role (e.g., aaa authentication port-access critical-role role1) is applied only when the RADIUS server is unavailable. The preauth-role is applied when a client connects but does not attempt 802.1X authentication." (Page 134, Port-Access Roles Section)

The AOS Security Dashboard in an AOS-8 solution (Mobility Controllers or Mobility Master) provides visibility into wireless threats detected by the Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system. The scenario describes a rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security. Ad hoc mode in 802.11 allows devices to communicate directly with each other without an access point (AP), forming a peer-to-peer network. Open security means no encryption or authentication is required to connect.

Ad Hoc Mode Threat: An ad hoc network created by a rogue device can pose significant risks, especially if a corporate client connects to it. Since ad hoc mode allows direct device-to-device communication, a client that joins the ad hoc network might inadvertently bridge the corporate LAN to the rogue network, especially if the client is also connected to the corporate network (e.g., via a wired connection or another wireless interface).

Option B, "It could open a backdoor into the corporate LAN for unauthorized users," is correct. If a corporate client connects to the rogue ad hoc network (e.g., due to a misconfiguration or auto-connect setting), the client might bridge the ad hoc network to the corporate LAN, allowing unauthorized users on the ad hoc network to access corporate resources. This is a common threat with ad hoc networks, as they bypass the security controls of the corporate AP infrastructure.

Option A, "It could be attempting to conceal itself from detection by changing its BSSID and SSID frequently," is incorrect. While changing BSSID and SSID can be a tactic to evade detection, this is not a typical characteristic of ad hoc networks and is not implied by the scenario. Ad hoc networks are generally visible to WIP unless explicitly hidden.

Option C, "It is running in a non-standard 802.11 mode and could effectively jam the wireless signal," is incorrect. Ad hoc mode is a standard 802.11 mode, not a non-standard one. While a rogue device could potentially jam the wireless signal, this is not a direct threat posed by ad hoc mode with open security.

Option D, "It is flooding the air with many wireless frames in a likely attempt at a DoS attack," is incorrect. There is no indication in the scenario that the rogue radio is flooding the air with frames. While ad hoc networks can be used in DoS attacks, the primary threat in this context is the potential for unauthorized access to the corporate LAN.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"A rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security poses a significant threat, as it can open a backdoor into the corporate LAN. If a corporate client connects to the ad hoc network, it may bridge the ad hoc network to the corporate LAN, allowing unauthorized users to access corporate resources. This is particularly dangerous if the client is also connected to the corporate network via another interface." (Page 422, Wireless Threats Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:

"Ad hoc networks detected by WIP are a concern because they can act as a backdoor into the corporate LAN. A client that joins an ad hoc network with open security may inadvertently allow unauthorized users to access the corporate network, bypassing the security controls of authorized APs." (Page 73, Ad Hoc Network Threats Section)