ISA ISA-IEC-62443 Exam With Confidence Using Practice Dumps

The ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards is divided into four main parts, each covering a different aspect of industrial automation and control systems (IACS) cybersecurity1:

• Part 1: Terminology, Concepts, and Models
• Part 2: Policies and Procedures
• Part 3: System Requirements
• Part 4: Component Requirements The part 4 of the series focuses on the requirements for the secure development and maintenance of products that are used in IACS, such as controllers, sensors, actuators, network devices, software applications, and cloud services. The part 4 consists of two standards1:

According to the ISA/IEC 62443-3-2 standard, a security zone is a grouping of systems and components based on their functional, logical, and physical relationship that share common security requirements. The primary objective of defining a security zone is to apply a consistent level of protection to the assets within the zone, based on their criticality and risk assessment. A security zone may contain assets from different vendors, different levels in the Purdue model, or different physical locations, as long as they have the same security requirements. A security zone may also be subdivided into subzones, if there are different security requirements within the zone. A conduit is a logical or physical grouping of communication channels connecting two or more zones that share common security requirements.

References:

• ISA/IEC 62443-3-2:2020, Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 3-2: Security risk assessment for system design, Clause 4.3.21
• ISA/IEC 62443-1-1:2009, Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 1-1: Terminology, concepts and models, Clause 3.2.42

One of the reasons for the increase in attacks on IACS is the availability of information and tools that can be used to exploit vulnerabilities in these systems. The Internet provides a platform for hackers, researchers, and activists to share their knowledge and techniques for compromising IACS. Some examples of such information and tools are:

• Stuxnet: A sophisticated malware that targeted the Iranian nuclear program in 2010. It exploited four zero-day vulnerabilities in Windows and Siemens software to infect and manipulate the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that controlled the centrifuges. Stuxnet was widely analyzed and reported by the media and security experts, and its source code was leaked online1.
• Metasploit: A popular penetration testing framework that contains modules for exploiting various IACS components and protocols. For instance, Metasploit includes modules for attacking Modbus, DNP3, OPC, and Siemens S7 devices2.
• Shodan: A search engine that allows users to find devices connected to the Internet, such as webcams, routers, printers, and IACS components. Shodan can reveal the location, model, firmware, and configuration of these devices, which can be used by attackers to identify potential targets and vulnerabilities3.
• ICS-CERT: A website that provides alerts, advisories, and reports on IACS security issues and incidents. ICS-CERT also publishes vulnerability notes and mitigation recommendations for various IACS products and vendors4. These sources of information and tools can be useful for legitimate purposes, such as security testing, research, and education, but they can also be misused by malicious actors who want to disrupt, damage, or steal from IACS. Therefore, IACS owners and operators should be aware of the threats and risks posed by the Internet and implement appropriate security measures to protect their systems. References:
• The increase in attacks on Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) can be attributed to several factors, including: A.Use of proprietary communications protocols:These can pose security risks because they may not have been designed with security in mind and are often not as well-tested against security threats as more standard protocols. C.Knowledge of exploits and tools readily available on the Internet:The availability of information about vulnerabilities and exploits on the internet has made it easier for attackers to target IACS.
• The other options, B and D, are incorrect because: B. The move towards commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems, protocols, and networks actually increases risk because these systems are more likely to be known and targeted by attackers, compared to proprietary systems which might benefit from security through obscurity. D. There is actually an increase in risk with more personnel with system knowledge because it enlarges the attack surface – each individual with system knowledge can potentially become a vector for an attack, either maliciously or accidentally.