300-420 Exam Dumps : Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD) v1.1

Route leaking on R13 and R9 is required so the Level 1 area can make a better exit decision toward the server. In an IS-IS hierarchy, Level 1 routers know detailed topology only inside their own area. For destinations outside the area, they normally follow the closest attached Level 1/Level 2 router, which can produce suboptimal latency when another exit has a better end-to-end path. Route leaking selectively injects more specific Level 2 reachability information into Level 1, allowing routers in the New Office area to evaluate a better path instead of blindly following the nearest attached-bit exit. Changing metric style on R8 alone does not import the external-area route information needed for better path selection. A static route could force a path but would not be a scalable dynamic IS-IS design. Making R8 Level 1/Level 2 does not solve the need to expose the relevant route through the correct area boundary. Reference topics: IS-IS Level 1 and Level 2, attached bit, route leaking, interarea optimization, latency-aware routing.

The design must influence how EIGRP-learned routes are injected into the OSPF domain, so R2 should redistribute EIGRP into OSPF as metric-type E1 and R3 as metric-type E2. Cisco OSPF documentation distinguishes external Type 1 and Type 2 routes. An E1 route includes the external cost plus the internal OSPF cost to reach the ASBR, while an E2 route uses only the external metric. Cisco path selection prefers O E1 over O E2 for the same external destination. Therefore, making R2 advertise the EIGRP routes as E1 causes OSPF routers to prefer R2 as the exit toward the EIGRP domain. Option C adjusts OSPF-to-EIGRP redistribution, which is the wrong direction for traffic passing toward EIGRP from OSPF. Removing redistribution on R3 would reduce redundancy. Option D reverses the preference and would favor R3. Reference topics: OSPF external route types, EIGRP-to-OSPF redistribution, ASBR preference, E1 versus E2 metrics.

The correct code snippet must use a secure HTTPS-based RESTCONF transaction with the YANG JSON media type. The requirement explicitly states that the content type is application/yang-data+json and that the connection to the network device must be secured. In Cisco IOS XE programmability, RESTCONF uses HTTP methods against YANG-modeled resources, and secure deployments use HTTPS rather than clear-text HTTP. A loopback interface with address 172.16.15.12/32 would be configured by sending a JSON payload that follows the selected YANG model structure, commonly an IETF or Cisco native interface model, with the correct content-type and authentication headers. The key security indicator in the option must therefore be HTTPS/TLS, not an insecure HTTP URL or a non-YANG content type. NETCONF over SSH would also be secure, but the stated content-type points to RESTCONF with JSON encoding. Option A is the valid snippet because it aligns the payload format with a secure transport. Reference topics: RESTCONF, YANG JSON encoding, application/yang-data+json, HTTPS, IOS XE programmability.