Newly Released Isaca CISA Exam PDF

The major concern with the situation where security incidents are resolved and closed, but root causes are not investigated, is that vulnerabilities have not been properly addressed. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses or gaps in the security posture of an organization that can be exploited by threat actors to compromise its systems, data, or operations. If root causes are not investigated, vulnerabilities may remain undetected or unresolved, allowing attackers to exploit them again or use them asentry points for further attacks. This can result in repeated or escalated security incidents that can cause more damage or disruption to the organization.

The other options are not as major as the concern about vulnerabilities, but rather secondary or related issues that may arise from the lack of root cause analysis. Abuses by employees have not been reported is a concern that may indicate a lack of awareness, accountability, or monitoring of insider threats. Lessons learned have not been properly documented is a concern that may indicate a lack of improvement, learning, or feedback from security incidents. Security incident policies are out of date is a concern that may indicate a lack of alignment, review, or update of security incident processes.

References:

ISACA CISA Review Manual 27th Edition (2019), page 254

Why Root Cause Analysis is Crucial to Incident Response (IR) - Avertium3

Root Cause Analysis Steps and How it Helps Incident Response …

Segregation of duties (SoD) is a key internal control that aims to prevent fraud and errors by ensuring that no single individual can perform incompatible or conflicting tasks within a business process. SoD reduces the risk of unauthorized or improper transactions, manipulation of data, or misappropriation of assets.

In the accounts payable department, SoD involves separating the following functions: invoice processing, payment authorization, payment execution, and reconciliation. For example, the person who approves an invoice should not be the same person who issues the payment or reconciles the bank statement.

One of the best ways to ensure appropriate SoD within the accounts payable department is to restrict program functionality according to user security profiles. This means that each user of the accounts payable system should have a unique login and password, and should only have access to the functions that are relevant to their role and responsibilities. For instance, an invoice processor should not be able to approve payments or modify vendor records. This way, the system can enforce SoD and prevent unauthorized or fraudulent activities.

The other options are not as effective as restricting program functionality according to user security profiles. Restricting access to update programs to accounts payable staff only is a general access control measure, but it does not address the SoD issue within the accounts payable department. Including the creator’s user ID as a field in every transaction record created is a useful audit trail feature, but it does not prevent users from performing incompatible functions. Ensuring that audit trails exist for transactions is a detective control that can help identify and investigate any irregularities, but it does not prevent them from occurring in the first place.

The most important factor when planning a network audit is to identify the existing nodes on the network. Nodes are devices or systems that are connected to the network and can communicate with each other. Nodes can include servers, workstations, routers, switches, firewalls, printers, scanners, cameras, etc. Identifying the existing nodes on the network will help the auditor to determine the scope, objectives, and methodology of the audit. It will also help the auditor to assess the network topology, architecture, performance, security, and compliance. References:

CISA Review Manual (Digital Version)

CISA Questions, Answers & Explanations Database

 The most critical finding for an IS auditor following up on a recent security incident is that the security weakness facilitating the attack was not identified. This finding indicates that the root cause of the incident was not analyzed, and the vulnerability that allowed the attack to succeed was not remediated. This means that the organization is still exposed to the same or similar attacks in the future, and its security posture has not improved. Identifying and addressing the security weakness is a key step in the incident response process, as it helps to prevent recurrence, mitigate impact, and improve resilience.

The other findings are not as critical as the failure to identify the security weakness, but they are still important issues that should be addressed by the organization. The attack was not automatically blocked by the intrusion detection system (IDS) is a finding that suggests that the IDS was not configured properly, or that it did not have the latest signatures or rules to detect and prevent the attack. The attack could not be traced back to the originating person is a finding that implies that the organization did not have sufficient logging, monitoring, or forensic capabilities to identify and attribute the attacker. Appropriate response documentation was not maintained is a finding that indicates that the organization did not follow a consistent and formal incident response procedure, or that it did not document its actions, decisions, and lessons learned from the incident.

References:

ISACA CISA Review Manual 27th Edition (2019), page 254

Incident Response Process - ISACA1

Incident Response: How to Identify and Fix Security Weaknesses